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ELECTRIFYING COPYRIGHT NORMS AND MAKING
CYBERSPACE MORE LIKE A BOOK
ANN BARToW*

ABSTRACT

The first half of this Article charts the evolving but eminently ascertainable social norms of the use of analog copyrighted works by individuals, and characterizes these norms as "what is" in real space and "what
ought to be" in cyberspace. The Author argues that while "what is" in the
analog world may be imperfect, uncertain and unsatisfactory at times, it
represents a discernible practicalequilibrium upon which copyright holders' ability to control and extract income from their works is balanced
against the rights of fair users. Authors, content distributors and users
all make decisions within a familiar longstanding copyright framework,
within which lots of small scale unauthorized copying occurs, but content
creation and distribution is still adequately incentivized. Nevertheless,
"what is" in terms of real space copyright use norms is not making the
transition to cyberspace, and will not, absent legislative intervention. Instead, copyright owners are using the attributes of digitalizationto realize
their own normative view of "what ought to be," absolute control over
copyrighted works that are embodied in electronicformats.
Using the specific example of non-profit libraries, the second half of
this Article explains how society will suffer if analogcopyright use norms
are not electrified and "what is" becomes dramatically altered in the digital domain: Individuals will lose traditional levels of access to informational works and be deprived of familiar ways and means of using
copyrighted works. In consequence, their respectfor copyrights is likely to
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erode as the distributive goals of the copyright system are correspondingly
unfutfilled.
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INTRODUCTION

AWS have both functional and expressive aspects.' When 30 million
people exchange music files over the Internet, 2 federal judges can

rule that the file trading infringes copyrights and they can enjoin online
services and technologies that facilitate the file trading. 3 What these ju1. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Injustice and the Normative Nature of Meaning, 60
L. REv. 578, 579 (2001) (noting both normative and expressive aspects).
2. See, e.g., Janelle Brown, The Gnutelta Paradox, SALON (Sept. 29, 2000), at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/09/29/gnutella paradox/print.html
(stating Napster has 30 million users); Schools Recess on Napster, WIRED (Aug. 30,
2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,38525,00.html (stating Napster has 25 million users).
3. See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-28 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding defendant likely engaged in secondary and vicarious copyright infringement and noting that "[u]ses of copyrighted material that are not fair uses
are rightfully enjoined"); see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F.
Supp. 2d 349, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs were entitled to partial
summary judgment because defendant had infringed plaintiffs' copyrights). The
recording industry's massive legal attack has forced some file-sharing services out
of business, while forcing others to adopt a "strike-first" strategy. See Brad King &
Jeffery Terraciano, Scour: Going, Going, Gone, WIRED (Dec. 12, 2000), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,40632,00.html (reporting on liquidation of
Scour's assets, made necessary because of large expenditures by company to defend itself from industry lawsuits). But see Brad King, File Traders Take Aim at RIAA,
SYMPATICO (May 2, 2001), at http://computers.sympatico.ca/news/wired/stories/
0,1856,62,00/0,1572,43496-62,00.html (discussing file-trading service Aimster's
MD.
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rists cannot accomplish, however, is to make those 30 million people
"obey" the copyright laws, at least not as a matter of collective conscience.
Even more problematically, neither Congress nor the courts can seem to
articulate in a meaningful way what it means for an individual consumer to
respect copyrights. There is a growing disjuncture between the Copyright
Act, copyright case law and the ways individuals (in their consumptive capacities) have traditionally used, and would prefer to continue to use,
copyrighted content.
Pragmatic concerns that shift and evolve over time, rather than commonly held precepts of right and wrong, have long driven copyright law.
Copyright owners have a profit-maximizing normative view of copyrights
best described as "absolute control." This vision of a world in which permission must be obtained for every use of a copyrighted work conflicts not
only with the policies underlying the copyright laws, but also with the ways
in which copyrighted works have traditionally been accessed and experienced by copyright-consuming individuals. Yet recently, large scale copyrighted content owners have effectively positioned themselves as the
victims of an immoral citizenry that will "steal" copyrighted works at every
opportunity unless the laws and the courts intervene. In response, the
legislative and judicial branches of government have orchestrated and implemented changes to the copyright laws based on assumptions that copyrights (and the underlying creative works that copyrights "protect") are
increasingly imperiled, and that guarding them from the ravages of popular infringement requires progressively stricter safeguards.
There has always been tension between how individuals actually utilize copyrighted works and how copyright laws attempt to regulate such
use. Content owners have, for example, tried (sometimes successfully) to
4
use copyright law to prevent or control the use of photocopiers, the sale
5
of used books and the rental of videocassettes containing motion pictures. 6 Friction between the owners and consumers of copyrighted works,
preemptive lawsuit against recording industry, seeking finding that service's encrypted network does not violate copyright laws and explaining that suit may save
company from fate suffered by Napster and Scour).
4. See, e.g., Princeton U. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., Inc. 99 F.3d 1381, 1383
(6th Cir. 1996) (finding photocopying violated copyright laws); Am. Geophysical
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Basic Books, Inc. v.
Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same). But see
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. CI. 1973) (finding photocopying did not violate copyright laws).
5. See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (denying ability
of copyright holder to set future resale price of book); Doubleday, Doran & Co. v.
R.H. Macy & Co., 199 N.E. 409, 411 (N.Y. 1936) (rejecting power of state to fix
selling price of books); see also M.J. Rose, Are Authors Abused By Used?, WIRED (Mar.
19, 2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/cnlture/0,1284,51113,00.html (discussing online sale of used books).
6. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 63 (3d
Cir. 1986) (finding improper public performance of copyrighted works); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1984)
(same).
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however, has increased dramatically as the "physical embodiments" of
copyrighted works are increasingly available (often primarily and some7
times exclusively) in electronic formats.
Some digital technologies offer copyright owners the possibility of increased ease and efficiency in the creation, distribution, monitoring and
control of their copyrighted works. Other technological developments,
however, threaten the ability of content owners to control and profit from
their copyrighted content at all. Digital technologies and the Internet simultaneously increase both the risks of extensive copyright infringements,
and the potential rewards of large scale controlled distribution of copyrighted works. As a result, large-scale copyright owners are tryingthrough lobbying and litigation-to tailor copyright laws to favor technologies that support their goals and to enfeeble or eliminate those that do
not. The consequences for individual copyright users are that copyrighted
works in digital formats are increasingly subject to access and use controls.
Emerging copyright management techniques in the digital environment represent forced changes in the way copyrighted works are experienced by end users.8 Copyright consumers may be chafing under these
new access and use limitations, and reacting with increased hostility toward the very concept of copyright protections. New, rigidly enforced restrictions on use and access to copyrighted content, especially if
accompanied by increased costs, may motivate otherwise law-abiding copyright users to circumvent copyright controls (or at least to feel increasing
sympathy for those who do so). While they may facilitate higher profits
and more control over users, these restrictions do not appear to foster
enhanced or principled respect for copyrights. Instead, they may actually
be undermining the perceived legitimacy of the copyright laws among the
copyrighted work consuming populace. One overarching theme of this
Article is that if the government wants its citizens to respect copyrights, the
copyright laws as they are promulgated and enforced, must be more consistent, comprehensible and respectful of individuals' needs and experiences. Real space copyright use norms are defined for the purposes of
this Article as patterns of behavior associated with the end use of creative
or informational works. The copyright laws, both as drafted by Congress
and interpreted by the courts, must embrace and reflect longstanding copyright consumer use norms, rather than conflict with them, if they are to
elicit widespread compliance.
7. See, e.g., A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1011 (explaining how Internet can be
utilized to create MP3 files and transfer such files among users); UMG Recordings,
92 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (finding unlicensed copying of copyrighted music recordings
is not fair use); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 346
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that decryption software violated copyright laws); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d
624, 633 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying injunction
against handheld MP3 device).
8. The term "end user" is used to distinguish the ultimate user of a product
from other users of the product, such as installers and administrators.
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This Article also analyzes the possibility of codifying real space 9 norms
associated with use of copyrighted works in traditional ink-and-paper mediums in order to statutorily mandate a comparable level of access to information in digital formats. While the copyright laws have never been
uncomplicated nor clear-cut, the norms of real space use can be fairly
straightforwardly ascertained and documented. This Article posits that if
individuals could access and use digitalized copyrighted works in old, familiar ways, perhaps they would also restrain themselves to analog levels of
unauthorized copyright uses and infringements. It advocates adapting
pre-existing real space copyright use norms to electronic formats as a
mechanism for protecting the legitimate interests of copyright owners
without depriving individuals of the customary real space access to information provided by bound books and periodicals. The concept of codifying real space copyright use norms is then specifically explored as a
mechanism for enabling non-profit libraries to provide library patrons
with the same functional levels of access to information in electronic form,
and through cyberspace, that have long been enjoyed in real space with
respect to printed materials.
II.

THE INTERSECTION OF NoRMs

AND LAW

Over a decade ago, Robert Ellickson published a book that is widely
regarded as a seminal work on the role of norms in regulating social interactions, entitled Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes.10 After
studying formal and informal dispute resolution among Shasta County,
California cattle ranchers and their neighbors, Ellickson observed that the
small, close-knit community had developed its own set of internal rules for
addressing property damage caused by trespassing live-stock and for ensuring the construction and repair of boundary fences. Based on the results
of his research, he hypothesized that members of close-knit groups tend to
govern their interactions by developing informal norms that maximized
the objective welfare of group members. 1 1 Where such informal governance occurred, Ellickson argued, a legal system could appropriately defer
9. The term "real space" is used rather than "meat space" largely because the
author is a vegetarian.
10. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE Dis-

(1991); see also Richard H. McAdams, Comment, Accounting for Norms, 1997
Wis. L. REV. 625, 631-32 (discussing Ellickson's views on societal incorporation of
norms with law).
PUTES

11. ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 282-83. Ellickson identified five varieties of

norms: Substantive norms, which define the conduct that is to be rewarded or
punished; remedial norms, which establish whether reward or punishment is appropriate, and the form and degree of reward or punishment if any; procedural
norms, which determine how information is gathered and acted upon by those
who impose sanctions; constitutive norms, which establish the internal structures
of norm governance; and controller-selecting norms, which administer choices between alternative sets of rules, such as between those of the relevant legal system
and those of an informal, norm-based dispute resolution mechanism. See id. at
132-36.
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to the group's informal practices by giving substantial weight to applicable
custom. Nevertheless, he asserted that legal rules would become more important when the social distance between disputants increased, when the
magnitude of a dispute increased and when the legal system allowed dis12
putants to externalize costs to third parties.
Informal norms are those that develop outside the confines of structured organizations, as contrasted with "formal norms" imposed by a centralized governing body, which are better described as rules. The norms
referred to in this Article are of the informal variety, unless otherwise
noted. They are also herein restricted to "end user norms," those directly
associated with the utilization of copyrighted works as a matter of ultimate
consumption. The norms related to using copyrighted works to create
new works that may enhance or compete with the original work are very
important and equally deserving of exploration, but are not considered
here.
Isolating a specific norm, establishing the precise moment when a
norm is formulated or adopted, articulating the rationale for a particular
norm and charting the contours of any given cognizable norm are all subjective determinations invariably fraught with ambiguity. Eric Posner has
written that norms resemble common law doctrines more than they resemble statutes because they reflect a societal desire for flexible situational
justice, but they are not constrained by the concern for consistency that
jurists often impose on applications of common law doctrines. 13 This, he
asserted, makes it more difficult to describe a norm than to articulate a
doctrine of the common law. In Posner's estimation, "[n]orms are
fuzzy."'1

4

Steven Hetcher has similarly observed that "[t]here is a systematic ambiguity . . .in the social-scientific conception of a norm, between

norms understood as rules and norms understood as patterns of
15
behavior."
Discussion of the role of norms in legal scholarship has frequently
surfaced in conjunction with both the "law and society" and "law and economics" approaches to legal analysis, which offer radically differing perspectives. 16 One of Ellickson's many contributions to norms discourse was
12. See id. at 283 (describing factors that lead to resolution of disputes
through law rather than through norms).
13. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
1697, 1700 (1996) (exploring use and definition of "norm").
14. Id. at 1699.
15. Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15
HARv.J.L. & TECH. 149, 154 (2001).
16. See ELLICSON, supra note 10, at 7-8 (discussing acrimony between both
groups). Ellickson defines the diffences between both camps in this manner: "To
exaggerate only a little, the law-and-economics scholars believe that the law-andsociety scholars group is deficient in both sophistication and rigor, and the lawand-society scholars believe that the law-and-economics theorists are not only out
of touch with reality but also short on humility." Id.; see also generally Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization,Persuasion, and History, 34 LAw & Soc'y REv. 157
(2000) (discussing socio-economic scholars' embrace of social norms importance
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his overt rejection of the supposition that correctly evaluating the interplay between norms and the law requires a particular political or philosophical bent. As Richard McAdams has observed, "Ellickson criticized
the extreme law and society claim that norms determine behavior to the
exclusion of la-what he called 'legal peripheralism'-and also the extreme law and economics claim that law determines behavior to the exclusion of norms-'legal centralism." ' 17 This Article attempts to adopt the
Ellicksonian approach of avoiding a stark doctrinal or philosophical orientation when discussing copyright use norms. In fact, to even characterize
norm theory as a singular or unified construct is inaccurate. Even among
self-identified law and economics adherents the word "norm" can have various meanings."' For the purposes of this Article, Steven Hetcher's characterization of social norms is adopted. Hetcher defines norms as follows:
[N]orms, at their core, are patterns of behavior, not rules, statements, or other linguistic entities. A norm need not be expressed in linguistic terms in order to have content, whereas a
rule is by definition linguistic. A norm's content is defined in
terms of its strategic structure. A norm, then, is behavior of a
certain sort, which may or may not have an attached linguistic
component. When characterizing a group's norms, it is neceson human development), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-ccps/etzioni/
A277.html.
17. McAdams, supra note 10, at 632.
18. Compare Posner, supra note 13, at 1699-1700
("A norm [is] a rule that distinguishes desirable and undesirable behavior and
gives a third party the authority to punish a person who engages in the undesirable
behavior .... [A] norm is like a law, except that a private person sanctions the
violator of a norm, whereas a state actor sanctions the violator of a law."), with
Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects In Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 832 n.54
(1998) ("By norms I mean regularities within the society to which we believe members of the society ought to conform, and that are enforced through mechanisms
other than legal sanction."); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 350-51 n.55 (1997) (discussing distinction between norms and regularities and stating his opinion that mere "intentional regularit[ies] or 'convention[s]"' are not norms). Because I am interested
in norms as regulations analogous to governmentally imposed common or statutory law, I adopt this more restrictive and less descriptive definition. On the other
hand, Robert Axelrod finds that a norm exists "to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in
[that] way." ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION 47 (1997). If the
source of the punishment includes legal as well as extra-legal sanctions, Axelrod's
definition seems to be too broad for my purposes. But to the extent that the existence of a norm entails any form of punishment for its violation, the concept of a
norm involves a normative element. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make
Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1580
(2000) ("[A] norm can be defined as an obligation backed by a nonlegal sanction.

Sanctions such as criticizing, blaming, refusing to deal or shunning are nonlegal

insofar as the people who impose them are not state officials."); see also McAdams,
supra note 10, at 634 ("If one scratches beneath the surface, it is clear that economic theorists have widely divergent views on what norms are and how they
function.").
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sary to keep in mind the difference between norms and rules, as
it is important to be able to look at the actual practices of groups,
rather than merely going by what they express linguistically. Talk
is cheap; it is conforming behavior that creates benefits for conforming groups and externalities for third parties. 19
Thus references to copyright-related norms in this Article are allusions to
actual practices of various groups with respect to exploitation of copyrighted content. For example, librarians and library patrons affiliated with
a particular library may constitute a close-knit community. There may be
rules which require the library to post "copyright warnings" on
photocopiers that can be used by library patrons to photocopy works in
the library's collections, 20 but the library may, without fear of censure,
choose not to supervise use of these photocopiers or to intervene even if
individuals seem to be engaging in excessive photocopying. The library's
"rules" concerning photocopier use are thus supplanted by an informal
norm that permits unfettered photocopying. The library benefits from
this norm both to the extent that easy access to copiers makes library patrons happy and from any income that the photocopiers generate for the
institution. Library patrons benefit from the convenience afforded by the
library photocopiers. Any acts of infringing copying that occur constitute
externalities that affect third parties-the owners of the affected copyrighted works.
An articulation of recognized norms is putatively an objective expression of how individuals behave, but how norms are identified and defined
is influenced by and subject to the normative biases of the observer, who
has her own internalized vision of how the world is, and how it ought to
be. 2 1 That being said, if they are to be the basis for law, the norms of real
space use of "analog" copyrighted works must be as fairly and impartially
set out as is feasible, because to do otherwise would compromise the legitimacy of the undertaking. Thus, while the advocacy tone imbuing the
description of why real space levels of information access need legislative
mandates in the electronic environment will be unmistakable to the
reader, it is hoped that the iterated norms in the second half of this Article
are rendered as neutrally and dispassionately as possible.

19. Steven Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create A Privacy Entitlement in Cyberspace,
L.J. 877, 892 n.53 (2001) (citation omitted).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(1) (1998) (limiting liability of libraries for copyright violations by patrons using reproducing equipment in library if equipment
displays notice that copies may be subject to copyright law).
21. This author admits a strong general preference for weak, "low barrier"
copyright protections. For a further discussion of "low barrier" copyright protections, see infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
16

BERKELEY TECH.
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Copyright Norms

The secret rules of engagement
are hard to endorse,
when the appearanceof conflict
22
meets the appearance offorce.

Copyright use norms doubtlessly vary by category of work and by the
formats in which works are embodied. Entire CDs containing music are
probably played and replayed more frequently than whole books are read
and re-read because people are less likely to want to read books repeatedly
than they are to play songs over and over. As a result, music CDs on loan
are probably "burned" more frequently than borrowed books are photocopied or scanned onto hard drives. This does not necessarily mean that
as a moral or ethical matter copyrights in music are respected less than
copyrights in literary works; it simply means that as a practical matter the
works are consumed differently.
The "containers" in which copyrighted sound recordings and musical
compositions are sold to consumers have changed and multiplied fairly
dramatically over the past few decades. The same recordings may be (or
at least may have been at some point in time) available on vinyl records in
78, 45 and/or 33 rpm formats, on eight track tapes, on cassette tapes, on
compact disks and as MP3 files. They can be easily copied from each of
these formats, or simply off of a radio broadcast. They can also be shared
from person to person without any copying across formats. However, because MP3 files may be simple and virtually free to copy, and sharing them
without any copying could additionally require simultaneously sharing a
computer or hand held MP3 player, sharing them as conveniently as tapes
or CDs functionally requires making copies. Building the norms of CD
and analog format usage into MP3 files can best be achieved by limiting
playing of an MP3 file, original or copied, to one device at a time. This
approach contrasts favorably with one that renders MP3 files uncopyable,
because this ignores pre-existing norms of unfettered copyability long enjoyed by consumers.
The variety of containers in which literary works are widely embodied
is more limited. Though "e-books" and books-on-tape or compact disc are
all available to consumers, ink and paper is still the predominant format in
which the typical work of fiction is purchased. The widespread and longstanding popularity of bound books suggests deeply entrenched norms of
use that photocopiers and scanners have done little to dislodge or modify.
Rather than making copies of an analog book, a consumer may retain possession of books she expects to re-read, and loan, sell or give away those
she feels finished with.
22.

TRAGICALLY

Hip, Grace, Too, on Day for Night (MCA Records 1994).
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Respect for copyrights is not an inherent or natural part of the cultural infrastructure. Instead, it is either learned or it is not. Sheldon Halpern has suggested, first, that because copyright law is fractured,
inconsistent and difficult to understand, perhaps copyright laws do not
have a normative role and, second, that the law is there because it is
needed so that appropriate energies can be focused on enforcement of
the law. 23 Can there be law without legislation, or order without law,
within the unauthorized use framework? The unilateral authority over use
and access that digitalization gives copyright owners makes evolution of
mutually satisfactory norms unlikely with respect to electronic formats. In
a more specific context, Julie Cohen offered the following commentary to
explicate her view that consensual norms are unlikely to develop in the
realm of digital copyright management:
The parties affected by the impending digital copyright management regime exhibit none of the characteristics that Ellickson
identifies as important for the development of such norms. First,
the "community" of authors, owners, and readers of copyrighted
works is neither well defined nor close-knit. It encompasses, on
the one hand, giant publishing and entertainment conglomerates such as Time-Warner and, on the other, anyone who has
ever read a newspaper article or watched a movie. While all
members of the copyright "community" depend on one another,
in some sense, for the production, distribution, and consumption of creative works, the community's sheer size and diversity of
tastes ensures that members do not depend on each other with
the same immediacy as two Shasta County neighbors who share a
boundary fence.
A second, and related, objection is that to the extent digital copyright management systems can be said to reflect shared extralegal norms developed by repeat-player members of a copyright
"community," that community does not include readers. The
transient nature of the reader's interest in particular copyrighted
works, compared with the more enduring interests of the authors
and copyright owners in administering the rights to all of their
works, marks the reader as the outsider. Ellickson offers a highway collision involving a passing tourist as an example of a situation in which Shasta County locals are content to leave
adjudication of fault and determination of remedy to the legal
superstructure. The passing tourist has no authority to invoke
the system of third-party enforcement that has arisen among
neighbors who are repeat players in interactions with each other.
Similarly, it is extremely unlikely that the individual reader who
23. See Sheldon W. Halpern, Copyright Law in the Digital Age: Malun in se and
Malum Prohibitum, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 11 (2000) (noting Halpern's

belief in necessity of copyright laws).
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wishes anonymous access to a copyrighted work will be able to
pressure the owner to grant it by invoking shared norms that the
24
reader helped create.
Thus, Cohen describes a dysfunctional macro digital copyright community
in which overarching norms that are inclusive of, and responsive to, the
needs of end consumers are unlikely to emerge, largely due to the power
imbalance between large copyright owners and discreet individuals. Cohen's specific concern underlying this analysis is that, in real space, the
ability to read anonymously is a norm, but it is one that can be abrogated
in electronic media by the adoption of digital copyright management technologies. A new norm prohibiting anonymous access, imposed unilaterally by copyright holders, would permit-and indeed facilitate-rampant
data collection and data based reader profiling. 25 It would also prevent
people from reading (and possibly writing) online without revealing their
identities.
Cohen allowed that, in some situations, consensual private ordering
may occur in cyberspace, 26 but seemed pessimistic about the possibility of
27
real space copyright use norms moving unscathed into the digital realm.
A parallel assumption of this Article is that unless the norms are codified
so that they have the force of (and indeed become) laws, they probably
cannot survive digitalization. It will require legislation to move real space
use norms into cyberspace. Full and accurate codification, however, will
require that real space use norms be carefully and fully cataloged, regardless of how little they correspond with formal copyright laws or comply
with the copyright precepts advanced by courts.
1.

Imaginary Fences and Gates
Was a big high wall there that tried to stop me
A sign was painted said: Private Property,

24. Julie E. Cohen, A Right To Read Anonymously: A Closer Look At "Copyright
Management"In Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 995-96 (1996) (citations omitted).
25. See id. at 985 (discussing use of transaction records generated by copyright
management systems to learn more about customers through "profiling").
26. See id. at 996-97 (outlining parameters for when Ellickson's model of consensual private ordering based on shared extra-legal norms may be valid in
cyberspace).
27. Mark Lemley has articulated similar sentiments. See, e.g., Mark Lemley,
Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYRON L. REV. 547, 578
(1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Overlapping] (discussing how cognitive differences between copyright law and real world can have troubling consequences). Additionally, Lemley has resoundingly criticized the idea that private ordering through
social norms could govern the Internet in an efficient and socially beneficial way.
See Mark Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
1257, 1293 (1998) [hereinafter Lemley, Internet Norms] (explaining that movement
towards private ordering, by taking public law out of regulation, would lead to
inefficient governance by combination of norms and code).
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But on the back side it didn't say nothing28
This land was made for you and me.

As one commentator expressed it, "[i]ntellectual property is nothing
more than a socially-recognized, but imaginary, set of fences and gates.
People must believe in it for it to be effective." 29 As is described below in
more detail, copyright law, as articulated by statutory provisions and court
decisions, is not particularly coherent, nor is it physically or cognitively
accessible to typical end consumers of goods and services that embody or
contain copyrighted works. 30 Even more troubling, however, is the fact
that even a good grasp of the Copyright Act 3" and applicable case law
(which is, of course, the hallmark of a top quality legal education) will not
provide effective guidance about how to legally use another's copyrighted
work. 32 In other words, not even someone with a firm knowledge of the
copyright law can confidently expect to reliably identify the metes and
bounds of copyright compliant behavior across disparate factual situations
because copyright laws are neither clear nor applied consistently or
33
predictably.
Ordinary consumers who want to make a single unauthorized copy of
a copyrighted work for personal use may believe that this is "legal" in the
sense that it is probably a legitimate and anticipated non-infringing use,
but it is also possible that they rationalize what they do despite an underlying belief that unauthorized copying is wrong, illegal or both. 34 The
ramifications of making an unauthorized copy are largely indeterminate.
As Sheldon Halpern has written:
Individual determinations of moral and ethical conduct require a
moral and ethical context. The problem for intellectual property
law in general, and the law of copyright in particular, is the lack
28.

WOODY GUTHRIE, This Land is Your Land, on GREATEST SONGS OF WOODY

VOL. 1 (Vanguard Records 1972), available at http://angam.ang.univie.ac.at/roadcult/guthrie/Land.htm (last visited July 27, 2002).
29. Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 616 (1996).
30. For a further discussion of the incoherent nature of copyright law, see
infra notes 91-92, 100-01 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of how
the incoherent nature of copyright law has manifested itself in the form of myths
and urban legends, see infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
31. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2002).
32. Fair Use is set out in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
33. SeeJessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. LJ.
29, 34 (1994) [hereinafter Litman, Exclusive Right] (finding copyright law technical, inconsistent and difficult to understand); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information
Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 587, 613-14 (1997) [hereinafter
Litman, Reforming] (discussing technicalities of copyright rules).
34. See, e.g., Charles C. Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Sept.
2000), at 58 (observing that people come up with intellectual justifications for
downloading music such as "information wants to be free," "the labels are thieves"
and "everything's going to the Net anyway"), available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/09/mann.htm.
GUTHRIE,
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of such an underlying clear context. The nature of American
copyright law makes it difficult, if not impossible to find or to
35
construct an unambiguous moral compass.
Copyright laws are not intended to create only locked gates or unscalable fences. The same barriers that are intended to stand as bulwarks
against piracy,3" 6 are also intentionally designed to allow some unauthorized admissions to otherwise corralled, copyrighted works. Because the
gates are imaginary, individuals must make independent moral judgments
about when it is acceptable to enter and when unauthorized entry might
constitute a trespass. These judgments are likely to be based on past experiences, observation of others' behaviors in similar circumstances and
some understanding of the precepts of copyright law.
The primary doctrinal justification individuals have for making nonpermissive uses of copyrighted works is the concept of fair use, codified in
section 107 of the Copyright Act,3 7 and framed as a limitation on the exclusive rights of copyright owners. A "fair use" of a copyrighted work may
be unauthorized, but it is not an infringement of a copyright.3 8 Section
107 explicitly sets out exemplary unauthorized uses that are potentially
(but not necessarily) fair, including "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship or research. ' 39 These examples were arguably chosen based on observed pre-existing norms of unauthorized use. It is difficult to imagine full and effective criticism, for example, unless access to
the work being critiqued is free, both in the sense of being unfettered and
also being without cost, so that excessive access charges cannot prevent or
compromise use of the work.
The listed archetypical fair uses are all socially valuable activities that
copyright owners would be motivated to attempt to restrain or manipulate.
Negative criticism or commentary, unfavorable news reporting and inauspicious treatment by teachers, scholars and researchers are all activities
that the First Amendment protects. For this reason alone, these activities
must, as a general proposition, fall within the scope of fair use when aimed
at (and therefore making use of) copyrighted works .4" These are also uses
35. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright

Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 572 (2001).
36. Defined here as large scale, for-profit commercial copyright infringement.
37. Fair use is further codified in 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1992).

38. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992) (establishing fair use of copyrighted material).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Essay, First Amendment Limits on Copyrights, 55
VAND. L. REv. 891, 898-99 (2002) (noting role of press clause on ensuring constitutional protection against improper governmental interventions); Paul Goldstein,
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983, 988 (1970) (suggesting
conflict between First Amendment and Copyright Act can be reconciled by accommodation of their respective principles); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147, 166-67
(1998) (differentiating between permissible and impermissible uses of copyrighted
materials); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the FirstAmendment Guarantees
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of copyrighted works that are likely to result in the authorship of new creative works. Therefore, copyright law is doctrinally bound to allow, if not
encourage, some unrestricted usage through fair use. The scope of fair
use is always broader for unauthorized users who make a "transformative
use" of a preexisting work and thereby create something potentially worthwhile themselves. 41 A survey of fair use jurisprudence suggests that people
who make unauthorized uses of copyrighted works for the express purpose of creating new, original works are viewed as having earned the right
to make fair uses of copyrighted works. Unproductive unauthorized uses
are often viewed as less justifiable.
The end use copyright consumption that is the primary focus of this
Article does not directly implicate First Amendment speech issues, though
burdens on the freedom to communicate are consequentially imbedded
42
in any encumbrance on the ability to access and use copyrighted works.
Nor is consumption of copyrighted works extolled here for its role in stimulating the production of new works, though access to existing works assuredly generates new ones. Instead, the critical inquiry here is what fair
use means when the anticipated use is not expected or likely to be linearly
productive and, therefore, concerns about free speech or the transformative use doctrine do not calibrate the scope of fair use. If, for example,
someone purchases a compact disk containing copyrighted music solely
for personal entertainment purposes, which uses of the compact disk are
unauthorized, and what unauthorized uses are unfair? Alternatively, assuming it was possible as a technological matter, is it fair to loan an e-book
to a friend or make copies of it, even though the copyright owner has
requested that you do not?
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1184 (1970) (describing conflict
over which forms of speech fall within meaning of First Amendment).
41. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
("[Transformative works] lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.") (citation omitted); see also Princeton
U. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting
degree to which challenged use transforms original work is determinative of
whether copyright law has been violated); Am. Geophyiscal Union v. Texaco, 60
F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that while transformative use is not essential for finding of fair use, it may serve to outweigh other factors suggesting unfair
use); Penguin Books, U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd.,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10394, at *54 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2000) (concluding that fair
use doctrine intends to protect transformative uses); Am. Geophyiscal Union v.
Texaco, 802 F. Supp. 1, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that transformative, productive
secondary uses have been historically favored throughout development of fair use
concept); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding transformative use or productive use of secondary work
essential for finding of fair use).
42. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 40, at 894-95 (noting potential conflict between
First Amendment and copyright law).
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Section 107 sets out statutory "factors to be considered" when a court
is evaluating whether any given non-permissive use is a fair one. The enumerated factors include: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is of a commercial nature or for non-profit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion of the work used; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the value or potential market for the work. 4 3 Presumably, anyone contemplating an unauthorized use ought to be guided
by these factors and the ways in which courts have applied them. Nevertheless, what this all means to a person who photocopies newspaper clippings and mails the copies to friends; or to someone who checks a
computer game out of the library, plays the game and then returns it to
the library several days later; or to a group of parents who share children's
videos and books-on-tape among themselves rather than each purchasing
their own copies; or to a church that sponsors dances at which CDs of
popular music are played; or a florist who plays the radio in her shop; or
to a hair stylist that posts pictures of well-coifed celebrities on her salon
wall, is unclear. Few have likely heard of section 107 of the Copyright Act
and, even if they have, they are unlikely to feel informed or constrained by
it.
Fair use is an elastic and evolving concept that perplexes even those
charged with applying the doctrine. Consider the teachings of the Sony
Betamax case, 44 one of the most important copyright disputes ever decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States. In his Sony dissent, Justice
Blackmun aptly stated: "The doctrine of fair use has been called, with
some justification, 'the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.' ,,45 As if to underscore this point, the five Justices comprising the
Sony majority and the four dissenters managed to disagree over the doctrine's general application and then, specifically, over how each and every
46
one of the section 107 factors should be applied to the facts of the case.
The Sony decision had a direct impact on the lives of almost everyone
in the United States by finding that taping television programs in homes
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing factors to determine fair use).
44. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
45. Id. at 475 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and
Technological Tensions, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 60-61 (1989). Oddi observed:
The Copyright Act subjects the "exclusive rights" to certain express exceptions. The "fair use" doctrine, as now codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act, provides one of the most significant exceptions to direct
infringement. However, in the words of Justice Blackmun in the [Sony]
Betamax case: "The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, 'the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.'" As if this
point needed any further demonstration, the majority and dissent in
[Sony] Betamax proceeded to disagree over the doctrine's application as a
general principle and how each and every one of the factors were to be
taken into account in its application.
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on videocassette recorders, without the permission of those who owned
the copyrights in those television programs, fell within the scope of fair
use. Yet the majority opinion in Sony, like so much statutory and courtmade copyright law, is an expressive disaster. The Sony plaintiffs, largely
producers of television programs and cinematic movies, brought an action
against Sony in federal district court, alleging that consumers who purchased Sony's Betamax videotape recorders were engaging in the unauthorized and infringing recording of copyrighted works that had been
exhibited on commercially sponsored television. The action asserted that
Sony was contributorily liable for this copyright infringement because they
marketed the Betamax and profited from its sale. The plaintiffs sought
money damages, an equitable accounting of profits and an injunction
against the manufacture and marketing of videocassette recorders. The
United States District Court for the Central District of California denied
all relief, holding that noncommercial home recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use of the copyrighted works and
that Sony could not be held liable as a contributory infringer, even if the
47
home use of a videocassette recorder was considered an infringing use.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
found Sony liable for contributory infringement and ordered the district
court to fashion appropriate relief.48 This "relief' could have enjoined
the sale of videocassette players to consumers, or burdened such sales with
licensing regimes or mandatory royalty payments. Instead, the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals, but on a five-to-four vote that was
unusual, even in the annals of controversial five-to-four Supreme Court
splits, because of the atypical distribution of personages on each side of
the decision: ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Brennan voted with the majority, endorsing an opinion penned byJustice Stevens, and joined byJustices White and O'Connor, while Justices Marshall, Rehnquist and Powell
joined Justice Blackmun's dissent.49 Thus, the Sony outcome is not easily
characterized as "liberal" or "conservative," as those terms are generally
understood in the political context. Yet another odd aspect of this decision was that it was reached only after the Supreme Court heard oral argu5
ments twice in the case before issuing its opinion. 0
The Sony majority opinion is routinely cited as support for analytic
arguments made by both plaintiffs and defendants in the pleadings of copyright infringement cases because it manages to buttress a variety of conflicting propositions simultaneously. 5 1 It covers so much rhetorical
47. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 419-27 (explaining procedural history).
48. See id. at 427-28 (noting decision of Court of Appeals).
49. See id. at 418 (breaking down distribution of Justices regarding Court's
opinion).
50. SeeJAMES LARDER, FAST FORWARD 240-45, 264-74 (1987) (compellingly recounting odd aspects of Sony decision).
51. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellant, Napster, Inc. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-16401), available at http://
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territory that language taken from the decision can be (and is) used to
support a wide range of constructions of the fair use doctrine. 5 2 In one
passage, the Sony decision goes so far as to assert a "presumption" that
unauthorized commercial uses are infringing. 53 A somewhat reconfigured
Supreme Court was later obligated to explicitly disavow this assertion to

54
reach the desired analytic outcome in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,

another important fair use case litigated in the wake of Sony.
At issue in Acuff-Rose was the rap group 2 Live Crew's commercially
released parody of late musician Roy Orbison's song "Oh Pretty Woman."
The Supreme Court's verdict in the Acuff-Rose case was a unanimous one,
reversing a court of appeals decision that had, in turn, reversed a district
court holding. The Sony opinion included the express statement that
"every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively ... unfair
.... -55 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied heavily on this
passage in rendering its decision for the copyright owner in Acuff-Rose, as 2
Live Crew's disputed song parody was clearly a for-profit endeavor. Yet, in
the Acuff-Rose majority opinion he penned, Justice Souter criticized the
court of appeals decision for "inflating the significance" of the commercial
nature of the work. He rather astonishingly took the court of appeals to
task for inappropriately applying "a presumption ostensibly culled from
Sony . . ."51 A more charitable view is that the court of appeals was simply
reaching for the bright line it assumed the Sony court had thrown down to
help illuminate the fair use fog permeating copyright jurisprudence. As
Acuff-Rose made clear, however, though the Sony decision constituted an
important statement on the scope of fair use, not even federal judges can
agree on the content, meaning and further application of the statement.
Average consumers are probably oblivious to the judiciary's role in
keeping VCRs available and affordable. To them, the Sony case largely
means that using a VCR to tape situation comedies, soap operas, dramas,
news programs, movies, concerts and sporting events-indeed anything
broadcast via television-is cost-free once they possess the necessary equipment, which is widely available. They are unlikely, however, to directly
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/napster/brieff0912.pdf, see also Ann Bartow, Educational
Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right To PhotocopyFreely, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. 149,

195 (1998) (describing Sony as "rife with broad generalizations").
52. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 51, at 195 (discussing how conflicting language in Sony has been used to argue and support opposing constructions of fair
use); Litman, Reforming, supra note 33, at 613 n.135 (describing Sony as illustrative
of fact-specific nature of fair use); James E. Murrill, Jr., Sounds and Silence:
Downloading and Fair Use in A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 24

Am.

J.

TRIAL ADVOC.

469, 470 (2000) (discussing Napster's argument that its service constitutes fair use
under Sony).

53. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (describing commercial use of copyrighted material as "an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner
of the copyright").
54. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
55. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
56. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 570.
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credit five Supreme CourtJustices with interpreting copyright law in a way
57
that makes unregulated taping possible.
Nor are they likely to comprehend why individual acts of copying are
treated disparately depending on the copying mechanisms employed. For
example, while the Audio Home Recording Act 58 defacto legitimized making a non-profit copy of a song to share with another person using analog
technology, using peer-to-peer file sharing software to accomplish the
same end has been held to infringe copyrights. 59 Analog cassette tape
recorders can make an unlimited number of copies of a work while, under
the Recording Act, digital audio tape recorders are legally required to contain serial copy management systems. 6 °( The inescapable conclusion that
the copyright laws permit making poor to mediocre quality unauthorized
copies, but forbid making good ones, is apt to be quite confusing to the
ordinary observer.
2.

The Limitations of ConsensualFence Building

As a consequence of the ambiguity and uncertainty of the copyright
laws, select copyright communities (those with at least some indicia of being close-knit) have engaged in, or least attempted, consensual rulemaking, though not particularly spontaneously or informally. Examples of this
include CONTU, the "photocopy guidelines" and CONFU.
57. One recent estimate is that 95 million U.S. households have VHS videocassette recorders, while 30 million have DVD players. See Ann Kellan, Is VHS Obsolete? (CNN television broadcast, Jun. 25, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/
TECH/ptech/06/25/dvd.vhs/index.html (discussing growing trend in household
use of DVD players).
58. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4247
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
59. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920, 927
(N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part and rev'd in pan, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), afJ'd,
284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (preliminarily enjoining Napster from engaging in,
or facilitating others in, copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted music, based on plaintiffs' prima facie establishment
of Napster's direct copyright infringement and court's conclusion that Napster
likely engaged in contributory infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights). Plaintiffs established that virtually all of Napster's users engaged in unauthorized downloading
or uploading of copyrighted music, that Napster had reason to know about infringement by users and that Napster facilitated such file sharing. Id. at 911, 91920; see a/so A&M Records, Inc v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014, 1020 (9th Cir.
2001), aff'd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's conclusions
that actions of Napster's users violated plaintiffs' copyrights and that Napster's
knowledge of its users actions made file-sharing company contribtitorily
negligent).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1992) (instituting copying controls and prohibiting
importation, manufacture and distribution of nonconforming digital audio recording devices; developing procedure to verify that systems meet Act's standards;
prohibiting encoding of information on digital music recordings; and requiring
accurate transmission or communication of copyright status of recordings).
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CONTU

The United States Congress established the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to study and
make recommendations about copyright issues related to computers and
photocopiers. 6' Congress decided that the Commission should be comprised of four members to represent the interests of authors and publishers, four members from "copyright user" communities (largely libraries
and educational institutions), four general public interest representatives,
62
including a consumer protection expert and the Librarian of Congress.
Ultimately a majority of CONTU members recommended (among
other things) that computer programs in machine-readable form should
explicitly be deemed copyrightable subject matter. 63 A spirited dissent by
one Commissioner, author John Hersey, opined that computer programs
were fundamentally different in nature from copyrightable works such as
sound recordings, motion pictures and videotapes. 64 He argued that conventional works used technology to communicate with human beings,
while computer programs communicated only with machines, and were
properly described as labor saving mechanical devices rather than copyrightable literary works. 65 Nevertheless, apparently relieved to have another entity make the call, Congress passed the CONTU majority's
recommended amendments to the copyright statute without debate. 66 In
this way, informal (if not completely consensual) rulemaking begat statutory copyright law. Though in this case perhaps ill advised, it represented
the grafting of one set of real space norms, copyright protections for literary works, onto electronically embodied creations.
b.

The "Photocopy Guidelines"

While the Copyright Act of 1976 was being debated and drafted, a
coalition of twenty-five educational associations (the "Ad Hoc Committee
on Educational Organizations on Copyright Law Revision") advocated a
blanket exemption from infringement liability for copying done for non61. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON NEw TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
(CONTU), CONTU GUIDELINES ON PHOTOCOPYING UNDER INTERLIBRARY LOAN ARRANGEMENTS-FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 54-55 (1979), available at http://www.cni.org/

docs/infopols/CONTU.html (last visited July 30, 2002).
62. See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-ReadableForm, 1984 DUKE LJ. 663, 695 n.128

(outlining Commission members).
63. See id. at 665 (noting finding of Commission).
64. See id. at 737 (summarizing Commissioner Hersey's dissent).
65. See id. (opining that computer programs in machine-readable form
should not be copyrightable because they are machine parts). "When a program
becomes machine-readable the 'writing' metaphor breaks down .... " Id.
66. See id. at 666, 694 (mentioning lack of debate in Congress over amendments to statute).
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commercial educational purposes.6 7 Publishing interests forcefully opposed this proposal. In an effort to defuse some of the tension surrounding educational photocopying issues, three groups of authors, publishers
and educational institutions (the American Association of Publishers, the
Ad Hoc Committee on Educational Organizations on Copyright Law Revision, and the Author's League of America, Inc.), were brought together
and charged with finding common ground on the issue of educational
photocopying. Together they negotiated "minimum standards of educational fair use," which were denominated the "Agreement on Guidelines
for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals," [hereinafter referred to as the "Guide69
lines"]. 68 These Guidelines were, and continue to be, controversial.
67. See Eric D. Brandfonbrener, Note, Fair Use and University Photocopying.Addison-Wesley Publishing v. New York University, 19 U. Micii. J.L. REFORM 669, 68283 (1986) (explaining that Congress paid considerable attention to copyright issues presented by university photocopying throughout twelve years of congressional debate regarding § 107). Though this recommendation was ultimately
rejected, § 107 was amended to include a specific reference to "multiple copies for
classroom use." Id. at 684. The first prong of § 107's four part test for fair use was
also amended to direct consideration of whether a use was commercial or nonprofit educational in nature. Id.
68. ASS'N OF AM. PUBLISHERS, INC., AD Hoc COMM. ON EDUC. ORGS. ON COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION & AUTHORS LEAGUE OF AM., INC., AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES
FOR

CLASSROOM

COPYRIGHTING

IN

NoT-FoR-PROFIT

EDUCATIONAL

INSTITUTIONS

H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681-84.
69. See Bartow, supra note 51, at 160-62 (footnotes omitted) (discussing controversial nature of guidelines).
Described by some academics as "a publishers' wish list of restrictions,"
the Guidelines authorize teachers to make a single copy of a chapter from
a book, article from a periodical or newspaper, short story, short essay,
short poem, or chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon, or picture from
a book, periodical or newspaper "for his or her scholarly research or use
in teaching or preparation to teach." The "Guidelines" for making multiple copies are much more restrictive. Copies must be limited to one per
student, and the reproductions must be brief. Complete works can be
reproduced only if they are comprised of less than 2,500 words. With
respect to longer works, only 1,000 words or ten percent of the work,
whichever is less, may be reproduced, though copying up to 500 words is
always permissible.
The decision to photocopy these short works or excerpts must also
be spontaneous. "Spontaneity" under the Guidelines requires that the
photocopying be at the "instance and inspiration of the individual
teacher," and that the time span between the decision to use the work
and the actual use be "so close in time that it would be unreasonable to
expect a timely reply to a request for permission." According to at least
one court, providing photocopies of copyrighted materials at the beginning of a semester that will not be assigned until later in the semester is a
violation of the spontaneity requirement.
The Guidelines restrict "cumulative" photocopying by limiting the
use of a brief or excerpted work to one course per school, and, with the
exception of works contained in newspapers and "current news periodicals," confine a teacher to nine or less "instances of such multiple copying" per course. Teachers are further limited to copying only one short
WITH RESPECT

TO BooKS

AND PERIODICALS,
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Both the American Association of University Professors (A.A.U.P.) and the
Association of American Law Schools (A.A.L.S.) denounced the Guide7
lines as too restrictive of photocopying. 0
The Ad Hoc Committee answered these objections by emphasizing
that the Guidelines were only minimum standards for educational photocopying, and expressed "hope that the interested parties would meet in
the future to develop new guidelines for areas where the Guidelines did
not apply or were inappropriate." This never happened, and educational
photocopying disputes have since moved to the courtroom. 7 1 Though
work or two excerpts per author, and only three works or excerpts per
collective work or periodical volume per class term.
The Guidelines also set forth the following additional restrictions.
Photocopies cannot "be used to create or to replace or substitute for
anthologies, compilations or collective works." No copies can be made
from "consumable" works that students could otherwise be required to
purchase, such as "workbooks, exercises, standardized tests and test booklets and answer sheets." Copying cannot "substitute for the purchase of
books, publishers' reprints or periodicals[,] be directed by [a] higher authority for] be repeated with respect to the same item by the same
teacher from term to term." "No charge shall be made to the student[s]
beyond the actual cost of the photocopying," and all photocopies must
carry a copyright notice.
This is what adherence to the Guidelines' construction of "fair use"
means in practice: First, a professor makes the "spontaneous" decision to
use a portion of a copyrighted work that is in no way "consumable" or a
substitute for a reprint or other publication that she could have required
students to purchase. Then, the Guidelines: dictate that the professor
may photocopy only excerpts of about three pages or less from any copyrighted work (and less than two pages if the underlying work is a short
one); require that the professor copy and distribute no more than nine of
these diminutive excerpts during the entire semester; and compel the
professor to ensure that she is the only person in the entire school who
multiple-copied each excerpt that term. The professor must additionally
warrant that, in totality, the photocopied excerpts do not take on the
appearance or function of an anthology or compilation. Finally, the professor must never use the excerpt again.
While compliance with the Guidelines almost automatically renders
educational photocopying fair use, failure to comport with the Guidelines does not (yet) automatically constitute copyright infringement. Educational photocopying that does not meet the Guidelines is evaluated
under the general fair use four part test set out in § 107.
Id.; see also LindaJ. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532,
1562 n.145 (describing "poorly kept secret" in academia that classroom copyright
guidelines are often ignored or rationalized away); Eileen N. Wagner, Beware of the
Custom-Made Anthology: Academic Photocopying and Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphics,
68 EDuC. L. REP. 1, 15 (1991) (explaining that even though educators have complained about unrealistic burden of Classroom Guidelines, they have not been
amended for twenty-five years).
70. See Bartow, supra note 51, at 159-60 (recounting negative views of
Guidelines).
71. See, e.g., Princeton U. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., 855 F. Supp. 905, 907-08
(E.D. Mich. 1994), affd in part and vacated in pait, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that act of copying works of scholarship and binding copies into "coursepacks" for college students violated fair use doctrine); Basic Books, Inc. v.
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Congress specifically declined to incorporate these Guidelines into the
Copyright Act, the few judges that have considered the issue have opined
that educational photocopying meeting the Guidelines constitutes fair use
of copyrighted works. No guidance has been given, however, about how
far an educator can surpass the limitations of the Guidelines without exceeding the boundaries of educational fair use.
While in "real space" there are certainly tensions around the scope of
educational fair use, 72 in cyberspace these are exacerbated by the ability of
content owners to track copying online as they could never do with photocopy machines. If she considers the copyright issues at all, a teacher might
grant herself broad fair use privileges when it comes to photocopying a
few chapters out of an out-of-print tome 73 for her students, taking a calculated risk that either she will not get caught, or will be successful in mounting a fair use defense to any infringement allegation. When use and
duplication of electronic content is carefully controlled and proactively
monitored, however, the same teacher may not even have the option of
making copies for her class, regardless of whether it would be fair use to
do so. Recent efforts by the U.S. Copyright Office to hammer out written
policies concerning educational photocopying that were acceptable to
Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that
Kinko's copying of excerpts from books whose copyright was owned by Basic
Books, compiling excerpts into course "packets" and selling packets to college students for profit violated Copyright Act).
72. See Bartow, supra note 51, at 150-51 (explaining how compression of fair
use in education by judges responding to publishers' concerns leads to educational institutions' attempts to simultaneously mollify publishers and protect themselves against charges of copyright infringement); Stephana I. Colbert & Oren R.
Griffin, The Impact of "Fair Use" in the Higher Education Community: A Necessary Exception? 62 ALB. L. REv. 437, 437 (1998) (discussing aggressive debate among publishers, authors and academics concerning fair use doctrine); Kenneth D. Crews, The
Law ofFairUse and the Illusion ofFairUse Guidelines,62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 658 (2001)
(discussing Williams & Wilkins case and suggesting that although Williams may give
CONTU Guidelines important support, Williams is arguably inconsistent with fundamental precepts of fair use); Maureen Ryan, Fair Use and Academic Expression:
Rhetoric, Reality, and Restriction on Academic Freedom, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'v
541, 557 (1999) (noting that photocopying of academic expression is form of derivative use that has recently been scrutinized in university context).
73. Some commentators argue that if a content owner fails to make a work
available (such as by letting a book fall out of print) then non-permissive access to,
and copying of the work would fall within the doctrine of fair use. See, e.g., Brad
King, Why You Can't Sell What You Buy, WIRED (Jan. 16, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41184,00.html (discussing doctrine of firstsale within fair use doctrine). However, at least one federal judge has ruled that
out of print works present the most compelling case for royalty payments since
there is no other mechanism by which a content owner can extract profits from
the work. See Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1533 (stating analysis that unauthorized copying damages out-of-print books more than it damages current or available ones
because copy royalties are sometimes only stream of income available to authors
and publishers of out-of-print works); see also Bartow, supra note 51, at 57 (noting
that availability of work has inverse relationship with prospective scope of fair use
usability resulting in out-of-print works having broader fair use scope than widelydistributed books).
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both content users and content owners were unavailing,7 " and there is no
indication that copying issues will be resolved consensually in the future.
c.

CONFU

The Conference on Fair Use ("CONFU") 75 was an attempt by nonprofit educational copyright "consumers" such as libraries, and copyright
"producers" such as publishers, to cooperatively draft a set of rules pertaining to the scope of fair use in electronic materials that both interest
groups could live with. However, these negotiations failed because the
parties were too far apart on many issues. 76 One commentator noted:
[Ninety-three] organizations representing for-profit and nonprofit publishers, the software industry, government agencies,
scholars and scholarly societies, authors, artists, photographers
and musicians, the movie industry, public television, licensing
collectives, libraries, museums, universities and colleges spent untold amounts of money and more than 2 1/2 years of their time
and their energy to find agreement on the scope of fair use in
various electronic contexts. Now it seems that not enough of
their constituents, and in some cases, not even the participants
themselves, agreed with the result to qualify the Proposed Guidelines as consensus documents. Forgive the overgeneralization,
but users thought the Guidelines were overrestrictive and copy77
right owners thought they were giving away too much.
The subject of interlibrary loans (ILLs) was one area of CONFU contention. 7 3 Publishers manifested a powerful desire to curtail or eliminate
ILLs in the digital environment, thereby derailing a norm of library func74. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 127 n.9 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA] (explaining that Guidelines attempted to clarify copyright law, but political
complexities made it difficult for truly workable guidelines to emerge).
75. See generally Bruce A. Lehman, The Conference on Fair Use: FinalReport to the
Commissioner on the Conclusion of the Conference on Fair Use [CONFU, (Nov. 1998), at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/confu/confurep.pdf (last visited
July 30, 2002).
76. See Crews, supra note 72, at 610-11 (analyzing CONFU's inability to reach
consensus on proposed guidelines for multimedia development, digitizing of visual images and distance learning); Laura N. Gasaway, Impasse: DistanceLearning and
Copyright, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 783, 799 (2001) (explaining that although CONFU participants spent two years drafting educational fair use guidelines, resulting guidelines did not receive broad support).
77. CONFU: The Conference on Fair Use, at http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/IntellectualProperty/confu.htm (last visited July 30, 2002).
78. See, e.g., CONTU: CONTU Guidelines on Photocopying Under Interlibrary Loan
Arrangements, at http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/IntellectualProperty/illconfu.htm
(last visited July 30, 2002) (establishing guidelines "to assist librarians and copyright proprietors in understanding the amount of photocopying for use in interlibrary loan arrangements permitted under the copyright law").
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tionality. 79 Librarians objected strenuously, since this would interfere with
libraries' ability to continue to offer their patrons the same levels of access
and service. No effective consensual rulemaking developed. Instead, using their superior bargaining power, publishers have simply imposed their
desired outcome on libraries through licensing agreements, at least in the
context of electronic journals,80 as is discussed in more detail below.
While these undertakings were far more formal and contrived than
the rulemaking Ellickson observed in Shasta County, they still represented
communitarian attempts to reach common understandings and build
frameworks for informal dispute resolution of select copyright issues.
However, the parties largely failed to informally agree upon how to characterize existing practices, or to reach anything resembling consensus on the
most controversial issues. As a result, the negotiation outcomes do not
form the foundation for emerging norms, as areas of agreement were not
widely accepted by nor communicated to the interested groups putatively
represented at these negotiations.
The law does not inform end consumers of copyrighted materials
about the appropriate parameters of unauthorized use of copyrighted
materials and, unless they are part of a particular copyright-using community, such as teachers, researchers or librarians, individuals are unlikely to
have any role in any ad hoc rule making, or even an awareness of it. Almost by default, the absence of cogent and accessible copyright laws and
copyright rules leaves only norms, the actual practices and conventions of
copyright use, which simultaneously influence and are shaped by both
8
emerging technologies and individual acts.
3.

Imaginary Fences and Gates Make Ineffectual Corrals

At a very general level, most people would probably agree that respecting copyrights is a desirable social practice, especially if they understand the role that copyrights can play in compensating content creators,
and in providing incentives for investments in new creative works. Dennis
Chong has argued that "even when the substance of the group norm does
not directly serve one's interest, it can be in one's interest to conform
when the norm represents a social convention that everyone has an inter79. See Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict in the Digital Environment: Librarians
Versus Copyright Holders, 24 COLUM.-V[AJ.L. & ARTS 115, 148 (2000) (recounting
negotiations between publishers' representatives and librarians over guidelines for
Interlibrary Loan in digital environment).

80. See id. (noting that recent license agreements for electronic journals effectively made CONTU Guidelines inapplicable by placing burdens on lending library
rather than borrowing library).
81. Cf Etzioni, supra note 16, at 157-78 ("[S]ocial norms ... are a major

factor among those that shape predispositions, the wants of people, and the bases
of individual choices."). Norms are not merely formed via rational choice. According to Etzioni, "the sources of norms are remote in time ...they are passed
from one generation to the next; and they derive authority by virtue of their being
a part of tradition rather than reflecting deliberations." Id.at 173.
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est in supporting so long as others do so." 8 2 Forgoing unauthorized uses
of copyrighted works might become a norm if it was assumed and expected that such forbearance would incentivize the creation and distribution of new copyrighted works. Nevertheless, few average consumers are
apt to believe, nor would it be logical or reasonable for them to presume,
that respecting copyrights at a personal level will have a cognizable effect
on the price or selection of creative works available for their consumption.8 3 Rather, they are more likely to respect copyrights (if at all) because it seems ethical, or because they are forced to do so by technological
means, or because they fear being sued or arrested if they do not.
An important threshold question, then, is: When is an unauthorized
use of a copyrighted work unethical and actionable? There are significant
disagreements concerning what specifically it means to respect copyrights,
and the level of respect that copyrights ought to be accorded.8 4 At one
82. Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2079, 2082-83 (1996).
83. In a different context, C. Edwin Baker explained the disjuncture between
the costs and benefits and the prices of media products as follows:
Think for a moment about externalities of media practices and products.
Members of the public benefit tremendously if a newspaper's reputation
for investigative reporting deters misconduct by government officials or
corporate executives, but effective deterrence means that the newspaper
has no story to sell. The paper receives nothing for this valuable product.
Even when an investigation uncovers spectacular misconduct and publication leads to reform, most people receive the benefit without buying or
reading the paper. Similarly, even a person who buys no newspaper, biography, or novel can reap a reward from those who do if their media
consumption leads them to be wiser voters or more cultured people. In
contrast, you can be hurt by another person's media consumption if it
leads to unwise voting, a boring personality, or damage to your material
or cultural environment. Most dramatically, you are hurt if consumption
by others is one factor in a causal chain that leads them to murder, rape,
or rob you. These are all costs and benefits that are not taken into account in the selling or purchase decisions and, thus, lead the market to
misprice media products.
In economic terms, these costs and benefits are not brought to bear
on the entity producing the content: they are not "internalized" by publishers, for example. Products that create negative externalities are sold
for less than their real social cost, while those creating positive externalities must be sold for more than their social cost. Given the economic
maxim that a lower price generates more purchases, people will consume
more media products that create negative externalities and less of those
that create positive externalities than they would if charged the item's
real cost. Given the huge externalities, both positive and negative, almost
no relation can be expected between the media the market actually provides and the media it would provide if properly priced.
C. Edwin Baker, Two Misplaced Objections, 23 BOSTON Rrv. 14, 14 (1998), availableat
http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR23.3/baker.html (last visited July 30, 2002).
84. Forcing subtle, nuanced and often diverse bodies of scholarship into one
category along a tripartite continuum is a problematic undertaking at best. Nevertheless, it does appear that the scholarship assessing the level protection that
should be afforded to copyrights can be divided into three groups: those that favor
strong, or "high barrier" protections; those that favor weak, or "low barrier" protec-
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end of the spectrum are copyright absolutists, who endorse broad "high
barrier" copyrights, either because they believe that robust copyright protections are likely to spur investment in the creation and distribution of
tions; and those that take a middle of the road view on the subject. For a further
discussion of scholars taking the "high barrier" road, see infra note 85 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of scholars taking the "low barrier" road, see
infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
"Middle of the Roadists" (arguably or by self-description) include Stacey L.
Dogan, Infringement Once Removed: The Perils of Hyperlinking to Infringing Content, 87
IowA L. Riv. 829, 845-49 (2002) [hereinafter Dogan, Infringement Once Removed]
(proposing standard for secondary copyright liability that expressly considers tension between copyright's goals of inducement and restraint); Stacey L. Dogan, Is
NapsterA VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other Internet Technologies, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 939, 950-53 (2001) [hereinafter Dogan, Is NapsterA VCR?] (arguing
for balancing approach to evaluating applicability of staple article of commerce
doctrine); Jon Garon, Media and Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 599-603 (1999)
(advancing pro-creativity argument for repeal of Term Extension Act and importance of First Amendment limitations); Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takingsfor IntellectualProperty: The Path Left Open After College Savings v. Florida
Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 637, 680-82 (2000) [hereinafter Ghosh, Regulatory
Takings] (arguing that intellectual property is protected by Takings Clause to
greater extent than real property); Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in Cyberspace, 7 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 30-32 (1999) [hereinafter Ghosh, Gray Markets] (arguing that
intellectual property is different and more porous species of property than real
property); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. Rav. 1600, 1614-27
(1982) (describing three-prong test for determining fair use in copyright infringement cases that will unify various factors which courts have made relevant in fair
use determinations); Dennis Kajala, Copyright and Misappropriation,17 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 885, 997-90 (1992) (believing copyright to be appropriate as incentive to
produce works that might not otherwise be produced); Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REv. 989, 996-1000 (1997)
(noting that courts have dubious task in intellectual property cases of differentiating between imitation and improvement); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property
and the DigitalEconomy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 546-57 (1999) (advocating need for copyright protection,
but recognizing that too much protection may stall competition and innovation of
technology); Eugene Volokh & Mark Lemley, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DuKE LJ. 147, 210-14 (1998) (arguing that in libel
cases, damages are appropriate for copyright and trademark claims and that intellectual property should not be beyond scope of First Amendment scrutiny); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review
in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 244549 (1998) (discussing copyright law and
deviations in treatment from other free speech restrictions and whether First
Amendment due process rules should apply to copyright cases); Alfred C. Yen,
Internet Service ProviderLiabilityfor Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability,
and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1890-93 (2000) (claiming that courts
should interpret copyright law and Digital Millennium Copyright Act so that free
speech and interests of society in preventing copyright infringement are balanced); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital Milenium Copyright Act:
The Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REv. 279, 285-87 (2001) (questioning whether deviations in Copyright Act narrow rights on those who rely upon Act for research and
education); see also generally Alfred C. Yen, A FirstAmendment Perspective on the Idea/
Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY LJ.
393 (1989) (expressing, perhaps, low to moderate view of copyright protection).
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new works, or simply because they deem content owners entitled to strong

copyrights as a matter of right.85 One radically opposing view is that copyright protection should be very weak, presenting "low barriers" to use and
protecting against little beyond literal copying. 86 This precept is usually
85. Those who appear to be in favor of strong copyright protections (for a
diverse range of reasons and not necessarily in every context) may include ED SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 150 (2000)

(noting Congress' constant expansion of copyrightable subject matter); Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and
Control OverNew Technologies of Dissemination,101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1619 (2001)
(arguing that tighter control will offer public increased quantity and quality of
work produced); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 217, 260 (discussing how stronger copyright protections through institution of private property regime would result in greater savings for society); Halpern, supra note 23, at 11 (describing focus on law enforcement and importance of
law enforcement to copyright law in society); Roberta Kwall, Copyright and the Moral
Right: Is an American MarriagePossible?38 VAND. LJ. 1, 4-5 (1985) (describing moral
right doctrine and discussing how implementation of doctrine would provide benefit of uniform means of protecting personal interests of creator and would permit
courts to avoid reliance upon inferior theories); Polk Wagner, Information Wants to
Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, (forthcoming 2003) (challenging Lessig's view of copyright as control mechanism).
86. Advocates for "low barrier" approaches to copyright protections appear to
this author to include STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? CONFRONTING THE
LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 291 (2001) (arguing that
"not only is the current law not working ... but that efforts to implement more
restrictive laws have not succeeded in bringing private personal copying under
control"), available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/call-for-realism.htm; LAwRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 14-15 (2001) (advocating that contrainsts on
"real space" creativity are no longer justified for Internet);JEsSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT:

PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 14 (2001)

("The fact that technology enables copyright owners to exercise more complete
control is no reason to modify the copyright law to facilitate it."); DAVID POST, HIS
NAPSTER'S VOICE IN COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN

INFORMATION AGE (W. Crews & A. Thierer eds., 2002), reprinted in Mots Pluriels,
special edition ('The Net: New Apprentices and Old Masters'), No. 18 (August
2001),
at http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/MP1801index.html;
SIVA
VAIDHYANATIAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 182-84 (2001); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual)
Property & Sovereignty: Notes Towards a Cultural Geography of Copyright, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1293, 1314-18 (1996) (advocating "low barrier" in domestic U.S. context);
Julie Cohen, Copyright and The Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1089, 1142-43 (1998) (noting that copyright law authorizes too much intrusion
and that proposed provisions would threaten constitutionally proscribed limits of
copyright protection); Rod Dixon, When Efforts to Conceal May Actually Reveal:
Whether First Amendment Protection of Encryption Source Code and the Open Source Movement Support Re-drawing the ConstitutionalLine Between the FirstAmendment Copyright, 1
COLUM. ScI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 106-08 (2000) (favoring thin protection of copyright for software); Michael Madison, Complexity and Copyright in Contradiction, 18
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 169-73 (2000) (arguing that for complexity to be
brought back to copyright, one must first expand interplay between copyright and
free speech); MichaelJ. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination,23 CARDozo
L. REV. 55, 64-65 (2001) (taking skeptical view on social value of price discrimination and arguing that reward for producer should be limited to amount adequate
to stimulate creation of work); Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or Over-Priced
Free Lunch: The IntellectualProperty Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public's
Control of Goverment, 30 Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (arguing that intellectual prop-
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either based on the perception that all works build on a preexisting body
of art, music, literature and knowledge, and therefore no new work is truly
original (nor entitled to be treated as if it is), or tied to the belief that an
expansive public domain is the best way to encourage the creation of ben87
eficial new works.
Even advocates of the "low barriers" approach to copyright protection
unequivocally recognize that acts of unauthorized copying can infringe
copyrights. People who make multiple copies of others' copyrighted
works without permission or permissible motive, and then sell the copies
to others for financial profit are sometimes referred to colloquially as "pirates." Most observers would agree that extensive piracy represents the
sort of quintessential feat of copyright infringement for which the copyright laws were drafted and are justifiably enforced. It is smaller scale acts
of copying, in which the non-permissive copies may substitute for
purchases of authorized ones but are not sold for financial gain, that incite
disagreements with respect to the appropriate characterization of the copying and the appropriate treatment of the copier by the copyright laws.
Some unauthorized copying is tied to professional mores and traditions. For example, Robert Ellickson asserted that academics chronically
ignore the prohibitions of copyright law by non-permissively photocopying
each other's scholarly writings but in so doing, adhere to professional
norms designed to serve the specific interests of the academic community.8 8 The relevant externalities-the costs of any copyright infringement-fall on publishers, but benefits to publishers accrue as well to the
extent the copying leads to purchases of authorized copies of the copied
work, or to the creation of new works that are issued and profited from.
erty clause should be able to control government's ability to bypass financial scrutiny); Richard H. Stern, Legal Protection of Screen Displays and Other User Interfaces for
Computers: A Problem in Balancing Incentives for Creation Against Need for Free Access to
the Utilitarian,14 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 283, 328 (1990) (arguing that copyright
protection of non-literal aspects and functional features of computer software does
not promote but hinders technological progress); Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to
Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REv. 1129, 1184 (2001) (recommending limited personal use privilege for noncommercial uses of copyrighted
works); John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, at http://www.eff.org/-barlow/
EconomyOfldeas.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2002) (arguing that entire concept of
copyrights is outdated and ill-suited to cyberspace).
87. SeeJames Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2007, 2038 (2000) ("[T]he
romance with which we view authorial creation and the incentives/public goods
story combine to provide a very powerful public rhetoric in support of expansive
intellectual property rights .... ).
88. ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 260-62 (discussing photocopying practices of
university instructors). Ellickson noted that "there is abundant, if unsystematic evidence that university instructors engage in rampant unconsented photocopying
when preparing class materials." Id. at 260. Nevertheless, Ellickson pointed to
"[i] mpressionistic evidence suggest[ing] that professors' substantive norms do disallow the copying of major portions of books for classroom use" where "such copying would significantly diminish authors' royalty income." Id. at 262 (emphasis in
original).
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Other unauthorized acts of copying occur within a more deeply personal sphere, and therefore implicate notions of a right to autonomy over
one's physical possessions within the home, in addition to copyright concerns. Music, for example, might be copied so that several household
members could enjoy it simultaneously in various rooms or automobiles,
or so that one person could listen to it in several different venues more
conveniently, without having to move a compact disk or MP3 player back
and forth. When, where and how often the music will be played, are
choices individuals may resist having monitored or proscribed by outsiders. The ability to make a few personal copies of the music increases the
autonomy individuals have over use of the music. Whether copyright law
provides individuals with a legal "right" to copy simply on the basis of a
preference for this autonomy alone, when the copying does not directly
advance any other social goal, is a source of great contention. Whether
individuals have the actual practical ability to make personal copies, however, is largely determined by the capabilities of the technologies that are
available to them, which, in turn, is increasingly a function of the copyright laws. Accordingly, some copying technologies are openly permitted
within the confines of the imaginary copyright corral, while others are
fenced out.8 9

89. Copying technologies that are openly permitted include VCRs,
photocopiers and analog cassette recorders. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1998) (discussing conditions under which library photocopying is permissible); Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 460 (1984) (noting that videotaping live
broadcasted television programs for personal use did not constitute copyright in-

fringement). Similarly, the Diamond Rio technology of copying music files from
hard drives (not directly from a digital recording) is permissible, having recently
survived litigation. See Indus. Assoc. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d
1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that MP3 player did not infringe upon copyright law because it did not directly reproduce digital recording). Conversely, digital audio tape, or DAT, is subject to certain statutory constraints. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 1001-10 (2001) (listing special restrictions on digitally copied recordings). Copying technologies that are fenced out include many of the most popular file-sharing
technologies. See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015-17 (9th
Cir. 2001) (commenting that direct economic benefit is not required to show commercial use, however, repetition can show commercial use); Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 430 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding injunction on distribution of encryption code that jeopardized DVD copyrights); UMG Recordings, Inc.
v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that defendant
used web service for commercial use by drawing clients to attract large advertising
base); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 226-27
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (ruling that irreparable harm would occur without injunction
preventing distribution of DVD encryption); Brad King, Ruling Spells Doom for Aimster, WIRED (Sept. 4, 2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,54950,
00.html (noting that Napster caused demise of other such downloading and filesharing services); King & Terraciano, supra note 3 (discussing copyright infringement against Scour, another music trading service, which caused its bankruptcy).
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Norm Gaps

Sometimes "norm gaps," a disjuncture between actual and desirable
social practices, can exist or develop in a given milieu. Steven Hetcher has
explained:
Gaps between actual versus desirable social practices may emerge
for a variety of reasons, including small group migrations or the
discovery of new scientific information. Sometimes when a
smaller group migrates into a larger group, some minority practices are deemed to be out of step with the morality of the majority group, and a norm gap exists between actual and desirable
practice from the majority perspective. In the case of cigarette
smoking, the disclosure of new scientific information about the
health impacts of smoking has opened a gap between actual and
90
desirable practices.
Some large institutional copyright owners lobby and litigate in an effort to
close the norm gaps they perceive between actual and desirable social
practices with respect to copyrighted works. Certainly there is little evidence of strong norms of cooperation and trust between copyright holders and their customers. Assuming that fostering and maintaining
appropriate levels of respect for copyrights are indeed advantageous societal objectives (and this author believes that as a general matter they are), it
is worth considering some of the possible impediments to achieving them:
The complexity of copyright law; exaggerations about the scope of copyright protections by copyright owners; hypocrisy by copyright owners who
demand respect for their own copyrights but ignore the copyrights of
others; attempts to copyright protect public domain works; and a sense
that copyrights are constructed to provide content owners with something
resembling a free lunch.
a.

The Gap-Creating Complexity of Copyright Law

Part of the explanation for any "copyright norm gap" may be that the
copyright law is voluminous, complicated and often counterintuitive to
non-lawyers (and sometimes even to lawyers as well). This is quite problematic in contexts in which the cumulative behaviors and attitudes of individuals toward copyrights can significantly affect markets and
industries.9 ' Robert Ellickson maintained that when people find the costs
90. Hetcher, supra note 19, at 896.
91. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 74, at 127 (explaining that current copyright law is focused less on behavior of large organizations than on behavior of
individuals), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/digital dilemma/ch4.html.
Accordingly, the "voluminous" body of "arcane and complex" copyright law today
works against individuals, who lack the resources of large organizations to "analyze,
understand, and even help draft legislation." Id. In this environment,
"[c]onsumers thus face the problem that the law is large, complex, and industry
specific." Id.
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of learning about the law and submitting to formal dispute resolution
processes to be very high, they will prefer to fall back on common-sense
norms, and that if obtaining information is costly, "one cannot assume
that people will both know and honor law." 9 2 One important implication
of high transaction costs for learning the law is that it may be meaningless
for the government to reconfigure the law (or for copyright owners to
lobby the government to reconfigure the law) if seemingly affected individuals will ignore or remain unaware of the law and any changes to it.
At present, most ordinary people are better versed in copyright myths
and urban legends than in actual copyright law. Over a decade agoJessica
Litman observed that not even immediate and obvious stakeholders such
as authors and publishers comprehend very much about the particulars of
the copyright protection structure.9 3 She further asserted that while members of the public do not find the overall idea of a copyright counterintuitive, they find the specifics of copyright law hard to grasp due to "its mind94
numbing collection of inconsistent, indeed incoherent, complexities."
Amendments to the Copyright Act and the promulgation of "copyrightrelated" statutory provisions in Title 17 have only made the law in this area
more complicated and less accessible since Litman wrote her compelling
commentary.9 5 Otherwise intelligent people may not even believe doctri92.

ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 281.
93. Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. Prr. L. REv. 235, 236 (1991)
[hereinafter Litman, Myth] (discussing failure of those whom copyright law was
intended to protect to fully understand its protections). Litman stated:
Neither copyright law, nor the models that seek to interpret it, seem to
pay great attention to the process of authorship. Perhaps because the
universe appreciates the aesthetics of symmetry, authors appear to return
the favor by paying little attention to the copyright law. One would think
that the two realms scarcely overlapped for all the attention each receives
from the other. One might posit that copyright law is written by
lawmakers unfamiliar with the process of authorship and that authorship
is committed by innocents unversed in the details of copyright. The hypothesis seems compelling if one has but slight acquaintance with both
domains. Indeed, it is a hypothesis that remains persuasive notwithstanding that the copyright law was written not by lawmakers or bureaucrats,
but by authors and publishers and the people who represent them. Although the community of industries that copyright affects paid close attention to the provisions of the copyright law during the long copyright
revision process, individual authors and publishers appear to have internalized the substance of those provisions not at all.
Id.
94. Id. at 237-38.
95. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (enhancing copyright
protection for digitally created works); Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304)
(extending copyright term to 95 years from date copyright originally secured and
allowing libraries and non-profit educational institutions to, during last 20 years of
any term of copyright of unpublished work, reproduce such work for purposes of
scholarship or research).
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nally accurate explanations of pertinent facets of copyright law. As Sheldon Halpern related:
Let's assume that you've got a client who says, "I've written a
book, how do I copyright it?" Well, if you tell the client the truth,
you will say, "You already have." The client will say, "I don't believe you," and will go away. The client will go to somebody else
who will tell the client, "If you pay me some money, I will file
some papers in the Copyright Office." But the fact is that the
96
first answer is the correct one.
Litman also made the important observation that those who view copyright law in economic or utilitarian terms inherently assume something
abjectly false: that the authors for whom the copyright law seeks to create
incentives for are generally aware of, or responsive to, this incentives
framework. 9 7 Mere passive consumers of copyrighted works are even less
likely to be alert to, no less motivated by, their doctrinally assigned role in
creating incentives for the authorship of new works and balancing the interests of content creators, content distributors, and society. Though they
are theoretically constrained by copyrights, neither the substantive requirements nor the substantive consequences of the copyright laws are
likely to be apparent to the average individual consumer of copyrighted
works.
More recently the authors of The DigitalDilemma concluded that both
consumers and copyright owners are poorly informed about copyright law,
and hold many widespread misconceptions about the nature and scope of
copyrights. 98 For example, consumers may erroneously believe that lack
of a copyright notice means that a work does not have copyright protection. Similarly, rights holders may be under the incorrect impression that
copyright protection accords them absolute control over every use of the
works in which they own copyrights. 9 9
96. Halpern, supra note 23, at 4-5.
97. See Litman, Myth, supra note 93, at 241 (observing potential false assumption by general population that authors understand copyright law).
98. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 74, at 123 (noting lack of formal research
regarding public knowledge about copyrights as applied to intellectual property).
99. See id. at 127 (discussing copyright holders' lack of knowledge of scope of
protections of their copyrights). As, the Digital Dilemma authors observed:
Although no rigorous study has been done, there is circumstantial evidence suggesting that many rights holders, too, are misinformed about
legal behavior with respect to intellectual property, and do not understand the legal limits to their control. For example, a major academic
publisher places the following legend on the page bearing the copyright
notice for its publications: "No part of this book may be reproduced in
any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system,
without permission."
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In addition to noting the apparent pervasiveness of significant misapprehensions about copyright law, the authors observed that even well informed individuals might find the interpretation of the sections of the
Copyright Act relating most directly to the conduct of members of the
general public complex and difficult. Moreover, dependable assistance
with copyright quandaries is unlikely to be available. While companies
might have the resources to comprehensively analyze and track evolving
copyright legal doctrine (and even to influence its legislative direction),
ordinary consumers generally do not.
It is hard to see how the legal rules of copyright can serve the roles
assigned to them by doctrinal scholars or economists if individual actors
do not pay these legal rules any attention. The conclusion that The Digital
Dilemma authors reached was that "if, as a matter of legal and social policy,
members of the general public are expected to comply with the requirements of intellectual property law, then it is important that the law be set
forth in a clear and straightforward manner that the general public can
readily comprehend."' 0 0 They call for "a greater degree of simplicity, clarity, straightforwardness, and easy comprehensibility for all aspects of copyright law that proscribe individual behavior," which might be facilitated by
"the development of specific interpretive guidelines on those aspects of
consumer behavior that raise questions frequently encountered in daily
life in dealing with copyright protection."" 1 In other words, copyright law
should (but clearly does not at present) resonate like a social norm, and
any given use to which copyrighted content is put should strike people as
fairly obviously right or wrong.
b.

Gap-causing Exaggeration About Copyright Scope

Another potential cause of copyright norm gaps is that copyright
holders exaggerate the scope of their ownership rights. One group of
commentators observed:
[A] major academic publisher places the following legend on
the page bearing the copyright notice for its publications: "No
part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission."
...

The use of similar legends or legal notices is widespread in the
publishing industry. Yet the fair use privilege in the Copyright
Act clearly authorizes the reproduction of at least some limited
portion of a copyrighted publication for legitimate purposes, in100. Id. at 125.
101. Id. at 127. However, other commentators have observed that a unitary
legal construct with universally applicable precepts, or "one size fits all" copyright
law may not be possible or even desirable. See, e.g., Halpern, supra note 35, at 59091 (noting difficulties associated with unitary copyright law).
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cluding critical commentary, scientific study, or even parody or
satire. In that respect the absolute nature of the prohibition
above is an overstatement of the copyright owner's rights. Similar observations could also be made with respect to the type of
notice prohibiting any form of copying that appears on videocassettes and digital video disks (the so-called "FBI notice"), in the
shrink-wrap licenses that accompany mass market software, in
point-and-click licenses, and even on some individual Web
10 2
sites.
No doubt intended to have an in terrorem effect, such overstatements may
be counterproductive in terms of encouraging respect for copyrights. If
consumers recognize them as overstatements and perceive them to be excessive, they may ignore them entirely as a result.' 0 3 Even judges will
sometimes remark on overreaching by copyright holders, as Judge Easterbrook did somewhat scathingly in one case, writing: "A definition of derivative work that makes criminals out of art collectors and tourists is jarring
0 4
despite [the plaintiffs] gracious offer not to commence civil litigation."
The absolutist language used in copyright notices or "warnings" reflects the norm preferred by some copyright owners. This desired norm is
that individuals abstain from any unauthorized copying whatsoever, which
is much more restrictive of use than the actual copyright laws. Attempts at
absolute copyright protection such as these are aggressively pitted against
rights of fair use and access to information. Accordingly, it is difficult to
characterize any given behavior or norm as the outcome of rights or interest balancing, even if people are assumed to know and understand copyright law, which they cannot be. Individuals may, however, recognize that
certain actions taken by copyright holders are driven by greed rather than
law. Additionally, there is a possibility that when the letter-C-in-a-circle
copyright notice is followed by words such as "unauthorized reproduction
10 5
prohibited," individuals react to it as a contemptuous ultimatum.
102. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 74, at 128.
103. See id. (explaining importance for copyright holders to understand scope
of copyright protection in order to avoid making overstatements).
104. Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997). It should be noted,
however, that this was a Seventh Circuit case in which the plaintiff artist was simply
asserting (unsuccessfully) a claim that had actually prevailed twice in the Ninth
Circuit. The plaintiff relied on those Ninth Circuit holdings. See Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309, 314 (D. Alaska 1993), afj'd 38 F.3d 1218 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that mounting of copyrighted artistic note cards on ceramic
tiles were derivative work and violated artists' copyright); Mirage Editions, Inc. v.
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming district
court's finding that attaching photographs cut from commemorative book to ceramic tiles violated not only photographer's copyright, but that of book publishers

as well).
105. Cf Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Big Government, 15 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
147, 153 (1995) (noting that "Ultimatum Game" demonstrates that certain economic predictions about rational self-interest are incorrect; rather, social norms
influence people's behavior when they negotiate distribution of potentially shared
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In fairness to large institutional copyright holders, individual authors
sometimes assert an equally expansive view of copyrights. Academics frequently post conference papers or works-in-progress on web pages with
admonitions such as "Unauthorized reproduction prohibited," or "No
part of this paper may be reproduced or cited without the permission of
the author." Yet, it seems unlikely that the author of a paper containing
such a notice truly expects readers to contact her before they click on the
print button that the software, with which she has posted her paper, so
conveniently and tantalizingly features. If she is so concerned about unauthorized reproductions, she probably should not have posted the document on the Internet in the first place, especially not on an unrestricted
website and in an easily downloaded and/or printed format. Under the
circumstances, her "copyright notice" is not entitled to a great deal of re10 6
spect, nor in all likelihood does she truly expect it to receive much.
c.

Gap-Fostering Exemplar Expediency

Copyright owners argue that unauthorized copying constitutes disdain for copyrights. Yet, large content owners will themselves fail to respect copyrights when it is in their financial interest to ignore the moral or
even legal precepts of copyright constructs, especially if they do not fear
provoking well funded copyright infringement suits. For example, despite
the pro-artist rhetoric they often employ, large copyright owners are notorious for trampling the copyrights of individual authors. Such contempt
for the copyrights of individual owners is evidenced by (to take one example) the devious machinations by which the recording industry recently
tried to-and almost succeeded in-depriving songwriters of termination
interests in their copyrighted works.' 0 7 This was almost accomplished
pool of money); see also Bart Kosko, Editorial, How Many Blonds Mess Up a Nash
Equilibrium?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at B13 (noting that "[s]tudies of ultimatums have shown that we can be so selfish that we become envious and we don't
achieve a Nash equilibrium").
106. In contrast, many of the CDs produced by Righteous Babe Records, such
as those featuring the music of Ani DiFranco, bear the somewhat cryptic legend,
"unauthorized duplication, while sometimes necessary, is never as good as the real
thing." ANI DIFRANCO, To THE TEETH (Righteous Babe Music/BMI 1999). It
would be interesting to know what effect if any this approach has on consumers.
In a slightly different vein Pete Seeger reported in June of 1967:
When Woody Guthrie was singing hillbilly songs on a little Los Angeles
radio station in the late 1930s, he used to mail out a small mimeographed
songbook to listeners who wanted the words to his songs. On the bottom
of one page appeared the following: "This song is Copyrighted in the
U.S., under Seal of Copyright # 154085, for a period of 28 years, and
anybody caught singin it without our permission, will be mighty good
friends of ourn, cause we don't give a dern. Publish it. Write it. Sing it.
Swing to it. Yodel it. We wrote it, that's all we wanted to do."
Woody Guthrie Folk Festival, at http://woodyguthrie.com (last visited Aug. 30,
2002).
107. For a discussion of the music industry's attempt to rob artists of their
rights through legislation, see infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
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when a Congressional aide, now employed by the Recording Industry Association of America (R.I.A.A.), surreptitiously placed a short but extremely substantive addition to the Copyright Act into the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Act of 1999,108 after debate on this unwieldy bit of
unrelated legislation had concluded. 10 9 This brief insertion created a new
category of "works for hire" under section 101 (2) of the Copyright Act
("sound recordings"), and the R.I.A.A. (which has since hired the aide as a
lobbyist)1 10 falsely represented to Congress that this was merely a "technical amendment."11 1
What the amendment really did was to render music companies the
"authors" as well as the owners of sound recordings (performed by nonemployee musicians) as a matter of law. If music companies had the forethought to "incorrectly" label the songs as "works for hire" in copyright
assignment contracts beforehand, this surreptitious change in the law potentially made the designation very meaningful. The fact that many copyright assignments in the music industry asserted work for hire status over
the master recordings of independently performed songs before this
change in the law was attempted suggests music companies planned to
reap the bounty of this "technical amendment" well in advance. 1 12 The
amendment actually went into effect for a brief period of time, but when
the true importance of the insertion became apparent, the subterfuge was
undone by Congress, which then specifically revised the Copyright Act to
expressly state that section 101 (2) should be interpreted as if the amend-

108. See Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. .106-113
Appendix I, § 1011(d), 113 Stat. 1501, (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp.
V 1999)), repealed by Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-379, 114 Stat. 1444 (2000).
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1999) (changing definition of "work for hire" by
inserting phrase "as a sound recording" after "audiovisual work").
110. See, e.g., Brad King, Rule Reversal: Blame it on R1AA, WIRED (Aug. 10,
2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/o,1294,38129,00.html ("The RIAA
hired Mitch Glazier, the chief counsel to the Senate subcommittee that passed the
legislation, just three months after the controversial clause was added .... ").
111. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REc. S14696, 14712 (Nov. 17, 1999); Copyright Act is
Amended to Make Sound Recordings Eligiblefor Classification as Works Made for Hire, 21
No. 9 ENT. L. REP., Feb. 2000, at 8 (describing amendment as "technical and clarifying change" to Copyright Act); Courtney Love, Courtney Love Does The Math, SALON, at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/06/14/love/
(last visited July
30, 2002) (discussing music piracy); Mann, supra note 34, at 52 (discussing
amendment).
112. See Kathryn Starshak, Comment, It's the End of the World as Musicians Know
it, or is it? Artists Battle the Record Industry and Congress to Restore their Termination
Rights in Sound Recordings, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 71, 90 (2001) (noting existence of
evidence suggesting that recording industry had been lobbying for "works for hire"
amendment for years). But see Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in
Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 375, 416 (2002) (asserting that many musical
compositions may be works for hire because they meet definition of "collective
works").
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ment was never enacted.'113 Had the recording companies been successful
in making the change to section 101 (2) permanent, human recording artists would have lost the ability to terminate the copyright assignments in
their song recordings after 35 years as a result of losing statutory "author"
status. This is an otherwise unwaivable right that the Copyright Act specifi11 4
cally provides for them.
Press reports of the incident and media attention paid to the aghast
reactions of well known musicians helped convince Congress to undo the
handiwork of the record companies as a legislative matter.11 5 It also
helped build a societal awareness that copyright laws can act as tools of
repression used against artists rather than to benefit them. When this sort
of nefarious plotting is exposed, it begins to seem possible that musicians
could actually make more money if copyrights were completely abolished,
so that they could perform, sell merchandise, offer subscriptions and engage in other career related activities without having to negotiate royalties,
pay intermediaries or otherwise interact with and risk exploitation by large
corporations. 1 6 Anyone looking for a way to internally justify using a
peer-to-peer file trading service to download free music certainly received
plenty of material to work with from this sorry episode.
In a similarly self-serving vein, many content owners opposed certain
provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and the Berne Convention that imperially commanded the sudden acknowledgement of copyrights in foreign works previously treated as
part of the public domain.11 7 Prior to these international treaties, it had
been technically non-infringing to make unauthorized use of certain foreign works because the works were not formally copyright protected
within the borders of the United States. Nevertheless, ignoring copyrights
113. See Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L.

No. 106-379, 114 Stat. 1444 (repealing additions to "works for hire" definition in
Copyright Act).
114. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (1998) (explaining procedures for termination of licenses granted by author and termination of licenses covering extended
renewal term, respectively).
115. See, e.g., Rob Evans, Senate Votes to Undo Controversial "Work for Hire Law"
LIvEDALYv (Oct. 13, 2000), at http://www.livedaily.citysearch.com/news/1996.html
(noting efforts by Don Henley-and Sheryl Crow-led Artists Coaltion advocacy
group); Bill Holland, HearingsSought on "Work for Hire"Law, RAC, at http://recordingartistscoalition.com/bbhear.html (describing reactions to last-minute inserting
of provision) (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
116. See, e.g., Kevin Kelly, Where Music Will Be Coming From, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 17, 2002, at 29-30 (detailing "battle over online music"); see also Mann,
supra note 34, at 49 (explaining how record companies use copyright law to disadvantage musicians).
117. See, e.g., Sabra Chartrand, Foreign Artists Whose Work is in the Public Domain
in U.S. Will Get Their ProtectionBack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at D2 (noting that
North American Free Trade Agreement provisions restored copyrights from Mexican and Canadian film and television works that had previously been in public
domain).
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because they were legally unenforceable was not behavior that strengthened normative societal respect for copyrights as a moral or ethical concept. It is also ironic that content owners opposed the same sort of procopyright strengthening legislation they often pursue on behalf of their
own copyrighted content, demonstrating again that their view of copyright
1 18
law hinges upon self-interest rather than principle.
Cass Sunstein once remarked on a similar phenomenon in a very different context, that of civil rights. 1 9 He noted that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was actually supported by some southern restaurants that were discriminating against African Americans on the basis of race. 12° Had the
restaurants decided on their own to start serving African American patrons, they would have violated a prevailing social norm of segregation.
Subsequent changes in the law made this norm illegal. The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 gave these restaurants the ability to begin serving African
Americans, thereby potentially increasing their patron pool, without risking social censure. 1 2 1 Their view of civil rights was clearly driven by concerns for profit rather than principle, and they were prepared to let the
decision about whether or not to respect the rights of African Americans
be dictated by the interplay between law and social norms: When it was
legal to discriminate, they would discriminate if this were more profitable
than opening their doors to African Americans. Once it was illegal to discriminate, no one could criticize them for conforming to the new legal
regime because the potential costs of not abiding by the law were large
and, in at least some cases, compliance with the law increased restaurant
profitability by expanding customer bases.
Thus, it is in a flagrant display of "do as I say, not as I do-ism," that
some content industry players work both sides of the street, trying to simultaneously profit from authorized and unauthorized uses of copyrighted works. For example, again in the context of Internet music file
sharing, one commentator observed: "[T]he [recording] industry is not
simply fighting an unorganized group of college kids. In an illustration of
Lenin's remark about capitalists' selling the rope with which to hang
themselves, businesspeople are lining up to profit from activities they officially decry." 122 Additionally, the commentator listed several examples of
content owners who invested heavily in file trading businesses and who
were ready to get rich off technologies like Napster if the courts decided
that file-trading facilitators were not liable for contributory copyright in118. See, e.g., CRAI JOYCE, ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAw 347-51 (5th Ed. LEXIS Pub.
2000) (discussing copyright restoration); Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and PerhapsPremature)Adieu to a Constitutionally-GroundedDiscourse of Public
Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 600-08 (1996) (analyzing

constitutionality of legislation restoring copyright).
119. See Sunstein, supra note 105, at 157 (discussing differences between social role of consumer and social role of citizen).
120. See id. (detailing subtle ironies of Civil Rights Act).
121. See id. (explaining effect of Civil Rights Act on restaurants).
122. Mann, supra note 34, at 46.
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fringement. 12 3 When large content owners behave opportunistically
rather than in a consistently copyright-respectful manner, they undermine
the message that respect for copyrights is an ethical imperative, and instead informally reinforce an attitude of cynicism by consumers toward
copyrights that they formally condemn.
Nor does the United States as a nation have a history of consistent
respect for copyrights. When it was useful and profitable to do so, publishers in the United States "disrespected" copyrights in foreign works on a
broad scale, acting as much the pirates as the unauthorized copiers they
currently ask the U.S. government to target with trade sanctions.1 24 It was
only when content owners in this country widely desired international protections to protect their copyrighted works abroad that the U.S. government began advocating and facilitating reciprocity of copyright respect
125
across national borders.
d.

Gap-Sparking Assertions of Copyright in Public Domain Works

Publishing entities may also lose credibility when they claim copyrights in public domain works, at least to the extent that individuals recognize that publishers are attempting to fence off portions of the literary and
cultural commons. Yet, there are monetary enticements to assert nonexistent copyrights, and few, if any, financial or legal risks to doing so. As Paul
Heald articulated:
Unfortunately, current practice seems to provide few disincentives for the impoverishment of the public domain. Why
shouldn't a publisher claim rights in public domain material?
Why not affix threatening language that will intimidate consumers into paying for otherwise fair uses of validly copyrighted material? The cost of affixing a copyright notice or threatening
language is very low, and the rewards can be substantial. Those
consumers who are intimidated will pay; those who understand
that a Bach Cantata or Shakespearean play belongs to the public
123. See id. (discussing music industry ties to such file sharing entities as
MP3Board.Com, Scour.Com and others); cf A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 924 n.28 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part and rev'd in part, 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), affid, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing recording industry's online music downloading ventures designed to protect intellectual
property rights); Eric Boehlert, In Defense of (Napster) Collusion, SALON (Nov. 2,

2000), at http://www.salon.com/business/feature/2000/11/02/collusion/
print.html (noting Bertlesmann's investment in Napster).
124. See, e.g., JAMES J. BARNES, AUTHORS, PUBLISHERS AND POLITIcIANs: THE
QUEST FOR AN ANGLo-AMERICAN COPYRIGHT AGREEMENT 1815-1854 1-30 (1974) (discussing depression of 1837-43 and American book trade); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra
note 86, at 26-34 (explaining European push for stricter American copyright laws).
125. See, e.g., BARNES, supra note 124, at 1-30 (examining early American attempts to protect copyright); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 86, at 26 (discussing pressures domestically and abroad resulting in changes to American copyright
protection policies).
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will not. In either event, the putative copyright holder sees only a
potential gain; economics and common sense would predict that,
in the absence of a significant deterring cost, spurious claims of
126
copyright will proliferate.
In some circumstances provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and overreaching by content owners could even physically obstruct access to works that are non-copyrightable, or in the public domain.
This can be accomplished because technological protection systems engaged in metering usage of copyrighted works can also be employed to
gate keep access to any public domain work that a commercial entity converts to electronic form. 127 For example, unless a public interest entity
digitalizes the complete works of William Shakespeare, libraries could find
that they must obtain the works from commercial electronic publishers
who charge for and monitor access to Shakespeare plays as if they were
copyright protected.
The prospect of paying copyright royalties, or "licensing fees" that
have the look and feel of copyright royalties, to access public domain
works would be infuriating to those who recognized what was transpiring.
A person could very well feel completely justified in circumventing "copyright controls" to secure the ability to use content that is not copyrighted.
Using any means necessary to access content that is illegitimately copyright
protected may violate "copyright-related" laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, but it hardly seems immoral. Quite the contrary, it
actually evokes the specter of well-warranted civil disobedience.
e.

Something for Nothing: The Gap-cultivating Impact of the Lack of
Formalities and Low Threshold of Originality

Additionally, a norm gap-wrenching backlash may be created when
individuals learn that copyright protections vest automatically, or gain an
awareness of the low level of originality required to obtain a defensible
copyright. Again, this assumes that a person actively attempts to educate
herself about the precepts of copyright law, perhaps in a laudable effort to
be "copyright compliant." What she learns, however, may make her question how much respect or deference copyright holders have actually
"earned" through labor or monetary investments.
126. Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four Causes of Action, IJ. INTELL. PROP. L. 259, 261 (1994) [hereinafter Heald, Payment Demands]; see
also Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of PublicDomain Music, 46 DuKE LJ. 241, 255-58 (1996)

[hereinafter Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric] (detailing practice of spurious claims to
copyright in musical arrangements by music publishing industry).

127. See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use
Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 166 (2001).
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elimination of formalities

In 1989, the United States dispensed with the requirements that copyrighted works be registered with the U.S. Copyright Office, or contain formulaic copyright notices, to be eligible for copyright protection. 28 This
was done to bring the country into compliance with the Berne Convention, and to meet its obligations as a signatory of this multilateral copyright
treaty. 129 However, eliminating formalities occasioned a tectonic shift in
the way individuals must look at the universe of potentially copyrighted
content. When copyright notices were required, one could assume that a
work that did not bear a current copyright notice was in the public domain. Now, almost fifteen years after the copyright notice requirement
was jettisoned, one must assume that almost everything is copyrighted until proven otherwise. 131 As a consequence, copyright protections may take
the form of background noise, rather than important and attention-worthy constructs. Copyrights are everywhere, and therefore are nothing
special.
The realization that copyright protection adheres automaticallywithout paperwork, consultations with attorneys or bureaucratic entanglement-may also devalue the perceived significance of copyrights. While
many people may be constitutionally disposed toward enjoying free
lunches, the contravening maxim that "you get what you pay for" would
suggest that copyright protections that are freely and effortlessly obtainable are of little inherent worth, and therefore undeserving of much
respect.
ii.

low level of originality

Judicial repudiation of copyright justifications such as "industrious
collection" and "sweat of the brow" made sense from a doctrinal standpoint to those who understood the importance of divorcing determinations about the scope of copyright protections from subjective judgment
calls about the quality or "protection worthiness" of a disputed work.' 1"
However, replacing heuristics that evoke hard work with a requirement of
a low level (or "scintilla") of originality seems to suggest that a work will
qualify for copyright protection even if few resources or very little effort
128. See, e.g., 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 7.02[C] [3] (2002) (noting that following U.S. implementation of Berne Convention Implementation Act, on or after March 1, 1989, notice was no longer required
for copyright protection).
129. Pursuant to The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
mandatory copyright notice requirements ceased as of March 1, 1989, but incentives for the voluntary use of copyright notices were retained. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 1,102 Stat. 2853 (1988).

130. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Presentation at Duke Public Domain Conference, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/realcast.htm

(last visited July 30,

2002).
131. See, e.g., Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 352
(1991) (explaining that copyright is reward for difficult task of fact compilation).
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was invested in it. This can create a perception that copyright owners can
"work the system" and receive something valuable (a defensible, infringable copyright), for almost nothing. If copyright owners are regarded as
skilled manipulators of the copyright law, copyright law itself can appear
to be somewhat of a scam, and therefore undeserving of respectful
adherence.
In a related vein, content owners' attempts to portray starving artists
and musicians as the real victims of copyright infringement are significantly undermined when lawsuits over the copyrightability of pedestrian
items such as phone books or page numbers are publicized. Ordinary observers would not likely consider data collections to be creative works, nor
their compilers to be "authors" in any meaningful sense. Even an accurate
and succinct explanation of the concept that uncopyrightable facts and
ideas can become the sole underpinnings of an enforceable compilation
copyright when they are selected, coordinated and arranged with a "scin132
tilla" of originality is likely to be met with confusion and incredulity.
Additionally, press reports about seemingly unmeritorious copyright
suits brought against successful authors, 133 (for example, the widely publicized but so far stunningly unsuccessful copyright infringement suit
against Harry Potter author J.K Rowling1 34 ), or on behalf of long dead
authors (for example, the "Wind Done Gone" infringement suit brought
by "the estate of" Gone With the Wind author Margaret Mitchell 135 ) may
taint the entire concept of copyright with an aura of gamesmanship and
illegitimacy. In the first example, the unknown author suing Rowling has
been portrayed as a jealous, opportunistic crank who is using copyright
law as a tool of extortion.' 3 6 In the second, a lay person might reasonably
132. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2001) (defining "compilation" as collection of
preexisting materials so that result constitutes piece of original authorship); Feist,
499 U.S. at 363 (stating that works must have more than de minimis amount of
creativity to receive copyright protection).
133. See Julie Dunn, Muggles From Earlier Time Haunt Hogwarts Express, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2001, at C2 (explaining challenges to "Harry Potter" books' authenticity); David D. Kirkpatrick, Harry Potter and the Battle Over Creativity, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at Al, available at http://www.cesnur.org/recens/potter_08.htm ("Legal challenges filed by the famous and the little-known alike over
the originality of creative works have proliferated steadily over the last 20 years,
partly because of the soaring value of intellectual property in a media-saturated
culture.").
134. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 133, at C2 (discussing infringement suit by
creator of "Larry Potter" character); Kirkpatrick, supra note 133 (same); see also
Tom Perotta, Judge Throws Out 'HarryPotter' Copyright Suit, at http://www.law.com
(last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
135. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282 (11th
Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff would most likely be unsuccessful in overcoming
defendant's assertion of defense of fair use).
136. See, e.g., Linton Weeks, Muggle Versus Wizard; "HarryPotter" Crew Sues Author Who Says Her Ideas Were Lifted, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2001, at C1 (examining
infringment claims of "Larry Potter" author).
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wonder why copyright law potentially enables dead authors to reach from
137
the grave to silence living writers.
f. Some People Are Unrepentant Copyright Infringers
Content users are decidedly not assumed to hold values that predispose them toward non-infringing use behaviors. Copyright holders seem
to have little confidence that the number of consumers who have internalized copyright-respecting social norms is adequate to render their copyrights sufficiently profitable. Yet as Albert Einstein once observed,
humankind would be in a poor way if ethical behavior were driven only by
fear of punishment and hope of reward after death. 138 There is in fact
reason to believe that individuals will respect copyrights even without being threatened with dire consequences for not doing so. Robert Cooter
claims that the extent to which an individual has internalized a social
norm can be measured by how much she will pay to conform to it.139 In
the copyright context, respect for copyrights might be measured by how
much a person is willing to pay for goods that embody copyrighted works;
or by how many free or inexpensive unauthorized copies a person is willing to forgo; or by how much inconvenience a person is willing to bear to
avoid infringing. The substantial profits often reaped by large content
owners such as the music, movie and publishing industries suggests that
individuals will and do respect copyrights to some degree and in some
contexts.
One of the doomsday scenarios painted by a music industry research
company in April of 2000 was that "within three years the industry could
lose as many as one out of six CD sales to Internet piracy."' 140 While onesixth of sales certainly represents a lot of revenue to lose, the implications
of a prediction that five-sixths (or about 83%) of presumably copyright137. See Gerald Nachman, Editorial, Let's Say Enough to Copyright Welfare, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at A26 (noting that heirs of copyright holders refuse to allow
reprint of work).
138. "A man's ethical behavior should be based effectually on sympathy, education, and social ties and needs; no religious basis is necessary. Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope
of reward after death." ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE EXPANDED QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 206
(Alice Calaprice ed., 2000); see also Cooter, supra note 18, at 1577 (quoting Gerard
Lynch). Lynch stated:
What society wants from its members, in any case, is not an intelligent
calculation of the costs and benefits of abiding by its basic norms, but
more or less unthinking obedience to them. To the extent people are
specifically comparing the costs and benefits of breaking criminal laws,
the battle is already lost; many of them must conclude, in particular situations, that the calculus favors law-breaking .... For society to function,
most people have to obey the law for reasons of conscience and conviction, and not out of fear of punishment.
Id.
139. See id. at 1581 (discussing people's willingness to perform civic acts).
140. Mann, supra note 34, at 40 (referencing warning by Bernstein Investment Research Group).
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respectful CD purchases will still occur, despite the allure of free Internet
file trading, cannot be dismissed as meaningless. In addition, when a CD
that contains songs easily available for free on the Internet sells 2.4 million
authorized copies in a week, 14 1 books that could easily be scanned and
infringingly distributed over the Internet sell millions of ink and paper
copies 142 or movies draw millions of people to theaters and video rental
stores despite DeCSS, 14 3 it looks like copyright laws are working fairly
44
well.1
That being said, however, it is clear that some cohort of people will
not pay for copyrighted content if they can obtain it for free. Content
owners assert that, as a consequence, the government should facilitate (or

at least allow) copyright protections to be reconfigured to thwart copy141. See id. at 56 (citing first-week sales of 'N Sync's No Strings Attached). As
Mann observed:
Ascertaining the financial impact of file-swapping is difficult-indeed, the
discussion quickly verges on the theological. Because not everyone who
downloads a song would otherwise have paid for the compact disc, one
can't simply multiply the number of illicitly traded CDs by the average
price of a CD to estimate the economic impact of unauthorized copying.
So pro- and anti-sharing advocates rely on indirect data. In May, Reciprocal, a start-up in New York that hopes to make money from secure
downloads, released a study showing that CD sales at stores near colleges-thought to be hotbeds of Napster users-had slipped slightly,
whereas overall CD sales had risen. Scoffing, pro-Napster forces pointed
out that this year, when MP3 is supposedly destroying the music business,
the industry is selling more compact discs than ever before. Such sales
increases, in the view of John Perry Barlow, an advocate of sharing and a
former lyricist for the Grateful Dead, are the logical outcome of musicswapping, which exposes audiences to new music. Counterargument: it is
simply the demographic boom in the number of teenagers that is propelling the rise in music sales. Counter-counterargument: this spring new
records by Eminem, Britney Spears, and 'N Sync were easily available on
the Internet, yet buyers mobbed stores for all three; No StringsAttached, by
'N Sync, sold 2.4 million copies in its first week-more than any other
album in history.
Id.
142. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Book Returns Rise, Signaling a Downturn in
the Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at CI [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Book Returns
Rise] (noting "booming" sales at online bookstores); David D. Kirkpatrick, A Year
Only as a Best Seller at No. 1 Chain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at C1 [hereinafter
Kirkpatrick, A Year Only] (stating that over past fifteen years "[t]he annual sales of
the top sellers rose from the hundreds of thousands to several million copies, even
though the number of books sold each year increased only slightly").
143. SeeJack Valenti, Valenti Reports Record-BreakingBox Office Results, Continued
Decrease in Production Costs and PraisesMovie Industry War Efforts in Showest Address, at
http://www.mpaa.org/jack/pressreleases
(Mar. 5, 2002) (gloating about
Hollywood's record revenues in 2001). Hollywood's 2001 revenues were higher
than ever in human history, with theater admissions the highest since 1959 and
U.S. box office receipts alone at $8.41 billion. See id. (observing, however, that
over 270,000 movies are illegally downloaded every day and noting that number is
increasing).
144. But see, e.g., Halpern, supra note 35, at 569-72 (recounting "pirate
stories").
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right free riders, decreasing accessibility and restricting use of copyrighted
materials for everyone else in the process. Whether the pessimistic view of
human behavior underlying this perspective is empirically justified is a
question no one seems to want to ask or answer. If people internalize the
assumption that everyone will always infringe copyrights if given an opportunity, perhaps they will live up or down to these negative expectations in
ways that exacerbate norm gaps.
5.

Proselytizing' 45 and CoercingNew Norms

Bob Hamilton once observed that "an interesting characteristic about
money is that the people who have it don't like to lose it; indeed, they will
take many, even extreme, steps to avoid losing money."1 46 Large-scale
content owners fear that norms of unauthorized copying and sharing will
deprive them of opportunities to realize profits from their copyrighted
works, and have reacted accordingly. Members of the resource rich music
industry, for example, have used every weapon in their arsenals to dislodge the disharmonious norm of unauthorized song sharing over the Internet that has developed among a rather large section of the population.
Music industry tactics run from persuasion, in which they proselytize respect for their copyrights, to coercion, a strategy that one commentator
147
has described as "legislation, litigation and leg-breaking."
a.

Proselytizing

Copyright holders want obeisance by consumers to a normative interpretation of copyright laws that provides broad and powerful monopoly
rights, because this will maximize control over and profitability of copyrighted works. They generally do not want to publicly acknowledge that
the copyright law has goals other than maximizing the income stream of
145. I borrow the term "proselytize" from Steven Hetcher, but use it in a
much more sardonic manner than he has employed it. See Hetcher, supra note 15,
at 151 ("The word 'proselytize' is appropriate because it would be reductionist to
describe these entrepreneurs as merely fostering preferences for data privacy.
Privacy norm proselytizers seek to arouse the moral consciousness of consumers
vis-A-vis websites' collection and use of personal data.").
146. Robert W. Hamilton, ConstitutionalIssues Involving Use of the Internet: Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 733, 736
(1998).
147. Mann, supra note 34, at 41; see also Richard Barbrook, How the Music Industry Blew It, SALON (Oct. 30, 2001), at http://www.salon.com/tech/books/2001/
11/30/sonicboom/print.html (reviewing John Alderman's SONic BOOK).
During the late 1990s, while so many others were succumbing to dot-coin
hype, the music business stubbornly resisted any accommodation with the
new technology. Its corporate leaders used all of their lobbying power
and legal resources to attack the Net. They had the copyright laws
strengthened, blocked software development and closed down Web sites.
They even successfully prosecuted Napster-one of the most popular services on the Net.
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copyright owners. Instead, they castigate copiers, labeling them pirates
and thieves and sometimes employing stunning hyperbole. 148 For example, at the 2002 Grammy Awards, Michael Greene, the president of the
National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences, revealed that he had
paid three college students to download as many music files as possible
over the Internet to prove the scope of the music piracy problem, and
claimed that they had managed to download 6,000 songs in two days. 1 49
The students themselves later admitted that they had spent three days on
the project, half the files never completely downloaded and 4,000 of the
songs were obtained through private messaging with their friends rather
than downloaded from publicly accessible websites. 1 50 The exercise was
apparently supposed to underscore the R.I.A.A.'s announcement that its
data showed a ten-percent decrease in music sales, purportedly due to online piracy and CD burning.1 5 1 Similarly, Metallica attorney Howard King
rhetorically equated using Napster with thievery, stating, "At this moment,
all around the world, hundreds of thousands of people are breaking into
record stores and stealing CDs and tapes. Or they might as well be."' 52 In
their complaint filed against Napster and several universities, plaintiffs
Metallica and Creeping Death Music accused Napster users of exhibiting
"the moral fiber of common looters."1 5 3
148. See, e.g., Metallica Sues Napster, Universities, Citing Copyright Infringement and
RICO Violations, LiveDaily (Apr. 13, 2000), at http://www.livedaily.com/news/
781.html [hereinafter Metallica Sues Napster] (last visited July 30, 2002).
Searching for the band's tracks and downloading them on Napster, she
said was like 'walking by a Tower Records or HMV music store, seeing
that the cash register was open and that no one was in the store, and
helping yourself to whatever was available,' according to Gayle Fine of Q
Prime, Metallica's management company). According to Metallica drummer, Lars Ulrich, "From a business standpoint [trading files via Napster],
this is about piracy-a.k.a. taking something that doesn't belong to you;
and that is morally and legally wrong. The trading of such informationwhether it's music, videos, photos, or whatever-is, in effect, trafficking
in stolen goods....
Id.
149. See Neil Strauss, DownloadingFiles and Storms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at
E3 (discussing Greene's experiment).
150. See id. (explaining problems students encountered while attempting to
download music files).
151. See, e.g., Chris Ayres, Fall in Sales Casts Cloud on Grammys, LONDON TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2002, Business (stating that "music industry is being brought to its knees
by Internet piracy").
152. Howard King, Two Views on the Copyright Dispute Between Metallica and Napster (CNN television broadcast, May 19, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com/LAW/columns/dual.metallica.05.19/ (last visited July 30, 2002).
153. Lisa Bowman, Metallica's Napster Hit: 'Enter Lawman', ZDNet (Apr. 13,
2001), at http://zdnet.com/2100-11-519908.html?legacy=zdnn; see also Michelle
Goldberg, Metallica Takes on Napster, THE STANDARD (Apr. 14, 2000), at http://
www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,14119,00.html (citing ZDNet's report about Metallica's press release).
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Robert Cooter has asserted that a person who intrinsically values obeying a social norm will pay something to do so, independent of resulting
advantages or disadvantages, 154 but an individual who does not intrinsically value obeying the social norm will do so only if it has instrumental
value, such as generating praise from neighbors, or it facilitates the making or saving of money.15 5 Copyright owners hope that if enough people
internalize their preferred normative view of high barrier copyrights protection, non-permissive uses will dramatically decrease. Individuals who
intrinsically value complying with this new copyright norm will "pay" to
obey it by foregoing acts of unauthorized copying. Those who do not intrinsically esteem obeying the norm will still honor it if the instrumental
value of doing so is high enough, and if the likely consequences of making
an unauthorized copy are confiscation of the work and legal censure, it
probably will be. Whether the threat of peer censure would provide an
effective deterrent is decidedly less certain.
Content owners would prefer people to respect copyrights as matters
of conscience and conviction, rather than because they fear punishment,
because infringing acts may be hard or expensive to detect. In addition,
content owners do not want to alienate their customer base by using resource intensive legal means to pursue small scale copying by individuals if
they can avoid it. 156 Copyright owners have therefore been attempting to
shift the social meaning of unauthorized access and copying from morally
neutral to morally reprehensible, by using lobbying, the legal system and
publicity and "education" campaigns to influence public opinion away
from any perception that unauthorized uses of copyrighted works are so57
cially legitimate or worthwhile.1
154. See Cooter, supra note 18, at 1583-84 (noting that economists describe
intrinsic values as "tastes" or "preferences").
155. See id. (explaining that, in economic terms, "intrinsic value implies a
'taste' for obeying the norm").
156. See, e.g., Marilynn Wheeler, Has Metallica Misjudged Napster?, ZDNet, at
http://zdnet.com/2100-11-520410.html?legacy=zdnn (last visited July 30, 2002)
(quotingJames Hetfield) ("We are going after Napster, the main artery here. All
the people doing illegal things here, whether with good or bad intentions, we are
not going after individual fans. Metallica has always felt fans are family."). But see,
Rueters, RJAA Assists in Student's Probe, WIRED (Sept. 18, 2000), at http://
www.wired.coin/news/print/0,1294,38863,00.html (noting that Oklahoma State
University student had his personal computer and CD recorder seized after university officials were notified by Recording Industry Association of America that he
may have downloaded as many as 1,000 Internet music files). The unnamed student was not arrested, and there was no evidence that he was selling the files or
profiting in any way from the downloads. See id. (discussing outcome of
investigation).
157. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Justice Department and Information Technology Association of America, a trade group, are engaged in initiatives
to educate children about cyber ethics, and apparently equate making unauthorized copies of MP3 files with hacking and other cyber crimes. See Associated Press,
FBI Pushes For Cyber-Ethics Education, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2000), at http://
www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti640.htm (last visited July 30, 2000) (discussing online piracy and hacking).
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In recent infringement actions aimed at file sharing technologies,
content owners have been wildly successful at painting copying technologies as "contributory infringers," 158 yet there is little indication that these
actions are increasing overall societal respect for copyrights. 159 The development likely most noticeable to average content consumers is that the
courts are responding to copyright owners' concerns by legally disabling
60
innovative technologies and making them unavailable to everyone,'1 copyright infringer and copyright-respecter alike. The outcomes of these
court cases are undoubtedly signaling something to individual content
consumers, but whether that message is effectuating the copyright use
norm shifts that copyright owners desire is unclear.
b.

Coercion

Many copyright holders have adopted a curious strategy of castigating
their potential customers for unauthorized copying, but stopping short of
actually suing them. 161 The prevailing assumption seems to be that no
one would voluntarily choose to pay for copyrighted content, so everyone
must be coerced into doing so. According to Robert Cooter:
Economics models of law typically accept the "bad man" approach and add an element to it: rationality. A bad man who is
158. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 34, at 41-44 (noting that music industry has
induced Congress to revamp unfavorable laws, and that some music industry lawsuits have been successful).
159. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law And The Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1245, 1365 (2001) (discussing impact of unauthorized copying). Lui noted:
If the concern is the increased potential for piracy presented by digital
copying, then surely increasing the already underenforced substantive
rights will have little impact on reducing piracy. Rather, it will only have
the impact of making infringing much activity that was previously not infringing, thereby leading to increasing disrespect for existing copyright
laws.
Id.
160. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 430 (2d Cir.
2001) (disabling decryption program which circumvented encryption technology
that prevented copying DVDs); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029
(9th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court's preliminary injunction on Napster's file
sharing operations); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349,
353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that defendant infringed plaintiffs copyrighted works
by copying their recordings onto computer servers and replaying them for subscribers); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 226-27
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (ordering preliminary injunction on decryption program which
decoded DVDs); King & Terraciano, supra note 3 (explaining that Scour, Inc.'s
financial troubles began when copyright infringement suits were filed against company, forcing them into bankruptcy); Scarlet Pruitt, In US Case, KaZaA Surrenders
to Paper Tiger, Itworld.com (May 24, 2002), at http://www.itworld.com/Net/4087/
020524kazaa (stating that KaZaA could not afford lawsuits brought against it by
music and motion picture industry).
161. For a discussion of the music industry's attack on its customers, see supra
note 153 and accompanying text.
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rational decides whether or not to obey the law by calculating his
own benefits and costs, including the risk of punishment. The
rational bad man breaks the law whenever the gain to him ex162
ceeds the risk of punishment.
Large-scale content owners seem to hold the view that most consumers are
"bad but rational men" who will infringe copyrights at every opportunity
163
unless they are dissuaded from doing so by the fear of punishment.
There certainly seems to be empirical evidence that some acts of unauthorized copying are not easily dissuaded, but whether this makes the copiers
"bad men" depends on one's perspective. Content owners would certainly
like unauthorized copiers to believe themselves bad, but they appear to
realize that achieving this objective alone will not be enough to realize
"copyright absolutism" among consumers.
The music recording industry has tried to thwart the unauthorized
sharing of digital music with every means at its disposal, yet it has apparently accomplished little in the way of engendering reverence for copyrights among certain song-trading sectors of the populace because a
64
substantial portion is still engaging in peer-to-peer music file trading.
Ostensibly fearing the copyright evil that consumers may do, they and
162. Cooter, supra note 18, at 1591.
163. See Ann Bartow, Arresting Technology: An Essay, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
95, 118 (2001) ("Most Americans are probably not the scofflaws that content owners make us out to be.").
164. See, e.g.,
Expert Report of Prof. Lawrence Lessig Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 26(a) (2) (B) at 66, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001), affd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002), at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
lessig/content/testimony/nap/napd3.doc.html (explaining viability of stopping
Internet file-sharing service web sites). In his expert report in the Napster case,
Professor Lessig discussed the difficulties in stopping online piracy using the example of Gnutella:
Gnutella is a simple substitute for Napster. It facilitates a better peer-topeer searching capability and is operated in a far more decentralized
manner. Because of this architecture, there would be no way, under the
present architecture of the net, for a court to stop the deployment of
Gnutella without essentially shutting down a substantial portion of the
Internet. Gnutella is simply an application that runs on the net; there is
no central server for this application; links are made in a chain that itself
is not consistent or easily tracked.
Id.
Other possible substitutes for Napster include Hotline, iMesh and KaZaA. See, e.g.,
An Underground Guide to Napster Alternatives, UnderGroundOnline, at http://
www.ugo.com/channels/music/features/napsteralternatives/imesh.asp [hereinafter UndergroundGuide] (last visited July 30, 2002) (evaluating various alternatives to
Napster). Still others include AIM, ICQ and IRC. See Robert Vamosi, PiratedMovies: Now Playing on a Server Near You, ZDNet (May 8, 2002), at http://www.zdnet.
com/anchordesk/stories/story/0,10738,2864410,00.html
(last visited July 30,
2002) (describing ease of online piracy via "chat services"). Mojo Nation is yet
another alternative. See, e.g.,
Damien Cave, The Mojo Solution, SALON (Oct. 9, 2000),
at http://www.salon.com/tech/view/2000/l0/09/mojo-nation/print.html
(describing MoJo Nation as "nothing short of the first-ever encryption-protected,
user-run, open-source, file-sharing marketplace. It essentially takes the decentral-
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other content owners have convinced Congress to make circumventing
"copy control" devices illegal, and to make the criminal penalties for some
165
acts of copyright infringement greater than those for armed robbery.
They purport to believe that committing substantial acts of copyright infringement is so inherently logical, reasonable and attractive that even
with the obvious self-help option of implementing technological barriers
to unauthorized copying, the legal strictures against performing such activities must be rigorous and the consequences for flouting them severe.
c.

Potential Effects of Norm Shifting

Attempts by content owners to proselytize and coerce adherence to
copyright holder friendly norms represent the convergence of two important phenomena. First, content owners are pushing for greater respect for
copyright laws, based on the premise that greater respect for copyrights is
necessary given the "dangers" posed by new technologies, particularly the
Internet. They want internalized respect for copyrights to spread among
the populace and the closure of norm gaps, and hope to achieve these
goals by convincing consumers that "copyright-respectful" norm adherence is socially responsible and morally correct.
Second, however, is the fact that content owners are simultaneously
using certain features of digital formats to strengthen their ability to control distribution of works, and to fundamentally change the nature and
scope of unauthorized use and access privileges accorded by longstanding
precepts of copyright law as applied to analog works. Real space formats
allow unfettered non-permissive use and access through libraries, personal
sharing, first sale doctrine, fair use and limitations on scope of copyrights
imposed by the idea/expression dichotomy. Digital formats, however,
raise the possibility of tracking, controlling and profiting from every use of
a work, and narrowing the scope of (or even eliminating) unauthorized
uses whether they are infringing or not.166
Only the first goal, encouraging respect for copyrights, is legitimate
and deserving of assistance, though only to the extent that the new social
norm recognizes appropriate limits on the scope of copyrights. The second objective is unequivocally improper, as curtailing unauthorized but
fair uses will be detrimental to society and contrary to the very goals of the
ized model of other Napster alternatives like Freenet and Gnutella and adds on a
layer of laissez-faire experimentation.").
165. Civil damages are available under § 1203 of the DMCA; the criminal provision, § 1204, permits fines of up to $500,000 and prison terms of up to five years
for the first offense, and up to $ 1 million and ten years for any subsequent offense. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (1998) (decribing criminal penalties for copyright
infringement), with MASSACHUSETTS COURT

SYSTEM,

Sentencing Guidelines Grid, at

http://www.state.ma.us/courts/formsandguidelines/sentencing/grid.html
(last
visited July 30, 2002) (mandating eight to twelve years for manslaughter; five to
seven years for armed robbery or rape).
166. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 29, at 615 (explaining concepts of "Copyright Norms" and "Freedom Imperialism").
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copyright laws. 16 7 Codifying real space norms such as fair use, thereby
imperializing and importing them into the sphere of digital formats, can
advance the potentially beneficial aspects of the first goal of copyright
owners, while thwarting the counterproductive second one.
Copyright holders would have individuals obey a social norm in which
only authorized and permissive uses are made of copyrighted content.
Conforming to any social norm may impose costs on individuals such as

financial expenditures, inconvenience and lost opportunities, but coterminously may convey the benefits of group approval and a good reputation.168

If respecting absolutist copyrights became a widespread social

norm, exercising fair use rights could be seen as a deviation warranting
sanction. This would serve the short-term control and profit maximizing
goals of content owners, but undermine the goals of information dispersal

and access to ideas that fair use is intended to realize.
To illustrate, copyright holders are limited to statutory damages for
acts of infringement committed by educators who believed in good faith
that they were exercising fair use rights under section 504(c) (2) of the
Copyright Act. Educators can therefore make unauthorized uses of copyrighted works knowing that, as long as they behave reasonably, the penalty
for exceeding fair use will be modest. Social norms that discouraged any

unauthorized uses of copyrighted works would add censure and other informal sanctions to these penalties, adding to the costs of exceeding fair
use, and exacerbating the risks of exercising fair use rights at all. 16 9
Moreover, if the "public interest" justification for unauthorized uses
of copyrighted materials is consistently and visibly invoked exclusively by
"evil" infringement defendants, the concept of fair use may be tainted and

ignored as the last refuge of scoundrels. Exercising fair use privileges
could become something for which one felt the necessity to make excuses
or apologize.
B.

"Use Norms" in the Correct Normative Framework: Copyright Infringements
Are Injuries Rather Than Thefts

The trend toward "propertization" of copyrights is well chronicled by
legal scholars and others.170 In some respects and contexts, treating copy167. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
580 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that challenge is to strike balance
between interests of authors and free flowing ideas).
168. See Cooter, supra note 18, at 1584 (showing cost of obeying and willingness to pay norm).
169. See David Nimmer, Remarks at the Duke Law School Conference on the
Public Domain (Nov. 9-11, 2001), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/realcast.htm (last visited July 30, 2002).
170. See Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience "Recoding"
Rights-Comment on Robert H. Rotstein, "Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and
the Fiction of the Work", 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805, 827 (1993) (outlining objections
to unauthorized depropertization); Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to ProfessorBenker, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 605, 610-11 (2000) (describing concept of properitiza-
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righted works like chattels, if not parcels of land, has become almost a
norm, but one that is challenged by a divergence of opinion as to how
allegations of infringement ought to be characterized and disposed of. An
act of copyright infringement is, at its essential level, most accurately described as a tort. Copyrights come under the rubric of "intellectual property," and many commentators rhetorically equate unauthorized uses of
copyrighted works with property takings and theft. 17 1 Nevertheless, infringing acts actually inflict injuries that are closer to trespass or nuisance
than to property theft, because nothing tangible is taken or withheld from
a copyright owner. 172 Rather, the value of the copyrighted work is diminished (and a copyright holder is consequently injured) only to the extent
that the copyright owner's right to control and exploit the work is compromised by acts that exceed fair use and reach the level of copyright
173
infringement.
Divining the extent of injury to a copyright occasioned by an act of
infringement such as the making of three unauthorized copies is difficult
and speculative, but a more doctrinally coherent approach than automatically concluding that the existence of three unauthorized copies means
the work was stolen three times. Were the three unauthorized copies sold,
and therefore substituted for three sales of authorized copies? Or, have
they been made and retained by the owner of an authorized copy? Were
the copies made by a so-called pirate, who was hoping to sell them illicitly
and reap an undeserved profit? Or were they made by a public school that
was unable to purchase "authorized" copies due to budgetary constraints,
or because the copied work is out of print? Was the unauthorized use
unusual in nature, or a type of use that is commonly made, and therefore
a norm?
A tort-based inquiry into the extent and reasons for the alleged injury
wrought by the unauthorized copying or use is more likely to lead to ajust
outcome and fair award of damages, if any, to the complaining copyright
holder. Copyright owners would usually prefer all unauthorized copies be
tion of information as "information that would be available if paid for"); Margaret
Jane Radin, Online Standardizationand the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1133 (2002) (stating that there is propertization by means of
copyright and patent).
171. For a discussion of such equation in the music industry, see supra notes
152-53 and accompanying text.
172. See Dan L. Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.
1, 15 (1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.ta.ABSTRACTID=
223513 (stating that "the elements of common law trespass to chattel fit poorly in
the context of cyberspace"); Brief of Amici Curiae by Mark A. Lemley et al., at 1319, Bidder's Edge, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., (No. 00-15995) (9th Cir. 2000), at http://
www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/lemley/bedgeami.pdf (analyzing injury requirement in common law trespass to chattels in context of cyberspace).
173. But see Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 1 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 638 (1996) ("While we protect real property to protect the
owner from harm, we protect intellectual property to provide the owner sufficient
incentive to produce such property.").
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treated as similarly situated thefts, but a factual and situational inquiry is
more appropriate, though it will not necessarily be more protective of the
right to engage in unauthorized fair use copying.
1.

The Role of Custom

In the context of ordinary negligence, Steven Hetcher analyzed the
role that social norms and customs play in tort law, and asserted: "When
people injure one another while conforming to social customs, it is the
duty of tort law to determine which of these injuries merits legal redress."'1 74 Hetcher observed:

In negligence litigation, injurers attempt to establish their conformity to custom as evidence of due care while victims attempt
to establish the injurer's failure to conform as evidence of negligence. When conformity is used defensively, the injurer in effect
asks: "How could I have done wrong, as I was simply doing what
others do in similar situations? How could all the conformers to
this widespread social custom be negligent?" . . . When the rule
of custom is used offensively, the victim in effect complains:
"Surely the injurer was negligent as she failed to exhibit the degree of caution that is so obviously required that is has become
1 75

customary."

This analysis is adaptable to copyright use cases, where it is the duty of
copyright law to determine which unauthorized uses of copyrighted works
constitute fair use, and which merit legal redress because a use has infringed a copyright. Fair use is by definition a defense to a claim of copyright infringement, and a defendant claiming fair use might assert that a
particular type of unauthorized use was customary.
Custom appeared to play a significant part in several important copyright decisions by the Supreme Court, including the majority opinion in
the Sony case. 1 76 In Sony, by the time the dispute was litigated up to the
Supreme Court, the ownership of videocassette tape recorders (VCRs or
VTRs) was widespread, and a large segment of the populace had grown
accustomed to using them to tape and "time shift" television programs.
The text of the majority opinion makes explicit and extensive reference to
the fact that "Petitioner Sony manufacture [d] millions of Betamax video tape
recorders and market[ed] these devices through numerous retail establishments," 177 referenced "millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of tele174. Steven Hetcher, CreatingSafe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1999).
175. Id. at 5.
176. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984) (discussing custom); see also LARDER, supra note 50, at 228-32 (recounting odd aspects of Sony decision).
177. Sony, 464 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added).
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vised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational programs such as
Mister Rogers' Neighborhood,"' 78 and stated:
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the
elected representatives of the millions of people who watch television
every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of
179
machines that make such copying possible.
Copyright holders are likely to use custom offensively when it is advantageous to them such as when the defendant has been engaging in
copying activities for which others customarily obtain permission and/or
pay royalties.' 80 Nevertheless, "market effect" is fortuitously invoked to
overshadow or supplant custom to defeat fair use defenses raised by accused infringers. 181 For example, in Texaco v. American Geophysical
Union,182 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
that the longstanding practice by researchers of photocopying articles of
interest out of circulating scientific journals was not fair use, and was
therefore copyright infringing. Unauthorized photocopying of articles of
interest, though customary, was held to harm the nascent market for pho178. Id. at 446 (emphasis added)

179. Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
180. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Gap, 246 F.3d 152, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2001) ("In rejecting
the defendant's claim of fair use, we observed that while a finding of infringement
would not necessarily prevent the defendant from publishing his expression, 'it
does recognize that any such exploitation must at least entail "paying the customary price.""'); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)); cf. Green Book
Int'l Corp. v. Inunity Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 (D. Mass. 1998) ("Consistent
with custom and practice in the off-the-shelf software industry, each package of
GBook, including the complimentary package that Sotirescu gave to Simmel and
each of the three packages that InUnity purchased, contains within it a so-called
'shrink wrap' license."); see also Bartow, supra note 51, at 185 (discussing letter sent
by publishers threatening universities and copy shops with copyright infringement
suits following Kinko's decision). The Kinko's opinion contains language suggesting the defendant's actions were "grossly out of line with accepted fair use
principles." Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1534
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). Accordingly, thejudge was apparently convinced that some norm
or custom had been violated. See id. Additionally, in Mich. Doc. Servs., the majority
pointed to the fact that some Ann Arbor copy shops were paying permission fees as
evidence that the defendant ought to do the same. See Princeton U. Press v. Mich.
Doc. Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting common practice of permission payments by most copy shops in Ann Arbor area).
181. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
569 (1985) ("[A] fair use doctrine that permits extensive publication ... from an
unreleased manuscript without ...consent poses substantial potential for damage
to the marketability of the [original work]."); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco,
Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed by 516 U.S. 1005 (1995) (stating
that publishers demonstrated substantial harm to value of copyrights due to lost
licensing revenues and subscriptions); Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1534 ("Kinko's copying unfavorably impacts upon sales of books and collections of permissions fees.").
182. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
dismissed by 516 U.S. 1005 (1995).
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tocopy royalties. The complaining copyright owners convinced the Texaco
Court to embrace and judicially endorse a new norm that imposed on
research institutions a duty to either pay photocopy royalties to publishers,
83
or to obtain photocopy licenses from the Copyright Clearance Center.1
2.

The Impact of Strict Liability

Copyright infringement is a strict liability tort, which, as a doctrinal
matter, explicitly takes account of the accidental or intentional nature of
184
the infringing acts only in the calculation of statutory damages awards.
Such strict liability provides copyright owners with a broad scope of protection against direct infringement. If liability for infringement were limited to intentional conduct on the part of an alleged infringer, this would
result in a significant narrowing of the tort when compared to strict liability.1 85 An intermediate scope of protection for copyrighted works would
result if infringement liability were premised upon a finding of negligent
conduct by the entity accused of infringement. 18 6 Strict liability eliminates the need for plaintiffs to muster certain types of evidentiary proof.
In some copyright disputes, however, establishing liability for direct
infringement will generally be facilitated by, and may even require, proof
183. See id. at 929 (affirming district court's finding that revenues would increase significantly because Texaco would pay royalties to publishers for right to
photocopy, negotiate licenses or acquire some form of photocopying license from
Copyright Clearance Center).
184. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1999) (providing remedies for infringement).
Copyright owners who can prove that infringement was willful can boost statutory
damages awards substantially (from between $750 and $30,000 to as much as
$150,000). See id. "Willfulness" in this context is generally defined as "knowing
infringement," something more than a mere intent to infringe. See 4 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[B] [3] (1999). Willful
infringers can also be subject to criminal penalties under § 506(a) of the Copyright Act and 18 U.S.C. § 2319, even if the infringing acts are committed without a
profit motive on the infringer's part. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1997) ("Any person
who infringes a copyright willfully... (1) for purposes of commercial advantage or
private financial gain ... shall be punished as provided in section 2319 of title 18
....
.).
185. Strict liability is defined as "[I]iability without fault." BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY 1422 (7th ed. 1999). Accordingly, intent plays no role under strict liability. Were copyright law to encompass only intentional acts of infringement, rights
holders would be unable to recover damages where someone accidentally misappropriates their work and makes a profit from that mistake.
186. By contrast, the doctrine of contributory infringement has a "knowledge" requirement. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A] [2] [a] (1999). Contributory infringement empowers copyright
owners to bring infringement actions against entities that (for example) distribute
technologies that enable the copying of copyrighted works. See id. It requires copyright owners to prove that defendants have "knowledge" that the accused technology is being used extensively by others to commit commercially significant acts of
direct copyright infringement. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("If plaintiffs can prove the knowledge element, Netcom will be liable since ... [it failed] to stop an infringing copy from
being distributed worldwide.").
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of something very much resembling negligence or even intentional conduct. Mounting a successful copyright infringement claim requires, at a
minimum, establishing that infringing unauthorized copying has occurred. Copyright owners can enjoy the benefits of strict liability when an
infringer's motives appear pure, 187 and simultaneously reap the advantages of painting unauthorized copiers as bad actors where factual circumstances allow. Consider the scathing words of a judge who decided that a
photocopy shop that was making "multiple copies for classroom use"' 88 of
educational materials (compiled and chosen by University of Michigan
faculty members), and selling them to students, was a willful copyright infringer. Articulating a view of copyrights as chattels she wrote:
[T] he defendants have continued for an extensive period of time
to take and use the property of others for their own personal
gain. They excuse all of this by further suggesting that they do
not agree with the law and asserting that they interpret the law
differently than appellate courts that have addressed copyright
infringement, and legal scholars who have counseled them
against their practice. They would argue that their efforts to determine the law for themselves would excuse their conduct as it
might be deemed willful. This court is compelled to see this practice for what it is. The defendant is taking the property of another without right or permission, using that property for
personal gain. There simply is no excuse for this conduct. How
often this court hears as an explanation for illegal conduct a
statement or argument that "the law is wrong, so Ijust chose not
to be bound by it." There are procedures to change the law; it is
not to be violated. 189
The defendant photocopy shop was clearly making unauthorized photocopies intentionally, but was doing so believing this to be an exercise of
copyright fair use. The legal dispute concerned whether or not this photocopying could be a fair use of the copyrighted materials at issue, given
the doctrinal conflict between the profit-making nature of the photocopying, and the non-profit educational purpose to which the photocopies
were put by the end users, who were students. The defendant faced precedent in the form of a district court opinion from another circuit in which

the judge ruled against a copy shop in similar circumstances.'

9°

However,

187. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177,
181 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that defendant plagiarized song even though use was
unintentional).
188. The term "multiple copies for classroom use" is an illustrative example of
fair use listed in Section 107 of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994)
(providing examples of fair use).
189. Princeton U. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., 855 F. Supp. 905, 908 (E.D.
Mich. 1994), affd in part and vacated in part, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
190. See generally Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp.
1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that copying of book excerpts, compiling excerpts

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

57

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 13

the defendant also reasonably, if not successfully, argued that because Section 101 of the Copyright Act specifically sets out "teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use)" as an illustrative purpose for which fair
use could be made of copyrighted works, making course packs was fair
use. 19 1 Despite the plain words of the statute, the copyright owners were
able to call forth the coercive power of the state with a vengeance by convincingly painting the defendants' behavior as intentional, premeditated
theft of another's property.
In spite of the vitriolic tone of her words and the apparent certainty
by this district judge that the defendant's conduct was "inexcusable" and
"illegal," an appellate court later tacitly disavowed this qualitative assessment of the defendant's actions by overruling the district court's holding
that the defendant's activities rose to the level of willful copyright infringement. 192 In addition, the appellate court required the district courtjudge
to modify an overbroad injunction that barred the defendant from engaging in any unauthorized copying of the plaintiffs copyrighted works altogether, even if the copying fell within the tiny realm of paradigmatic and
virtually unequivocal fair use such as making a personal copy for scholarly
purposes. 193 While the flawed nature of the injunction implies a lack of
comprehension of the nuances of copyright law by the judge, it also suggests her perception that the defendant was intentionally engaging in
something illicit and destructive that needed to be unambiguously halted.
Most pertinently for the purposes of this Article, despite the strict liability
framework, the behavior and motivations of an accused copyright infringer were clearly important factors in the liability inquiry when a fair
use defense was raised. Other copy shops in the region were paying photocopy royalties to publishers when this suit was brought,1 9 4 and the defendant was punished harshly for deviating from this norm.
C.

How a Copyright Norm Can Become Law: The "Teacher Exception" to the
Work For Hire Doctrine

Norms in the guise of past practices have already found their way into
copyright jurisprudence. For example, prominent "law and economics"
into course packets and selling packets to college students without permission of
publishers violated copyright law).
191. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
192. See Princeton U. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir.
1996) (concluding that defendant's belief that copying constituted fair use was not
so unreasonable as to be deemed willful).
193. See id. at 1392-93 (remanding to district court for modifying order to
allow fair use copying of works); Mich. Doc. Sews., 855 F. Supp. at 913 (granting
injunction from any reproduction of existing or future copyrighted works) (emphasis added).
194. See Mich. Doc. Sews., 855 F. Supp. at 908 (noting that "other copy houses
similarly situated recognize the copyrighted interests, the protected materials, the
property of others, and pay the required copyright fee for use of copyrighted
materials").
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scholar and former law professorJudge Richard Posner perceived a significant "teacher exception" to the Copyright Act's work for hire doctrine that
protects professors from being treated like ordinary employees.1 9 5 The
work for hire doctrine is set out in sections 101 and 201(b) of the Copyright Act, and designates an employer (rather than the actual human creator) the author of any copyrightable work created by an employee within
the scope of his or her employment. 196 Application of the "work for hire"
doctrine in an academic context would give universities and colleges the
ability to claim both authorship and ownership of the copyrights in creative works prepared by faculty members within the scope of their employment. As a general matter, academia has never worked this way, but this
case certainly represented an attempted move in that direction.
There is a complete dearth of textual support for the teacher exception divined by Posner in either the Copyright Act or its legislative history. 19 7 In fact, Posner overtly conceded that "[tlo a literalist of statutory
interpretation, the conclusion that the [1976 Copyright] Act abolished the
[teacher] exception may seem inescapable."19 8 Nevertheless, Posner determined that universities should not be deemed the authors of the copyrighted works created by the professors they employ because of the "havoc
that such a [contrary] conclusion would wreak in the settled practices of
academic institutions, the lack of fit between the policy of the work-forhire doctrine and the conditions of academic production, and the absence
of any indication that Congress meant to abolish the teacher exception." 199 In other words, applying the work for hire doctrine to faculty
members would be contrary to the norms of academia.
Posner's analysis suggests a belief that these norms are widespread
and entrenched, and that to disregard these norms by issuing a ruling that
contravened them would be highly disruptive and counterproductive. He
observed that authority supporting the notion that scholarly writing by
teachers is presumptively not work made for hire was scanty "not because
the merit of the exception was doubted, but because, on the contrary,
virtually no one questioned that the academic author was entitled to copyright his writings." 200 In describing the history of the teacher exception,
Posner wrote:
195. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing "teacher exception").
196. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1994) (codifying work for hire doctrine).
197. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1093-94 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing
17 U.S.C. § 201(b)) ("The copyright law gives an employer the full rights in an
employee's 'work for hire' . . . unless a contract provides otherwise."). The Wein-

stein court noted that section 201(b) "is general enough to make every academic
article a 'work for hire' and, therefore, vest exclusive control in universities rather
than scholars." Id. at 1094 (citing DuBoff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v 17 (1984)).
198. Hays, 847 F.2d at 416.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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Although college and university teachers do academic writing as
a part of their employment responsibilities and use their employer's paper, copier, secretarial staff, and (often) computer facilities in that writing, the universal assumption and practice was
that (in the absence of an explicit agreement as to who had the
right to copyright) the right to copyright such writing belonged
to the teacher rather than to the college or university. There
were good reasons for the assumption. A college or university
does not supervise its faculty in the preparation of academic
books and articles, and is poorly equipped to exploit their writings, whether through publication or otherwise .... 201
Posner concluded: "The reasons for a presumption against finding academic writings to be work made for hire are as forceful today as they ever
20 2
were."
Another former law professor identified with the law and economics
viewpoint, Judge Roger Easterbrook, had reached an analogous conclusion in a similar case a year earlier, basing his ruling on a combination of
rules (in the form of a university copyright policy) and the norm of allowing academics to be deemed authors for copyright purposes, which he
believed the rules left intact. 20 3 Easterbrook observed that allowing academics who created copyrightable works during the course of their employment to own the copyrights to these works "has been the academic
tradition since copyright law began." 20 4 Like Posner, Easterbrook clearly
201. Id.
202. Id. Later in the decision Posner, a former law professor who wrote prolifically, humorously observed:
At argument Sony tried to distinguish between the [word processing
manual at issue] and what college and university teachers write on the
ground that the manual is "boring," insignificant, and in short unworthy
of legal protection. In making this argument Sony's counsel either betrayed a lack of familiarity with academic writing or was exhibiting an
exaggerated deference for members of this panel.
Id. at 417. Judge Posner also issued a ruling in a trademark case that deferred to
societal norms. See generally Ill. High Sch. Ass'n. v. GTE Vantage, 99 F.3d 244 (7th
Cir. 1996). In GTE Vantage, Posner held that where the public appropriated the
trademarked term "March Madness" from a high school basketball tournament
and began using it to refer to the NCAA college basketball tournament, the trademark became susceptible to "dual use." See id. at 247 (holding that once trade
mark becomes generic, "trademark is dead"). In reaching this decision, Posner
judicially created a wholly new category of trademark for the purpose of keeping
trademark law from "interfering" with widespread public usage of the expression.
See, e.g., MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 691 (2d ed. Aspen 2000) (explaining that in GTE Vantage, the public
had appropriated trademark for use).
203. See Weinstein v. Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
manual created by teachers was not "work for hire").
204. Id. As Easterbrook noted:
A university "requires" all of its scholars to write. Its demands-especially
the demands of departments deciding whether to award tenure-will be
"the motivating factor in the preparation of' many a scholarly work.
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found the importance of tradition in the intersection between academic
writing and the copyright law dispositive. 20 5 The teacher exception example thus serves as "precedent" 20 6 for approaching copyright law through
established real life behaviors and practices rather than strictly through
statutory interpretation.
One wonders how these jurists might react to the wholesale downgrading of traditional access levels to information as copyright and digitalization curtail the distributive abilities of entities like libraries. Loss of
customary access is arguably more chaotic, disruptive and unsettling than
academic copyright ownership issues, in part because a major alteration in
the fundamental terrain of fair use (to the extent there is such a thing)
impacts a much larger cohort of people, though academics are clearly
among this group. Given the opportunity, would Posner and Easterbrook
act to preserve the copyright status quo for library patrons, as they did for
academics? The second half of this Article is geared toward persuading
the reader that this would be a very good idea.
D.

Toward a Taxonomy of Copyright Norms

The overarching principle that should drive classification of real
space copyright use behaviors is simple and straightforward: Privileges and
obligations that consumers enjoy or recognize when accessing and using
works embodied in analog forms are norms. These are the familiar practices worthy of codification and appropriately mandated into electronic
When Dean Manasse told Weinstein to publish or perish, he was not simultaneously claiming for the University a copyright on the ground that
the work had become a "requirement or duty" within the meaning of

paragraph (3) [of the University's copyright policy]. The University concedes in this court that a professor of mathematics who proves a new
theorem in the course of his employment will own the copyright to his
article containing that proof. This has been the academic tradition since
copyright law began, see M. Nimmer, Copyright § 5.03[B] [1] [b] (1978 ed.),
a tradition the University's policy purports to retain. The tradition covers
scholarly articles and other intellectual property. When Saul Bellow, a
professor at the University of Chicago, writes a novel, he may keep the
royalties.
Id.
205. See generally id. But see Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 16 F.
Supp. 2d 1297, 1307 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that professor's creation of teaching
outline, even though prepared on his own time and connected directly with work
which he was employed to do, was fairly and reasonably incidental to his employment and, therefore, based on statutory and judicial precedent, constituted "work
made for hire").
206. Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094 (noting general rule that faculty members
own copyrights to their academic work). But see Posner, supra note 13, at 1700
(stating that norms are not identical to common law doctrines because while
judges may be self-conscious about making their decisions consistent with prior
decisions, norm-producers are more likely to be swayed by their sense of justice).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

61

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 13

formats. They are easily observable and ascertainable, and widespread
20 7
without regard to implicit precepts of formal copyright law.
Consider, for example, the contrast between "legal use" and common
usage of ink and paper books. Joe Liu has observed:
Copyright law places a number of limits on what I can do with my
dog-eared copy of William Faulkner's As I Lay Dying. I cannot
run it through the photocopier to make another copy. I cannot
read from it aloud in a public place. Nor can I translate the book
into a foreign language (assuming I could speak one). These are
things that I simply cannot do with my book, at least not without
permission from the copyright owner or some statutory privilege.
At the same time, copyright law permits me to do many, if not
most, other things with my copy of that book. I can read it as
many times as I want. I can lend it to a friend. I can destroy it. I
can sell it to a stranger. I can even rent it out for a fee. All these
things I can do without asking the copyright owner for permis20 8
sion or relying on some notion of fair use.
207. Copyright law as currently constituted does not directly address how consumers can use the copies of copyrighted works that they obtain. As Joe Liu very
intelligently articulated, there is, for example, no specific or explicit "right" to reread, or even read, a book that one has purchased:
The legal "source" of this unlimited ability to read, to the extent there is
one, can be found in the gaps in the Copyright Act. Section 106 of the
Act, as several commentators have noted, does not include in the bundle
of copyright rights the right to control the reading of a given copy.
Rather, section 106 confers upon copyright owners only the limited bundle of rights mentioned in the previous section. Rights that are not mentioned in section 106 are, by default, retained by the copy owner. So, by
virtue of my ownership or possession of a physical copy of a book, I can
read it as many times as I wish (until the book itself begins to deteriorate), and the Copyright Act says nothing that would prevent me from
engaging in such an activity. The lack of a right to control reading, combined with the inherent attributes of the physical copy, gives rise to the
copy owner's ability to read or access the copy. The ability to read and
access physical copies is thus part of the physical reality that copyright law
takes for granted and upon which it operates.
At the same time, however, it is worth noting that the Act nowhere
preserves or guarantees copy owners any right to read against other restrictions on reading. Therefore, for example, a book could be written in
a special kind of ink that vanishes ten minutes after being exposed to the
air, or a sound recording could be recorded in such a way that it automatically erases itself, la Mission Impossible, after a single playing. Nothing
in the Act itself bars these potential (though unlikely) methods of limiting my access to a physical copy in my possession. Rather, my ability to
access and read a book in my physical possession is a function of both the
limited bundle of rights in section 106 and the physical characteristics of
the copies themselves. The Act is simply silent on the issue.
Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1245, 1287-88 (2001).
208. Id. at 1247.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss1/2

62

Bartow: Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Bo
2003]

ELECTRIFYING COPYRIGHT NoRms

If end use purchasers customarily re-read analog books and loan them to
friends, these are norms of use that should be protected legislatively when
the works are embodied in electronic formats in which multiple readings
could otherwise be technologically prevented. In this way consumer expectations will be met, access levels will remain constant and respect for
copyrights, if not outright fostered, at least will not be undermined.
Conversely, if consumers do not typically destroy analog books nor
rent them out for fees, it would be unnecessary to codify rights to do so
specifically with electronic books. The rights would remain intact to the
extent they exist as a general matter of copyright law, but if these rights
are not commonly exercised in real space, there is no need to affirmatively
require that they be easily or symmetrically exercisable with respect to
works in digital forms.
This approach dramatically disengages end user accessibility and use
levels from complicated economic and theoretical discourses about providing proper incentives for the creation and distribution of copyrighted
works, or adequately protecting intellectual property rights. These are debates individual consumers largely lack the knowledge, resources or inclination to fully or effectively participate in. Instead, driven by empirical
observation rather than advocacy, it simply codifies a pre-existing, balanced framework that both consumers and content owners understand,
and have long functioned within.
In the next section of this Article, the adverse impact that abrogation
of copyright use norms will have upon one particular subset of copyright
consumers, library patrons, is described in detail. A specific legislative solution, the codification of the real space norms of library use, is also
proposed.
III.

THE NORMS OF LIBRARY USE IN THE CURRENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

Recall Ellickson's hypothesis that members of close-knit groups tend
to govern their interactions by developing informal norms that maximized
the objective welfare of group members, but that legal rules would become more important when the social distance between disputants increased, when the magnitude of the dispute increased and when the legal
system allowed disputants to externalize costs to third parties. 20 9 Whether
or not libraries and copyright holders ever constitute close-knit groups is a
complicated question. For some types of works, libraries stand squarely in
the way of profit maximization by copyright holders. Because some fraction of the library patrons who check out a book, movie or computer game
would have rented or purchased the work had the item not been made
accessible through a library, libraries negatively impact copyright owners'
revenue streams.
209. See ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 123-37.
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The purchases made by the libraries themselves to stock their collections benefit publishers financially, but, unless they pay premium prices,
sales to libraries of some works probably generate royalties that are inadequate to compensate for the "lost sales" they cause. Though libraries are

likely to purchase multiple copies of works for which high patron demand
is expected or encountered, the royalties still may not be proportionate to
a work's popularity.
For other works, such as reference books, libraries may be publishers'
best customers, and publishers that target library markets with particular
information products would no doubt like to increase the consumption of
these works (and of updates to these works) by libraries. Given the consolidation among publishing entities that has occurred recently, 2 10 some
companies happily market works to libraries from some subsidiaries while
simultaneously cursing the very existence of libraries from other corporate
divisions.
Assuming for the sake of argument that copyright owners and content-consuming libraries form something resembling a close knit community, one possible explanation for the increasing importance of copyright
law to large scale content owners, as evidenced by the explosive rates of
copyright infringement litigation and the increased congressional lobbying efforts by corporate copyright holders, is that relatively recent technological innovations that enable high quality, low cost copying of
copyrightable works have triggered or exacerbated the factors identified
by Ellickson as increasing the importance of legal rules. Digital copying
technologies may have increased the social distance between copyright
owners and content-consuming libraries by pitting them against each
other in high stakes and/or antagonistic licensing negotiations. As discussed below, when libraries must license information products, they lose
the autonomy over licensed portions of their collections that the first sale
doctrine provides with respect to works that they can purchase outright.
Libraries may not realize any concomitant gains, and resent the limitations
that licensing regimes unilaterally impose.
The magnitude of any given copyright dispute is certainly increased
when large numbers of infringing copies can be rapidly and inexpensively
made. Additionally, certain copyright law precepts allow copyright owners
210. See, e.g., Michael Ginsborg, Consolidation in the Legal Publishing Industry
Mean Rising Costs for Attorneys, at http://www.nocall.org/dj02221.htm (Feb. 21,
2001) (stating that 1990's witnessed unprecedented level of mergers including

$3.4 billion merger of West Publishing Company and Thomson Corporation of

Canada); David D. Kirkpatrick, As PublishersPerish, LibrariesFeel the Pain,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2000, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/03/business/
03PUBL.html (reporting that mergers of publishers of scholarly journals in fields

of science, medicine, technology, economics and law has resulted in sharp rise in

price for such works); Mark Walsh, Houghton Mifflin Acquisition Extends Industry
Trend, EDUC. WK.,June 13, 2001, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=

40biz.h20 (commenting on "wave of acquisitions of US educational publishers by
global-media powerhouses").

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss1/2

64

Bartow: Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Bo

2003]

ELECTRIFYING COPYRIGHT NoRms

to externalize costs to third parties such as the court system, customs
agents and federal marshals and entities marketing copying technologies. 2 11 With respect to libraries, restrictive licenses externalize some of
the consequences of access compression to library patrons.
In the ink and paper context, the norms of Library Use of copyrighted works are arguably self-enforcing. A library purchases copyrighted
works in quantities correlated with expected demand, and makes them
available to patrons who may or may not have purchased copies of their
own if the library did not have the work in its collection. Every instance in
which a given book is checked out does not necessarily represent a lost
sale any more than every child enrolled in public school represents "lost
tuition" to private educational institutions. In the case of some works,
such as inexpensive paperback copies of works of fiction, library copies
very likely supplant some purchases library patrons might have otherwise
made. However, even if copies of these works were purchased by individuals rather than borrowed from libraries, evidence suggests that people will
still share the privately purchased books informally.2 1 2 In other cases
readers would simply forgo exposure to the works rather than buy them.
Libraries pay hundreds of millions of dollars to publishers to provide
patrons with access to books and other objects embodying copyrighted
works. 21 3 Because patrons can borrow these books to use as their own for
a reasonable length of time, they are intuitively less likely to make infringing copies of the works. Though libraries may very well cost publishers
sales, it doesn't necessarily follow that libraries foster or enable copyright
infringements that wouldn't otherwise occur. Libraries may actually reduce incentives for infringing copying, since they facilitate access to authorized copies of works.
If copyrighted works are lost or damaged, a library may procure replacement copies if the copyright owner continues to make the work available for purchase. If a given work is no longer in print, the library may
resort to purchasing a used copy of the work, or to photocopying copies
that remain available in its collections. If a library exceeds the scope of
copying authorized by section 108 of the Copyright Act, it may be vulnerable to censure by the owner of the affected copyright. Alternatively, if the
copyright owner reacts with excessive harshness, the library may be reluc211. Plaintiffs have to pay lawyers, but taxpayers must bear court costs, administrative and maintenance fees and the salaries/expenses of the federal agents who
pursue alleged "criminal offenses" and confiscate allegedly infringing goods at the
border. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1999) (discussing potential criminal offenses
under Copyright Act); 17 U.S.C. § 509 (1978) (discussing seizure and forfeiture of
infringing phonorecords or copies); 17 U.S.C. § 601 (1997) (discussing manufacture, importation and public distribution of certain copies).
212. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 34, at 57 (noting that "editors often guess that
four or five people read every 'hard' copy of most popular books and magazines").
213. For example, the Association of Research Libraries 122 members spend
$900 million a year on books and journals. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 210 (explaining how journal costs are rising because of mergers).
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tant to purchase other works from that entity. Libraries and at least some
publishers are locked into long-term mutually dependent relationships
with each other. Nevertheless, it is apparent that publishers have been
deeply dissatisfied with the extensive use that libraries and library patrons
could make of copyrighted works in ink and paper formats after simply
remitting the initial purchase price. Digitalization has given publishers an
opportunity to restructure their relationships with libraries, and to force
abandonment of all pre-existing norms in the new distribution mediums.
One academic librarian recently published an interesting article in
which she explicated the values conflicts between librarians and copyright
owners, observing at the outset that "[w]hile these conflicts have existed
for centuries, they are escalating in the rapidly expanding digital environment, and the debate between the two groups is becoming increasingly
acrimonious." 214 While there may be equal amounts of acrimony on both
sides of the debate, the power imbalance between the two groups is substantial. A set of norms pertaining to library usage of copyrighted written
materials in analog formats evolved that displeased publishers in several
respects. As a result, copyright owners challenged these norms whenever
new copying technologies emerged, such as when photocopying technologies made copying paper onto paper cheap and efficient, but failed to
significantly alter either the law or the norms. They did not go so far as to
begin publishing books comprised of ink and paper that could not be
photocopied, perhaps because this was cost-prohibitive, or because it
would have alienated consumers. Digital technologies, however, present
economically efficient opportunities for control of content that
photocopiers, microfiche and similar copying mechanisms simply do not.
Copyright use issues that have arisen regarding "distance education"
provide illustrative examples of how publishers have challenged educational use norms. Educators, educational institutions, students and librari2 15
All
ans all have normative expectations pertaining to distance learning.
214. Gasaway, supra note 79, at 115.
215. See Gasaway, supra note 76, at 795-97 (discussing distance learning). As
Gasaway explained:
Library staff anticipate that they will be able to meet the needs of distance
learners by providing copies of materials under sections 108(d) and (e)
of the Copyright Act. They expect that they can provide copies to these
students obtained for them via interlibrary loan. Libraries expect that
they can create electronic reserve systems that will be available to all students, including distance learners. They assume that they will be able to
negotiate licenses for digital materials for students, faculty, and staff on
campus as well as for enrolled distance learning students who are located
off-campus. Libraries also expect that they will be able to implement authentication technology that will not require all users to have the same
"edu" address but rather will authenticate them as having access under
the license. They believe that license fees will be reasonable in comparison to license fees for printed works and that license terms will not be
inordinately restrictive. Libraries expect that publishers will respond
quickly to their requests and will respect the time-sensitive nature of these
requests. They expect that the Copyright Clearance Center will cover an
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of these stakeholders anticipated from the outset that they would be able
to make real-space-equivalent uses of copyrighted works in distance learning courses, even though such equivalents necessarily required transmitting copies of the works over the Internet. 21 6 The example of the
intuitively real-space rooted student expectations that Laura Gasaway articulated is particularly instructive:
Students in distance learning courses expect that they will not be
treated differently than students who take the same course in a
traditional classroom. They believe that their learning experiences will not suffer because of restrictions on the types of
materials that are performed or displayed in the course, restrictions that do not apply to the traditional classroom. They expect
that the school will provide course materials for them just as it
does for local students through course packs, access to webpages,
and through other materials. They also assume that access to
these materials will not be more expensive than it is for on-campus students. Students expect that the library in the educational
institution will provide copies of books, articles, and other materials needed for their research and study for the course. They also
expect the library to provide access to electronic journals, which
2 17
are available to other students enrolled in the school.
Nevertheless, it has become apparent that these user expectations contrast
dramatically with copyright holders' expectations, which include the conviction that schools offering online courses should obtain licenses for providing digital access to textual materials, should restrict access to course
materials to enrolled students and should "implement technological controls to prevent downstream copying." 2183 Copyright holders have also as219
sumed that they are free to offer licenses on a "take it or leave it" basis,
or to decline to license a particular work at all, 220 even if a consequence is
that distance learning students are completely denied access to certain
22 1
materials.
increasingly larger number of publishers and types of materials for digital
copying.
Id.
216. See id. at 797 (noting expectations of library staffs, educational institutions and distance learning students).
217. Id.
218. See id. at 798 (discussing restrictions on user access).
219. See id. at 817-18 (discussing copyright user options).
220. Gasaway has observed that "there may be little motivation for certain
copyright owners to license their works for distance learning because 'it may not
be a remunerative market."' Id. at 813 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT
ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DIsTANCE EDUCATION 165 (1999)).
221. See Tom Bell, Escapefrom Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failurein the
Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 741, 798-800 (2001) (noting that
those seeking access to copyrighted works must go through copyright owner or be
denied access).
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Thus, the expectation by several groups of copyright users that real
space usage norms would move seamlessly into cyberspace proved unfounded. Instead copyright owners used the control mechanisms enabled
by digital technologies to unilaterally alter the rules of use and access.
A.

E-Book Borrowing in Cyberspace and in Person: "Library Use"

New technologies can facilitate unprecedented distribution of new
creative works and access to information. Trends in the development and
application of copyright and "copyright-related" laws, however, are bolstering business practices by content owners that may undermine or virtually
incapacitate the ability of non-profit libraries to maintain the level of access to electronic copyrighted content that is provided by traditional paper-and-print books and periodicals. The goal of this section of the Article
is to articulate the necessity, importance and rectitude of establishing for
individual library patrons the electronic equivalent of "real space access"
as the minimum standard of a free, unfettered and unmonitored entree to
information contained in digital form within the collections of non-profit
libraries, whether accessed in person or via the Internet, herein desig'
nated "Library Use. "222
Library Use, as proposed here, would be an explicit constraint on
copyright exploitation giving library patrons the right to access and use
the digital works owned by libraries, with no more constraints than have
historically been placed upon ink-and-paper publications. Library Use will
neither enlarge nor restrict the doctrine of fair use, nor affect the legality
of excessive or extra-library copying. It will simply allow access to the
works in the first place, to the extent rising prices allow libraries to main223
tain and add to their holdings, electronic or otherwise.
222. See Ann Bartow, Libraries in a Digital and Aggressively Copyrighted World:
Retaining Patron Access Through Changing Technologies, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 821, 822-31

(2001) (proposing concept of "Library Use").
223. See, e.g., Peter Givler, Scholarly Book, the Coin of the Realm of Knowledge,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDoC., Nov. 12, 1999, at A76 (explaining that while publishers
are charging more for scholarly books, research libraries are faced with declining
budgets and therefore are unable to purchase books); see also Marjolein BotJohan
Burgemeester & Hans Roes, The Cost of Publishing an Electronic Journal: A General
Model and a Case Study, D-Lm MAGAZINE (Nov. 1998), at http://www.dlib.org/dlib/
november98/ 11 roes.html (discussing Tenopir and King's study of development of
scholarly publishing in United States). The study presents evidence that the institutional price of a scholarly journal subscription increased from $39 in 1975 to
$284 in 1995, a factor of 7.3 in just twenty years. See id. (analyzing price increase
for scholarly journals). Tenopir and King concluded that "traditional scholarly
publishing is in serious economic difficulty." Id. The authors stated that general
inflation and increase in size of the journals accounted for 52 percent of the price
increase. See id. (noting reasons for increase in price of scholarly journals). Tenopir and King explained that the remaining 48 percent of the price increase was
due to the dramatic decrease in personal subscriptions. See id. (same). The authors surmised that publishers responded to the decrease in personal subscriptions
by increasing institutional subscription rates. See id. (drawing conclusion for gradual increase in subscription rates for institutions). This, in turn, resulted in more
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The statutorily constructed right to Library Use proposed is directly
intended to counter access restrictions imposed by content owners, both
those implemented to control use of copyrighted works in electronic formats generally, and those specifically aimed at curbing the ability of nonprofit library patrons to access and use copyrighted information. These
restrictions are intended to reconfigure the norms of information access
available through libraries. To prevent narrowing the portals of access to
informational works that libraries provide, either Congress or the courts
must step in to preserve pre-existing library use norms associated with ink
and paper and Congress is better situated than the courts to address norm
preservation in an immediate and consistent manner.
The exemplar Posner "teacher exception" pronouncement demonstrates that courts can preserve copyright norms based on past practices if
they are so inclined. 22 4 Thatjudgment, however, was not rendered in the
context of an orchestrated attempt to challenge and alter a preexisting
norm by well-funded norm opponents. Nor would courts ordinarily have
had the first hand experience with the customs at issue that Posner had
225
with academia.
Real space Library Use norms are functionally under attack by licensebased restrictions imposed as conditions for access to information products. Even if libraries or library patrons are willing and able to litigate
access compression issues, content owners are likely to have far better resources, and to the extent that they are defending their licensing practices, will benefit from "freedom to contract" jurisprudence that appears
far clearer, better established, more consistent and easier to apply than
the complex vagaries of copyright's fair use doctrine.2 26 Even if fair use
cancellations of subscriptions and a corresponding increase in institutional subscription rates. See id. (discussing "vicious cycle of cancellations and further increases" in rates).
224. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting
existence of "teacher exception" to copyright law). For a further discussion of the
"teacher exception", see supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
225. See Richard A. Posner, Senior Lecturer of Law, at http://www.law.uchicago.
edu/faculty/posner-r (last visited July 30, 2002) (noting that Posner has been professor for thirty-four years). But see Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private
Orderingin Information Transactions,53 VAND. L. REv. 2063, 2080 (2000) (discussing

role ofjudges and legislature). Benkler opines:
Increasing excludability enhances the welfare of owners of information
goods, and these owners lobby for expanding rights. Those whose welfare is adversely affected are usually too diffuse to represent the full measure of the social loss, thereby presenting legislatures with a skewed
picture of the social effects of perfecting the excludability of information
goods. Perhaps, then, it is up to publicly spirited legislators, but even
more so to judges, to serve as counterweight to these political imbalances,
to review very carefully, and with a skeptical eye, proposals for further
enclosure of the public domain.
Id.
226. See, e.g., THE EMPIRE RETURNS: THE FALL AND RISE OF CONTRACT (F.H.

Buckley ed., Duke University Press Sept. 1999); Robert Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the Law: Intellectual Property and The Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review
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was held to trump content owner imposed licensing terms, it would take a
Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1571-72 (1995) (stating that federal body of intellectual property law should exist so that rules will be coherent); Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Contract and Copyright Are Not at War: A Reply to "The Metamorphosis of Contract
into Expand" 87 CAL. L. REV. 79, 79 (1999) (arguing that state law proposals are
ineffective in light of fast-growing and complex copyright industry); see also generally Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructureof Markets: The Role of Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REv. 389, 390 (1993) (noting that desire for efficient markets
requires use of property law over contract law). As Frankel explained:
The guiding value of contract law, subject to few exceptions, is that society supports individuals' freedom to interact by mutually consenting to
binding exchange relationships-free of coercion, and free of law's (government's) interference. The government intervenes in the contract relationship only upon the request of a party to enforce the bargain, and
bargains are generally enforced if made under the conditions assumed in
the contract prototype-that is, the parties consent freely to enter into
the relationship, that they can fend for themselves, and that they have
capacity to enter into the relationship.
Id. at 393. But see, e.g., Gillette, supra note 18, at 828-29 (discussing use of legal
system to circumvent legislature). Gillette notes:
A legal entrepreneur who wanted to modify an existing rule to make it
more pro-consumer, on the other hand, would tend to proceed through
the judicial process, even if the initial rule was promulgated by the legislature. By proceeding through the courts, any single consumer (or attorney) could mount a challenge without incurring the significant costs
necessary to lobby the legislature. Although class action litigation may
require coalitions among and significant investment by attorneys, in all
but the most complex cases those costs are likely to be less than the costs
related to organizing interest groups, drafting legislation, and approaching legislatures. In fact, even in the most complex cases, the organizational costs of litigation may still be less than the costs of pursuing the
same result through legislation. Plaintiffs' tort lawyers, for example, may
join forces in litigation to share expertise and realize economies-but
they have less capacity to lobby legislators, with whom they have less contact. Further, the need for greater numbers in order to lobby effectively
for legislative change would reduce the lawyers' capacity to monitor and
prevent shirking by coalition members. Individuals who have difficulty
coalescing into groups because potential members are geographically diffuse or have insufficient individual stakes might find it costly to approach
legislators relative to courts. Thus, we should not be surprised to find
that tobacco reform and civil rights and anti-death-penalty movements
take the form of litigation campaigns rather than legislative campaigns.
The result is that whether lock-in occurs more readily in courts or in legislatures will depend to a significant extent on which forum is more amenable to the legal entrepreneurs who seek to modify the status quo.
Entrepreneurs who face low organizational costs and little opposition
from other organized groups or who are repeat players in the market for
legal rules and thus more able to amortize investments in relationships
with rulemakers can be expected to address the legislature both to obtain
their initial objectives and to modify existing rules. If these entrepreneurs would be the predominant beneficiaries of legal change, we could
expect to see more lock-in with respect to common law than statutory law.
If, on the other hand, legal entrepreneurs tend to be poorly funded and
face organizational barriers, we can expect them to seek their reforms
through the courts and, as a consequence, we could expect to see relatively more lock-in with respect to statutory law.
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while for a consistent body of like decisions to emerge across jurisdictions.
An imperial defense of real space copyright use norms through legislation
227
is therefore preferable.
Structural interventions by the government that impose real space access norms on cyberspace are justifiable as a general matter because they
will improve the quantity and diversity of information that is available to
all citizens, facilitating the prime directive of copyright law. Copyright
protections (indeed copyrights themselves) depend for their very existence on government action, primarily through extensive legislative and
judicial apparati. Congress has been willing to pass laws that protect copyrights, and must legislate to protect users' rights to access and make fair
use of copyrighted works. As Diane Zimmerman has observed, "the advent
of law-backed self-help to assert and enforce copyright owners' interests
also demands that lawmakers engage in an affirmative rebalancing of interests as between users and owners to assure that crucial social policy
objectives are not lost in the shuffle .... ,,228
Except where sexual content 2 29 or copyrights are involved, federal officials have generally preferred a "hands-off' approach to the Inter227. See, e.g., id. at 831-32 (noting differences between ability ofjudiciary and
legislature to affect social change).
A judge who shares the interests of a group that wishes to maintain the
status quo can do little more than render decisions that maintain the
existing rule. The zero-sum nature of litigation and the inability to decide issues not presented to them provide courts little opportunity to
trade away social gains in favor of preventing those losses that would be
imposed on the groups that prefer to lock in the existing regulation.
Legislators have more flexibility in effecting tradeoffs. Legislators need
not deal solely with discrete, individual decisions; instead, they can buy
out those who lose in one piece of legislation by granting them an offsetting benefit in some other legislation. In this manner, legislators can
more easily avoid lock-in at a suboptimal point because they can simultaneously vote in a manner that facilitates a socially optimal solution while
granting those who oppose the measure an offsetting benefit in some
unrelated matter.
Id.
228. Zimmerman, supra note 84, at 284.
229. The federal government is reluctant to (for example) tax the Internet.
See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing legislative history of 47 U.S.C. § 230 and noting that Internet regulation would have chilling effect on free speech caused wholly by specter of tort liability); Declan
McCullagh, Wrong Time for Net Tax? WIRED (Mar. 15, 2001), at http://www.wired.
com/news/print/0,1294,42442,00.html. Nevertheless, federal officials are much
more enthusiastically "hands on" about sex on the Internet. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.
§ 231 (2001) (regulating access of minors to adult material on Internet). Cyberspace Law authority Robert W. Hamilton has humorously (and yet with startling
accuracy) observed:
I have two syllogisms that produce rules for me, the rules that I use to
analyze any legal question involving the Internet. The first one starts
from a proposition that's really beyond genuine dispute: all lawyers are
inherently evil. It therefore follows, it seems to me, that if all lawyers are
inherently evil, what they practice must be inherently evil as well, i.e., that
the law is inherently evil. And, as we all know, money is the root of all
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net. 230 Consider the rationalizations Congress used to justify granting
ISPs immunity under the Communications Decency Act, 23 1 finding that
the Internet and interactive computer services "have flourished, to the
' 23 2
benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation,
and further stating that it is "the policy of the United States... to preserve
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
State regulation ....
"2313 Though reluctant to tax e-commerce, 2 3 4 or to
consider legislation pertaining to online data privacy, 2 35 Congress has
been perfectly willing to interfere with the otherwise ostensibly laissez-faire
commercial environment in cyberspace in the context of copyrights, as
evidenced by passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.

evil. The logical conclusion: money is the root of all law. So analytical
rule number one is: follow the money. If you follow the money, you will
find the answer to your question on virtually any legal issue.
The second syllogism that produces my two rules of analysis is derived from the quotation that I believe is attributable to George Gilder:
Back in the early days on the Internet law lecture circuit (say, three or
four years ago), the popular quip we heard was: "Soon, all law will be
Internet law." In fact, we heard a variant of that quip from Mr. Shapiro
this morning, in which he repudiated the notion of some distinction between cyberspace and real space and instead suggested that soon it will all
be considered the same space. So the first premise is: "All law will be
Internet law." To this premise I add what I believe is equally indisputable: "Soon, all Internet law will be pornography law." It therefore follows,
then, that soon, all law will be pornography law. Thus, my two analytical
rnles for all Internet law questions are: (i) follow the money, and (ii)
figure out what pornography law has to say about the issue, and you'll get
your answer.
Hamilton, supra note 146, at 735.
230. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L. REv. 447, 449
(2000) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)

and

ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING PEOPLE IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW (1999)) (noting that

government's view stems from Internet's "decentralized nature and tradition of
bottom up governance").
231. Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 133 (1996).
232. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (4) (2001).
233. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2) (2001).
234. See, e.g., Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1101, 112 Stat.
2681, 2681-719 (1998) (providing moratorium on taxation of Internet until November 1, 2003).
235. See, e.g., Dick Armey, Privacy: For Those Who Live in Glass Houses, (Apr. 9,
2001), at http://www.freedom.gov/library/technology/memo/privacy3.asp (last
visitedJuly 30, 2002) (urging Congress to consider online computer privacy legislation); see alsoJohn L. Micek, U.S. Urged to Focus on Consumer Privacy, E-COMMERCE
TIMES, (Apr. 11, 2001), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/8871.
html%20 (discussing electronic privacy debate).
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In fact, Congress has a tradition of reacting to technological changes
by adding to or altering the Copyright Act. 236 Many of the amendments
to the Act have been largely aimed at protecting certain categories of copyrightable content from the potential risks of excessive unauthorized copying posed by emerging technologies. For example, the first sale doctrine
in section 109 of the Copyright Act was explicitly circumscribed by an
amendment that made it a copyright infringement to engage in the
"rental, lease or lending" of copies of computer software and sound recordings embodied in phonorecords for "direct or indirect commercial
advantage." 23 7 This prohibition was intended to protect certain content
owners from having their wares leased and copied outside the scope of
their control and profit streams. 238 Yet, even this targeted content owner
protective amendment sought to preserve for libraries the benefits of the
first sale doctrine, at least as applied to sound recording bearing phonorecords. Accordingly, section 109(b) (1) (A) of the Copyright Act reads
in pertinent part: "Nothing in the preceding sentence shall apply to the
rental, lease, or lending of a phonorecord for non-profit purposes by a
non-profit library or non-profit educational institution."2 39
Furthermore, Ruth Okediji has persuasively argued that legislative intervention with respect to fair use in cyberspace can be problematic, because rules that emerge can be complex or difficult to follow. 240 She also
warned that legislating exemptions for specific uses must be accompanied
by room for evolution of the Internet, as even the framework and design
elements currently integral to the functioning of cyberspace are not necessarily immutable. 24 1 Both libraries and copyright holders have incentives
to misunderstand or willfully misconstrue copyright law to further their
own ends, 242 and they can be expected to pursue self-serving agendas in
ways that could distort or complicate any statutory framework.
236. See, e.g., Adapting Copyright Law to the Digital Environment of the National
Information Infostructure: Hearingon S. 1284 and H.R. 2411 Before the House Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Bruce Lehman, [then]
Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks)
(discussing amendments to Copyright Act).
237. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (])(A) (1997) (providing restrictions on tinauthorized use of computer programs).
238. Other content owners whose works are not covered by this statutory provision (such as motion picture producers) had to find their own paths within the
constraints of the first sale doctrine to maximize profitability and minimize infringement of their copyrighted works. It is important to note that most in fact
did; the lack of statutory protection may have resulted in changed business method
models, but it did not discernibly impact artistic creativity in a negative manner.
239. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1) (A).
240. See Okediji, supra note 127, at 173-74 (discussing online fair use
legislation).
241. See id. (analyzing mutability of Internet).
242. See, e.g., Gasaway, supra note 79, at 115, 160-61 (observing that both librarians and copyright holders often misunderstand copyright law and sometimes
engage in fairly gross overstatement).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

73

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 2
VILIiANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 13

Richard Pildes has made a similar point, although more generally, by
asserting that laws can act destructively with social norms if lawmakers fail
to appreciate the complexity of the ways in which given norms are created,
enforced and altered. 243 Certainly, the codification of copyright use
norms will need to be finely calibrated, yet it is hard to believe these laws
could put copyright users at more of a disadvantage than typical copyright
licenses do. As Mark Lemley has noted:
[I]ntellectual property rules may not always be pretty, or easy to
determine, and they certainly aren't perfect descriptions of an
optimal incentive structure. But they are at least an effort to arrive at the right balance of incentives-an effort that would never
even be made were we to leave social ordering entirely in the
2 44
hands of private parties.
Library Use will have the most dramatic and unequivocal impact if it
is straightforwardly defined by making explicit, unambiguous and detailed
reference to minimum standards of access derived from traditional real
space rights and privileges. Content owners could be required to concede
to library patrons the electronic equivalent of checking out books, with
the imbedded ability to read the works multiple times over a period of
several weeks, and to print out portions of the work or even the work in its
entirety just as a book could be photocopied. This guaranteed minimum
would preserve the ability of library patrons to use electronic books essentially as they had used ink-and-paper books, but would deny them most of
the advantages of digitalization, with the exception of remote access.
Alternatively, the access standard promulgated by Library Use could
be elevated to allow patrons to download electronic content, electronically
"cut and paste" portions of digital works and otherwise share in the benefits of digital media. It could also imbue libraries with the authority to
digitalize pre-existing analog works to make them susceptible to remote
access via the Internet. Simplicity, clarity, straightforwardness and easy
comprehensibility should be the guiding principles, whatever the particulars of Library Use are ultimately chosen to be. This movement toward
transparency and specificity must, however, preserve a sufficient flexibility
and adaptability in the law so that it can accommodate the future evolution of technologies and consequent use behaviors.

243. See Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2055, 2073 (1996) (discussing lawmakers' use of social norms).

244. Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 11], 169-71 (1999); see also Benkler, supra note 225, at
2079 ("There is ... no general theoretical reason to think that private ordering of
information transactions will systematically enhance aggregate social welfare, relative to public ordering of such transactions. There are, on the other hand, many
reasons to think that increasing the excludability of information goods will impose
significant costs on public discourse and on personal autonomy.").
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Imposing Norm-based Limits on Libraries as Well as Publishers

Congress could construct Library Use to place limitations on libraries
and patrons as well as copyright owners. For their part, libraries might be
compelled to limit perusal of information units to one user at a time,
again using past practices involving books as norm models, though it is
unclear why it would ultimately make a difference to the content copyright
owner if two patrons access an electronic document sequentially rather
than simultaneously. If libraries limit themselves to granting book-like access, both patrons and libraries will lose some of the advantages of electronic mediums. Other advantages may be maintained, such as the
amount of physical storage space required, maintenance, searchability,
245
preservability and ease of acquisition.

2.

The WTO/GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)

There are also various international considerations, as the United
States will need to remain in compliance with the Berne Convention and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), which largely incorporated the principles of the Berne Convention. 24 6 Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement obligates member states of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) not to adopt exceptions or limitations
except in "certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder."2 47 At a macro level, simply codifying real
space library usage and access norms and importing them into the digital
environment would not appear to be a new exception or limitation. However, to the extent that other signatory nations hold the expectation that
digital works will be accorded higher levels of copyright protection than
works in analog form, adhering to TRIPS may pose difficulties. Marci
Hamilton has asserted that TRIPS was outdated at its inception because it
did not address the issues posed by online distribution of intellectual
property, 248 and that the task of constructing an appropriate fair use zone
245. See, e.g., Kent Milunovich, Issues in Law Library Acquisitions:An Analysis, 92
LAw LIBR. J. 203, 205 (2000) ("Technology provides a potent tool in matters re-

lated to data handling: storage, access, searching, relating, and retrieval. As such,
it enhances the library's role as an information center and as a research support
resource.").

246. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 29, at 625 (1996).
247. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 31, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
248. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 29, at 614-15 (discussing faults of TRIPS
agreement). Hamilton argued:
Despite its broad sweep and its unstated aspirations, TRIPS arrives on the
scene already outdated. TRIPS reached fruition at the same time that the
on-line era became irrevocable. Yet it makes no concession, not even a
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in an online world still lies ahead of national and international policymak-

ers. 249 Both Congress and the U.S. courts must be cognizant of TRIPS
obligations when drafting and interpreting statutory Library Use, 250 but
should not be dissuaded by them.
B.

Why a Statutory Right of "Library Use" is Necessary

A statutory right of Library Use is necessary for many reasons, including preserving the right to share, avoiding the pitfalls of fair use, giving
libraries the scope of immunity accorded commercial ISPs, preventing replacement by for-profit E-Libraries and preventing the evisceration of the
First Sale doctrine. Each of these will be discussed in turn. Finally, this
section will illustrate select paradigmatic examples of the need for Library
Use.
1.

To Preserve the Right to Share

Copyright law has never given copyright owners control over all uses
of their works. Rather, it gives copyright owners exclusive rights and expressly subjects those rights to a host of exceptions. 25 1 The DigitalDilemma
authors articulated seven categories into which exceptions and limitations
252
to copyright owners' rights seem generally to fall:
* Those that are based on fundamental human rights such as free
253
speech and privacy interests;
nod, to the fact that a significant portion of the international intellectual
property market will soon be conducted on-line.
Id.
249. See id. at 625-29 (discussing difference between hackers' view and publishers' view of fair use zone).
250. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 74, at 139 ("The U.S. Congress will need
to keep TRIPS obligations in mind when it contemplates adopting new exceptions
and limitations to copyright law, including those that might apply to digital works.
Judicial interpretations of exceptions and limitations will also need to be consistent with TRIPS obligations.").
251. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-122 (2001) (listing exceptions to rights of copyright
holders).
252. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 74, at 136 (discussing exceptions and
limitations to rights held by copyright owners).
253. See id. at 137 (discussing human rights).
A number of fundamental human rights might provide a basis for a limited exception to copyright owner rights, including freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of expression, freedom of information,
democratic debate, and privacy or personal autonomy interests. A literary critic for a print magazine, for example, can republish a portion of
another author's work in order to develop her critique of that author's
work. A reporter for a print newspaper can publish some portions of a
politician's speech in order to show the errors it contains. Copyright laws
in some countries have specific "rights of fair quotation" to provide for
legitimate copying for purposes of criticism and news reporting. In the
United States, these concerns are generally dealt with through the fair
use doctrine. Given the robustness of criticism, news reporting, and pub-
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Those that are based on public interest grounds such as insuring
access to information for non-profit education purposes, and in
254
libraries;
* Those that arise from competition policy such as compulsory licensing and findings of fair use for reverse engineering for compatibil255
ity purposes;
" Those that promote flexible adaptation of the law to new circumstances such as the development of technologies that can copy, but
25 6
also have substantial non-infringing uses;
"

lic debate on the Internet, it would seem that fair quotation/fair use rules
would likely have some application in the digital world, just as they do in
the print world.
Id.
254. See id. (discussing public interest).
Public interest exceptions to copyright vary to some degree from country
to country. Among those that could arise under the laws of the United
States and some other nations are those that permit performance of copyrighted works in the course of face-to-face instruction in nonprofit educational settings; those that enable libraries and archives to make copies for
preservation, replacement, and other legitimate purposes; and those that
enable the creation of derivative works for the blind. It is worth noting
that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act seeks to maintain an appropriate balance between the rights of rights holders and the needs of others
and contains a provision to enable libraries and archives to make digital,
as well as print and facsimile, copies for these purposes. It also mandated
a study to help Congress consider what copyright rules might be appropriate to promote distance learning. Fair use may sometimes be invoked
on public interest grounds to justify some copying of copyrighted articles
in legal proceedings (e.g., as evidence relevant to a contested issue of
fact) or to satisfy some administrative regulatory requirements (e.g., to
demonstrate the efficacy of drugs).
Id.
255. See id. (discussing competition).
Competition policy concerns underlie some exceptions to and limitations
on copyright owners' rights. Two examples of competition policy-based
limitations in U.S. law are rules that impose compulsory licenses on owners of musical copyrights to enable further recordings of those musical
works and on owners of rights in broadcast signals for passive retransmissions of the broadcasted material by cable systems. The U.S. fair use defense is sometimes employed to promote competition policies, as in the
Sega v. Accolade case, which upheld the legality of unauthorized decompilation of computer programs for the legitimate purpose of developing a
compatible but noninfringing program. As the Sega case demonstrates,
competition policy issues may arise at times when information is in digital
form.
Id. at 138.
256. See id. at 137 (discussing rapid technological change).
In times of rapid technological change, it may be difficult for legislatures
to foresee what new technologies will arise, how they will be used, and
what copyright rules ought to apply. Courts in the United States have
often employed the fair use doctrine as a flexible mechanism for balancing the interests of rights holders and of other parties in situations in
which the legislature has not indicated its intent. These include not only
the Sony v. Universal City Studios decision about home taping of television
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* Those that arise from perceived market failures such as when the
transaction costs of negotiating a license far outweigh the benefits
25 7
derivable from the transaction;
" Those that are the harvest reaped from successful lobbying endeavors; 2 5 8 and

* Those that cover situations in which uses or copying of protected
works are de minimis, incidental to otherwise legitimate activities or
259
implicitly lawful given the totality of circumstances.
programs for time-shifting purposes, but also a number of cases involving
digital information. These include the Galoob v. Nintendo case, which upheld Galoob's right to distribute a "game genie" that enabled users to
make some temporary alterations to the play of certain Nintendo games,
and the Religious Technology Center v. Netcom case in which automatic posting of user-initiated Internet messages by an online service provider was
found to be fair use.
Id. at 138.
257. See id. at 137 (discussing market failure).
Exceptions and limitations may arise from a perceived possible market
failure. One argument for fair use may be that a market cannot effectively be formed when the transaction costs of negotiating a license far
outweigh the benefits derivable from the transaction (whether they be
licensing revenues or some other benefit, such as enhanced reputation or
goodwill). To the extent that a fair use defense arises, at least in part,
from market failure considerations, the scope of the fair use may be affected by changed circumstances that enable new markets to be formed
effectively. As noted above, this view is expressed in the Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure (IITF, 1995) white paper,
specifically in relation to the digital environment. To some degree, the
exception aimed at promoting publication of works for visually impaired
persons reflects market failure, as well as public interest, considerations.
Id. at 138-39.
258. See id. at 137, 139 (stating that in situations such as copyright privileges
for veteran's groups, successful lobbying has created exceptions or limitations to
copyright owner's rights).
259. See id. at 137 (discussing de minimis copying).
Finally, some exceptions and limitations to copyright owners' rights
would seem to be the result of successful lobbying or of a legislative perception of the de minimis or incidental character of a use. In Italy, for
example, military bands are exempt from having to do rights clearances
for music they perform in public. In the United States, a number of exceptions, such as those creating special copyright privileges for veterans'
groups, are the result of successful lobbying. Whether they can be justified on de minimis grounds or are pure pork barrel politics is perhaps
debatable. Better examples of de minimis or incidental uses for which
special copyright exceptions have been created are those in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, which provides some "safe harbor" rules for
certain copies in the digital environment, such as those made in the
course of a digital transmission from one site to another where the transmitting intermediary (e.g., a telephone company) is merely a conduit for
the transmission and not an active agent in it. It is conceivable that other
such exceptions will need to be devised for incidental digital copying in
the future, or that fair use law will be used to exempt incidental or de
minimis copying.
Id. at 139.
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The copyright law allows unauthorized copies, downloads, uploads, transmissions or distributions that might be fair use under section 107 of the
Copyright Act, lawful noncommercial consumer copies under section 108
and private performances and transmissions over which the statute gives
the copyright owner no control. Most pertinently here, section 108 explicitly permits photocopies of articles and other short works for library users,
whether the user is on location or has made a request through another
library. 260 As Laura Gasaway explained:
Section 108 contains three subsections dealing with the reproduction and distribution of copies to library patrons. Section
108(d) states that the rights of reproduction and distribution apply when the user requests no more than one article from a periodical issue or other collective work, or a "small part of any other
copyrighted work." For example, when a patron asks the library
to provide a copy of an article, the library may supply the request
if three conditions are met: (1) the copy becomes the property of
the user, (2) the library has no notice that the copy will be used
for other than fair use purposes, and (3) the library places the
register's warning on copy order forms and prominently displays
the same warning at the place where orders are made ....

[If a

patron] identifies him or herself as a student, the library usually
presumes that the use is for a course or for other research. All
the statute requires is that the library have no actual notice that
the copy will be used for other than private study, scholarship, or
261
research.
As a practical matter, the norms of Library Use of bound books and
periodicals favor the access rights of library patrons over profit maximizing
by copyright owners. Communities act collectively to found and maintain
non-profit public libraries as a venue through which purchased or
donated copies of copyrighted works are shared among community members. Similarly, educational organizations develop and sustain libraries for
the benefit of their institutional communities, largely students and faculty
members, and also sometimes allow their libraries to be utilized by outsiders as well. Libraries insure that individuals can have access to large numbers of books and periodicals without purchasing or subscribing to them.
Because activities over digital networks can be tracked and recorded,
library activities involving the accessing and copying of copyright-protected works that were essentially unmonitorable in the offline world become ascertainable and quantifiable when conducted online. Moreover,
the nature of digital technology means that many activities analogous to
non-infringing acts in the offline world become putatively technical in260. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1998) (allowing unauthorized photocopying by library users).
261. Gasaway, supra note 76, at 793.
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fringements if conducted over the Internet, because some degree of content copying is a functional requirement of using a computer.2 62 In real
space, libraries can provide access to a book by acquiring only one copy,
and extensive sharing of the book is accomplished through serial loans,
without copying that purchased copy. In the digital world, however, even
routine access to information requires "making a copy," both as a technological issue, and as a legal matter. 263- "Copying" is a touchstone of copy262. See, e.g., NeedhamJ. Boddie, II et al., A Review of Copyright and the Internet,
20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 193, 225 (1998) ("The end result of virtually every transmittal
of a work across the Internet will involve the exclusive right to copy. Printing to
paper, copying to disk, and loading into memory all amount to reproduction.");
Lemley, supra note 27, at 555 (explaining the multitude of copies made when
downloading material).
Obviously, each act of uploading or downloading makes a RAM copy in
the recipient's computer, but that is only the beginning. When a picture
is downloaded from a Web site, the modem at each end will buffer each
byte, as will the router, the receiving computer, the Web browser, the
video decompression chip, and the video display board. Those seven
copies will be made on each such transaction. Further, since most Internet transmissions do not travel directly between sender and receiver,
more copies will be made of the individual packets at each node they pass
through on their way to the end point.
Id.
263. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that unfixed, ephemeral RAM use of digital work is copying);
cf. Lemley, sup'a note 27, at 550-52.
Generally speaking, RAM and screen copies exist only while the computer or monitor are turned on; they are erased when the computer is
turned off. Clearly, this fact does not prevent such copies from being
"perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated" with the aid of a
computer-data loaded in RAM can be viewed on a computer screen,
printed onto paper, saved to magnetic storage, or transmitted via a computer network. Rather, the question is whether the RAM copies themselves exist "for more than a transitory duration."
The legislative history accompanying the "fixation" language in the
1976 Copyright Act strongly suggests that Congress did not consider such
copies to be "fixed." The House Report provides: "[T]he definition of
'fixation' would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient
reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in the 'memory' of a computer." Several cases have suggested that
RAM copies and screen copies are not fixed.
In 1993, however, the Ninth Circuit decided MAISystems Corp. v. Peak
Computer. In that case, the court held that loading a computer operating
system from magnetic storage into RAM (by turning the computer on)
violated the Copyright Act because it made a fixed RAM copy of the program. There are a number of problems with the MAI opinion-it does
not refer to the legislative history, it does not discuss the "transitory duration" prong of the fixation test, and the sources it cites are generally inapposite and many commentators have been quite critical of it.
Nonetheless, courts both in and out of the Ninth Circuit have taken the
same approach as MAI, and the government's NII White Paper has enthusiastically endorsed it as settled law. Further, legislation recently considered by the House of Representatives would reverse the MAI decision on
other grounds, but might be read to agree implicitly with the court's
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right infringement even if the supposed copies are intangible and fleeting,
such as in the random access memory (RAM) of a computer. As a result,
functionally identical uses of books may be legally disparate. Serially loaning an ink-and-paper book to twelve eager readers is acceptable, but serially loaning an electronic book online to even half that number is
potentially a copyright infringement because the library has enabled the
making of six "unauthorized copies" of the work even if readers never
print the work or save it to their hard drives.
Traditionally, loaning a book, compact disc or videocassette to a library patron infringed no rights under copyright law. The right to share
or dispose of a purchased copy of a copyrighted work fell within the first
sale doctrine. 2 64 In cyberspace, however, a library cannot "share" material
over the Internet without reproducing and transmitting it.265 It is therefore necessary as well as expedient to make multiple copies of copyrighted
digital works to facilitate any sort of sharing. This fast, facile and inexpensive copying enables (if a library were so inclined) broad sharing with
many people simultaneously, on a scale not possible with a real space
book, compact disc or videocassette. Such "sharing" at some point admittedly begins to look less like acts of altruism and more like incidences of
copyright infringement, especially to copyright holders.
To prevent wide spread sharing, content owners are attempting to use
contracts, courts and laws to render it legally and technologically impossible for libraries to share even one legitimate, authorized copy of a work.
Though the Internet makes sharing information faster and easier than
ever, some content owners would have all unauthorized digital sharing
rendered copyright-infringement.2 66 Such action is neither possible nor
generally even attempted in real space, in part because preventing sharing
of analog works would run contrary to longstanding conventions of everyday use. Content owners are thus leveraging new technologies to change
holding that copies in RAM are fixed. At the very least, there is some
authority for the proposition that every time digital information is recorded in RAM memory, a reproduction of the work is made that implicates [section] 106(1) of the Act.
Id.
264. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1997) (codifying doctrine of first sale). In 1984,
Congress enacted the Record Rental Amendment of 1984. See Record Rental

Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 115) (prohibiting commercial record rental, but
placing no restrictions on resale, loan or gift).
265. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1997) (prohibiting reproducing and transmitting
material without compulsory license).
266. See generally, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) (discussing music industry's attempt to permanently enjoin Napster's peerto-peer file-sharing service); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001) (enjoining publication on web site of computer code for decryption of
DVD technology preventing unauthorized copying); UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that copying of copyrighted works onto computer servers and replaying those works for "customers"
infringed copyright).
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the norms of sharing and other uses of copyrighted material well beyond
the context of libraries. Jane Ginsburg explained the new options available to copyright owners by contrasting Napster and VCRs as follows:
There is an important difference between the Napster technology and the Sony videotape recorder. Videotape recorders are a
free-standing technology; as the District Court in Napster recognized, once a machine was sold, its producer could no longer
follow up how consumers employed it. As a result, the determination of contributory infringement entailed an all-or-nothing
outcome: if the manufacturers were held liable, then no machine
could be distributed, despite its capacity for non-infringing uses;
if no liability, then the machine can be distributed, despite its
capacity for infringing uses. Splitting the difference by limiting
distribution of the machine to a class of non-infringers was not a
possibility. Whether as a matter ofjudicial political instinct, or of
technology policy considerations, when the choice is all or nothing, those who end up with nothing are not likely to be the producers and consumers of a vastly popular new device that is
susceptible of legitimate applications. With Napster, by contrast,
the difference could be split; the online technology makes possible the confinement of the service to a class of non-infringers.
The user class will be restricted to non-infringers because, with
the implementation of notice and take down, only authorized
267
files will remain available for "sharing."
The underlying assumption here seems to be that any distributive act
not expressly authorized by copyright owners is infringing. Libraries,
meanwhile, are veritable cultural icons of sharing, providing access to
works that are copyright protected as well as works that are in the "public
domain," and in so doing, facilitating a significant amount of public domain treatment of copyrighted works. Sharing copyrighted works with the
populace is the mission of non-profit libraries, and has long been part of
the culture of information distribution, but is jeopardized by restrictions
on sharing.
Patron access is also affected by the ability of libraries to share with
each other. Books and journals are expensive, which is one of the reasons
patrons seek access to them in libraries in the first place. 268 Since 1986,
the average journal price has tripled, forcing libraries to drastically cut the

267. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 1, 37 (2000).

268. See, e.g., Larry Keller, Looking It Up, (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 28,
2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/CAREER/trends/ 11/28/librarians/index.
html ("One incentive for Internet users to tap into their local library: cost. Large
library systems . . . subscribe to online journals and data bases that charge fees.").
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number of books they buy and serials they subscribe to. 2 6 9 Major commercial academic publishers, in particular, tend to increase their prices
every year and charge almost six times as much per page as non-profit
publishers. 270 Patrons can only be assured of access to a broad range of
books and journals if their "home libraries" can assist them by supplementing their collections by borrowing works they lack from peer
institutions.
a.

Sharing and the Shadow of Napster

To the extent that content sharing is demonized, and library access is
viewed as indistinguishable from "common" sharing, library content users
risk being analogized to Napster users, who in turn have been accused in
27 1
legal documents of exhibiting "the moral fiber of common looters."
When it was launched, Napster did not charge for its services. 2 72 Napster
users didn't make any more money when they made a song available to
other Napster users than a non-profit library would have, and in fact Napster users who downloaded songs could have, at least theoretically (though
with less convenience), obtained the songs from libraries that maintained
music collections.
Libraries start to look even more like Napster when library collections
are accessed remotely. Library patrons who access digitalized works from
home necessarily make copies of the work, either ephemeral or permanent.2 73 If libraries made optimal benefit of the advantageous properties

of digital formats, many patrons could access (and therefore "copy") the
same copyrighted works within a very short time span, much as multiple
Napster users accessed a single electronic copy of a song quickly and
efficiently.
269. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, supra note 210 (discussing effect of journal price
increases). Members of the Association of Research Libraries report increasing
their spending on collections by 130% over the past 15 years, cutting their number
ofjournal subscriptions by 6% and the number of books they buy by 26%. See id.
(same).
270. See Kendra Mayfield, Publish, Perish or Pay Up, WIRED (Mar. 15, 2001), at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42377,00.html
(noting traditional

price increase by commercial publishers).
271. Plaintiff's Complaint at 2, Metallica v. Napster, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(No. 00-03914), transferred to In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LExIs 15493 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. 1369).
272. See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir.
2001) (noting that Napster's services are free of charge); see also Aimee Picchi,
Creating Napster Competitors Record Labels, Publishers Reach Web-music Accord, SEATrLE
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2001, at E3 (describing Napster as "the free music-swapping service
that won millions of fans and angered songwriters and music publishers").
273. Computers make ephemeral copies in their random access memories
(RAM) and permanent copies in cache files and when information is affirmatively
copied or downloaded. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64
F.3d 1330, 1333-34 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting how information is stored and files are
shared through computers).
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While it might seem unlikely that content owners will begin the
wholesale litigation campaign against libraries they crippled Napster with,
the more that electronic library access begins to resemble peer-to-peer file
sharing, the more hostility content owners will begin to express toward
libraries. Recently, for example, Patricia Schroeder, a former Congressional Representative, stated that her employing organization, the Association of American Publishers (AAP) has "very serious issues with librarians"
because a library that buys electronic journals may give them to other libraries.2 7 4 As a result, according to Schroeder, the AAP is looking for ways
to charge library patrons for information. 2 75 Similarly, Bruce Lehman,
former Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks and author of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, stated:
"The law just never said that information should be free, it just said that
information (should) be available on a vast scale for a reasonable fee276
hence the library system."
Napster effectively made a wide selection of music available to millions of individuals without cost, offering unique selection and control options that ordinary radio broadcasts had never made possible. Content
owners such as those represented by Schroeder, however, seek to impose
charges on library patrons for access to information that has traditionally
been available for free. This would represent a significant norm shift with
serious repercussions for libraries. According to Laura Gasaway, librarians
are resisting this, as they emphatically want information to be free to library patrons after libraries have paid for access, as it has always been. She
observed:
What librarians staunchly advocate is that individual users should
not have to pay for information obtained from their public libraries. Libraries should be able to negotiate licenses to provide access for users in their companies, academic institutions, and
public libraries. They fear the threat that information will become pay-per-view and that the library will no longer be able to
negotiate appropriate terms and fees to make a database available to its users. So, statements such as "information wants to be
free" may simply mean free to the individual, not free to the library. If database proprietors charge too much for the license

fee, then the library will not be able to purchase access for its
users. This will mean that patrons with economic means will be
able to afford individual access to the data while the masses will
not. The idea of "information have-nots" provides a direct clash
274. See Linton Weeks, Pat Schroeder's New Chapter,WASH.

POST,

Feb. 7, 2001, at

C1 (expressing discontent over librarians' use of electronic journals).
275. See id. (discussing patron payment for use of online journals).
276. Brad King, Copyright: Your Right or Theirs?, WIRED (Jan. 19, 2001), at
(last visited July 30,
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41199,00.html
2002).
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with the core values of librarians. Librarians deeply believe that
information should be available to everyone who chooses to
come to the library to use it, and that access by individuals should
not be determined by their ability to pay. This likely originates
2 77
with the idea of free public libraries and universal service.
2 78

If libraries are forced to operate under Napster-like restrictions,
patron access to information may deteriorate well below "pre-Internet"
levels, losing rather than gaining from technological innovations in information distribution. For example, libraries generally oppose "pay-perview" access schemes because it is too hard to predict or estimate demand
for a given resource accurately enough for a realistic budgeting process. 279
As a result, works available only on that basis may not be accessible
through libraries. With respect to other works in electronic format, content owners may permit libraries to allow extended access, but probably
only to the extent that such access does not involve any printing or other
copying of the work. Content owners empirically oppose patron copying
of electronic works and even attempt to restrict archival copying by librar280
ies, rigidly limiting them to what is permitted by statute.
Before widespread, inexpensive photocopying technology emerged,
researchers and scholars had to laboriously hand-copy excerpts and quotations out of texts. 281 Researchers and scholars of the future may face the
277. Gasaway, supra note 79, at 134.
278. This point has not escaped the American Library Association, which filed
an amicus brief in the Napster case, arguing that a ruling adverse to Napster could
have chilling consequences for entities such as libraries and search engines that
catalog information for others to use. See Lisa Bowman, Filter This! Librariansto Sue
Over New Law, ZDNet (Jan. 18, 2001), at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/
news/0,4586,2675701,00.html (criticizing software filtering).
279. See Gasaway, supra note 79, at 134 ("Libraries must have a 'sum certain'
in the budget .... Negotiating for a year's access, not on a per search basis, but on
a flat rate permits the library greater flexibility even if it then has to narrow access
to everything in the database as a way to reduce its costs.").
280. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1998) (providing limitations on patron copying); see also generally Crews, supra note 72 (reviewing guidelines that attempt to
define scope of fair use for library services).
281. See Princeton U. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1394 (6th
Cir. 1996) (Martin, Jr., CJ., dissenting). As one Judge in reaching the decision
fondly recalled:
When I was in school, you bought your books and you went to the library
for supplemental information. To record this supplemental information,
in order to learn and benefit from it, you wrote it out long-hand or typed
out what you needed-not easy, but effective. Today, with the help of
free enterprise and technology, this fundamental means of obtaining information for study has been made easier. Students may now routinely
acquire inexpensive copies of the information they need without all of
the hassle. The trend of an instructor giving information to a copying
service to make a single set of copies for each student for a small fee is
just a modern approach to the classic process of education. To otherwise
enforce this statute is nonsensical. I therefore dissent.
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same fate if content owners make information products unprintable as a
technological matter, by using distribution software that disables print capabilities. Additionally, content owners may attempt to make information
products unavailable as a legal matter, by pursuing or at least threatening
to pursue vicarious or contributory copyright infringement actions against
libraries. Lastly, owners of copyrighted content may be able to prohibit
even scholarly use of information products as a matter of contract, forbidding libraries-and in turn, patrons-from acquiring or accessing information unless they agree that there will be little or no downloading or
printing of content, under penalty of loss of access or breach of contract
suits.

Libraries are the ultimate sharers-a fixed geographic or cyber location to which an individual can go to access a wide range of copyrighted
materials. As the authors of one copyright law textbook noted:
Once [a] manuscript has been commercialized or otherwise dis-

closed to the public.., library patrons can read the work, libraries can lend it, critics or scholars can quote from it, teachers can
photocopy it for classroom use or read it, students and actual or
potential competitors can analyze it-all without obtaining permission or paying license fees, thanks to traditional limiting doctrines such as "first sale" and "fair use." Such a published work is
not in the "public domain," in the technical sense of that term,
but it is available to the public as part of the general "informational commons"-the existence of which has been regarded as
282
crucial to the "Progress of Science and useful Arts."
As generous and inveterate sharers of content, libraries are thorns in
the sides of content owners, who believe or at least purport to fear that
access to an electronic work in a library somehow has a more deleterious
effect on profits than ink-and-paper library availability does. In short, content owners assert that library patrons are pirates-in-waiting. Jack Valenti
of the Motion Picture Association of America expressed his purported fear
of libraries as follows:
[S]ome libraries and some universities want to be given a passkey to unlock the shielding technology for what they describe as
"fair use." That is, all libraries and their employees would have
unlimited entry into copyrighted encrypted movies, with the additional power to copy at will. To allow this unlimited pass-key
entry would entice massive piracy. It would vanquish the technological guardians, which preserve copyright integrity. Everyone
knows this.

283

282.

JOYCE, supra note 118, at 57.
283. Jack Valenti, ProtectingAmerica's Most Prized Export in the Digital World, at

http://www.mpaa.org/jack/98/98 7_16b.htm (July 16, 1998) (making remarks
before Summer Internet World 1998).
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Yet the public has long had the ability to copy audiovisual works at will
by using videocassette recorders. The assumption that new and emerging
digital technologies would encourage library patrons who have checked
out "authorized" copies of movies to make more unauthorized copies than
they have before is unsupported and illogical. Certainly higher quality
copies can be made more quickly, but if a library patron has had a week or
more in which to view the library's authorized copy, how often would she
truly bother making a copy for herself? And if she is running a massive
piracy-based business out of her home, would she really endure the inevitable waiting list for library copies of recently released movies rather than
simply buying an authorized copy of the movie she intended to pirate?
One could see how the fact that libraries can loan patrons videocassettes of movies without charging rental fees or remitting royalties must be
galling to the movie trade, but that is what the Copyright Act provides.
The movie industry has apparently invested a lot of resources into making
sure that unlike videocassettes, digital copies of motion pictures cannot be
treated like books. 284 More disturbingly, publishers are attempting to insure that electronic versions of literary works cannot be treated like books
either.
Trepidation that the unauthorized dissemination of digitalized versions of creative works made possible by the Internet will decimate the
marketplace for authorized ink-and-paper or electronic books appears
overstated to date. Even the average person has the ability and equipment
to scan analog books into digital form and distribute them widely over the
Internet. Yet, there is no evidence of this occurring to any significant degree, and millions and millions of books are still being sold. Americans
are probably not the copyright-infringing scumbags that content owners
self-interestedly make us out to be.2 85 In cyberspace as in real space, most
of us are generally law-abiding. 28 6 Moreover, as long as library collections
284. See, e.g., Halpern, supra note 35, at 577 ("Digital technology has significantly enhanced the ability of copyright owners of digital material to encrypt the
material. Where the material is distributed digitally.., such encryption can effectively not only prevent copying in the traditional sense, but can ... limit access to
the material itself, even for otherwise lawful purposes.").
285. See, e.g., Janelle Brown, Ethical Music Piracy, SALON (October 5, 2000), at
http://www.salon.com/tech/log/2000/l0/05/fairtunes/print.html
(discussing
voluntary donations by Napster users); see alsoJanelle Brown, TheJukebox Manifesto,
SALON (Nov. 13, 2000), at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/1 1/13/jukebox/print.html (quoting Rob Reid, CEO of Listen.com) ("If people can pirate for
free, but it's hard to find things and it's hard to get good quality, most people who
have more money and less time than they used to have will feel fine paying $10
[for an industry-approved service] and getting a better experience."). But see Jack
Valenti, Valenti Urged Congress to Support Copyright Protection in Internet Age, Uune 15,
2000), at http://www.mpaa.org/jack/2000/00-06_15.htm (asserting that Internet
is invested with thievery).
286. My focus is on U.S. residents since these are the folks that U.S. courts can
realistically exercise jurisdiction over. I certainly don't mean to suggest other nations have either greater or lesser concentrations of scumbags within their borders.
But see Jack Valenti, If You Can't Protect What You Own-You Don't Own Anything
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remain legal, available and comprehensive, they actually reduce incentives
for individuals to invest time and energy in obtaining counterfeit copies of
copyrighted works, or to gain unauthorized access to any copies.
Now that cyberspace is the repository of all manner of art, literature,
history and scholarship, the real space attributes of public and private,
academic libraries matter little, but the access to information that libraries
provide is as critical as ever. Emerging data technology has greatly enhanced the speed and efficiency with which information can be distributed. Nevertheless, access to information through non-profit libraries has
not only failed to be significantly enhanced, but in some contexts has actually been reduced as new technologies, copyright law and licensing regimes give content owners the ability to control and restrict paradigmatic
library-to-patron sharing of information.
Thus, digitalization undermines the ability of non-profit libraries to
maintain the level of access provided by traditional paper-and-print books
and periodicals. This trend will continue as digitalization becomes the
preferred method of preserving the contents of modern paper-and-print
books, which are subject to physical deterioration over time, and have a
useful life of about fifty years. This means that actual books last a far
shorter time period than the copyrights in the works these books contain,
and they will not even last that long if expansively used, misused or stored
287
under improper conditions.
A library ordinarily provides access to a work in its collections to everyone in its constituent community, regardless of whether there are alternative means of access to the work. Additionally, a library may sometimes
serve as an "intermediary," demonstrating its faith in the value (or at least
"worthwhileness") of a book orjournal with its decision to add the work to
its collection. As Lawrence Lessig observed in another context:
Historically, libraries have always had to choose what materials to
bring into a library. That choice has been influenced in part by
the interests of the community served, in part by budget constraints, and in part, no doubt by the values of the person making
288
the selection.
(Sept. 16, 1997), at http://www.mpaa.org/jack/97/97-9-16b.htm ("In China, in
Russia, in Italy, in scores of other countries, video pirates steal more than $2 billion
Russia . . . is literally infested with
of our intellectual property each year ....
pirates .... ).
287. See Harry S. Martin III, From Ownership to Access: Standardsof Qualityfor the
Law Library of Tomorrow, 82 LAw LiBR.J. 129, 130 (1990) (stating that most of books
in large research libraries of this country are physically dying because they were
printed on highly acidic paper and stored in less-than-ideal physical environments
for bulk of their shelf lives).
288. Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 629, 656 (1998); see generally Junichi P. Semitsu, Note, Burning
Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filtering Software vs. The First Amendment, 52
STAN. L. REV. 509 (2000) (exploring use of Internet filters to restrict library patron
access to certain material).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss1/2

88

Bartow: Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Bo

2003]

ELECTRIFYING COPYRIGHT NoRMs

While libraries are subject to market forces to some extent, and are intuitively more likely to stock works that patrons demand than those that will
be of little or no interest, they offer an alternative to the more strictly
market driven "gate-keeping" intermediation of bookstores and video
rental establishments and are more likely to provide patrons with access to
works undiscovered by, or unimportant to, the mainstream.
Current copyright laws make it possible for libraries to provide any
works they desire as long as the work can be procured in ink-and-paper
format,2 89 yet the same is not true for electronic content. 2 90 Libraries licensing digital content must comply with any use restrictions contained in
the license, and are vulnerable to any decision made by publishers to remove the work from the library's online collection if the publisher has
reserved that right. Some libraries have already experienced the consequences of ceding this power to publishers in the context of digital journals. For example, when companies supplying the libraries with eperiodicals decided to drop titles from their databases, libraries were left
completely without access to journals for which they had been paying if
they did not have analog ink-and-paper backups (which required an addi29 1
tional remittance).
Library Use in the digital context should be coterminous with accessibility, usability and core library values such as patron privacy in real
space. 292 Digital rights management systems that rely on tracking programs to discern authorized access from non-permissive use create
databases of file names and IP addresses that can be sent to an accused

289. See Boddie, supra note 262, at 223 (stating that under first sale doctrine,
"a library which has acquired ownership of a copy of a book is entitled to lend it
under any conditions it chooses to impose without violating the copyright owner's
distribution rights").
290. See Gasaway, supra note 79, at 134 (asserting that intermediary role of
librarians is one of information filtering rather than censoring, and is threatened
by "pay-per-view" models of electronic information distribution).
291. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Companies Find Academic Libraries a Key Target and
a Tough Sell, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 18, 2001), at http://chronicle.com/

free/v47/i36/36a03701.htm (discussing publishers' powers in licensing digital
content).

292. See generally, e.g., Susan Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the US Department of Justice: Losing Our Balances?, Jurist, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/
forumnew40.htm (last visited July 30, 2002) (noting that new law may give government access to email and Internet activities of people not specifically targeted by
law enforcement agencies); see also Cohen, supra note 24, at 1031-32. Cohen states
that comprehensive federal legislation to safeguard reader anonymity can be based
on the multitude of state statutes that protect identities of library patrons. See id.
(listing various state statutes protecting anonymity of library patrons). Cohen
identified a myriad of such prophylatic statutes. See id. (same); see also POLICY ON
CONFIDENTIALITY OF LIBRARY RECoRDS SOURCE: HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION 1990/

91, AMERICAN LIBRARY AssOCIATION 256, Chicago, IL, 1990, available at http://

www.cni.org/docs/infopols/ALA.html#pcpr (discussing library confidentiality).
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infringer's Internet Service Provider. 29 3 Disreputable content owners
could track and collate information about how even "authorized" patrons
use their information products-without the knowledge and consent of
patrons and despite any contrary representations that they have made to
the library itself-if the content owners are confident that libraries are
unlikely to have the ability, resources or technological proficiency to ascertain their treachery. Content owners may also use "push" technologies to
try to steer patrons toward certain works and away from others for monetary gain. To the extent these technologies are less than transparent, content owners can at least attempt to surreptitiously shape the scholarly
investigation agendas and research outcomes of library patrons.
2.

Avoiding the Pitfalls of "FairUse"

Fair use is, as explained above, 29 4 a limitation on the exclusive rights
of copyright owners, codified at section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
All library users, particularly researchers, educators and scholars, are at
least somewhat protected from use restrictions imposed by publishers

through the doctrine of fair use, limited and uncertain though it may be.
Nevertheless, law professor and librarian Kenneth Crews has trenchantly
observed: "[flair use is both a privilege, and a source of confusion. Nearly
everyone will disagree on what is 'fair,' and no one has a definitive, legally
binding 'answer."' 2 9 5 This sort of sinister ambiguity creates incentives to
avoid litigation by erring on the side of denying access in any questionable
situation. This is bad for patrons, and contrary to the mission of a library.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 29 6 particularly impedes the public's ability to exercise the right of fair use with respect to
digital works. 297 The DMCA "makes it illegal to manufacture or distribute
293. See, e.g., Brad King, Digital Rights Gain a Foothold, WIRED (May 30, 2001),
at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,44153,00.html (discussing use of
digital rights management systems).
294. For a discussion of the "fair use" doctrine, see supra notes 37-60 and
accompanying text.
295. Kenneth Crews, Copyright Law, Libraries,and Universities: Overview, Recent
Developments, and Future Issues, at http://palimpsest.stanford.edu/bytopic/intprop/crews.html (last visited July 30, 2002) (noting that "many fair use rights are
not well identified, and those voids in the law are invitations for diverse interest
groups to propose and negotiate guidelines"); see also Crews, supra note 72, at 658
(analyzing divergent views on fair use doctrine).
296. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
297. The Librarian of Congress and Copyright Office were given the opportunity by Congress to issue rules governing the access provisions of the DMCA that
established an enhanced right of copyrighted works fair use access. They chose
not to do so. See, e.g., Oscar S. Cisneros, Fearof a Pay-Per-Use World, WINED (Oct. 9,
2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,39330,00.html (explaining that Librarian of Congress had two years to study access provisions of DMCA);
see also American Library Association, Nero Digital Copyright Rules Badfor the American
Public (Oct. 26, 2000), at http://www.ala.org/washoff/alawon/alwn9085.html
(noting ALA's discontent with new digital copyright rules from Librarian of Congress allowing only two exceptions to access provision of DMCA).
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devices designed to bypass technology that protects copyrighted material."' 298 The DMCA also makes it illegal for an individual seeking to make
a back-up copy of a digital work for herself-the type of copying that is
almost universally viewed as allowable under copyright law-to use such
devices with digital works. 299 As a result, while making the copies does not
violate the Copyright Act, breaking through the copy-protection measures
to make perfectly legal copies violates the DMCA. 300 Moreover, individuals can legally copy portions of a work for purposes of parody, scholarship,
news reporting or criticism when they are engaging in fair use of copyrighted works, but circumventing copy prohibition technologies to exercise this right is illegal under the DMCA, as are software tools that make
such circumvention possible. 30 1 As Diane Zimmerman has written, it is a
statute with a sense of humor, 30 2 albeit a very cynical and malevolently
droll one.
The DMCA, like the Copyright Act, does provide exemptions for libraries. 30 3 For example, libraries may circumvent copyright protection
measures if the reason they do so is to make a determination about
whether to acquire a particular work.30 4 In addition, a library may make
three non-permissive copies of a work, and the statute specifically permits
copies to be in digital format. 30 5 Nevertheless, these exemptions also contain some alarming restrictions. For example, the statute states that if a
copy that is reproduced is in digital format, the digital copy may not be
"made available to the public in that format outside the premises of the
library ...."306 Laura Gasaway has explained that prior to this amend298. See, e.g.,
Amy Harmon, Software Double Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at
C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/13/technology/ebusiness/
13NECO.html?pagewanted=print (noting several practices now illegal under
DMCA).
299. See id. (discussing limitations imposed by DMCA).
300. See, e.g., id. (explaining confusing "double bind" in DMCA).
301. See id. (describing various exceptions to DMCA suggested by Library of
Congress).
302. See Zimmerman, supra note 84, at 279 (questioning whether DMCA actually helps educational institutions' special needs).
303. See Gasaway, supra note 79, at 161 (noting exceptions for libraries provided in DMCA).
An unusual part of the DMCA is found in section 1204, which states that
nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational institutions are exempted
from the criminal provisions for anti-circumvention or removal of copyright management information. Subsection (b) states that neither the
large fines nor federal prison terms will be assessed against libraries.
Note that the library will not go to jail-the statute does not say "librarian" but "libraries."
Id.
304. See id. at 161 (noting means in which DMCA extends fair use).
305. See id. at 138 (stating that under DMCA, libraries are no longer limited to
making only one copy of work); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2000) (allowing three
copies of work to be made "in digital format" for replacement or preservation).
306. Gasaway, supra note 79, at 138.
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ment, a library could treat the reproduction just as it did the original
work, lending the reproduction to library patrons for home use, and providing it to others through interlibrary loans.3" 7 The new restriction, however, seems to state that if the work is preserved in digital format, it cannot
"1 8
be used outside the library building.
Because of the new restrictions it imposed, librarians publicly (and
vehemently) expressed concern that the DMCA negatively impacted libraries' abilities to make interlibrary loans, provide off-site access to digital
materials and to use donated digital copies of works.-3 0 9 The Copyright
Office's response was the discouraging statement that it hoped and expected that "the marketplace will respond to the various concerns of customers in the library community."" 10 Imposition on digital content
providers of real space access obligations for libraries is, therefore, unlikely to be attained through bare persuasion or lobbying by librarians.
This is especially true after the Copyright Office deemed the librarians'
307. See id. at 139 (contrasting pre- and post-DMCA copyright restrictions).
308. See id. at 138-39 (discussing limitations of provision).
While these three changes broaden the preservation exemptions for libraries, each subsection also contains a new limitation. If the copy that is
reproduced is in digital format, the digital copy may not be "made available to the public in that format outside the premises of the library..."
This may narrow the library's rights even though a library now may make
a digital copy for on-premises use. However, the library could also then
make a printed copy from that digital copy and loan the printed one
since it is allowed to make up to three copies of a work. Prior to the
amendment, a library that reproduced a work under these subsections
could treat the reproduction just as it did the original work. It could lend
the reproduction to users, provide it through interlibrary loan, and the
like. This new restriction may mean that if the work is preserved in digital format, it cannot be used outside the library buildings, and this is
much more restrictive. Surely what Congress must have meant was that if
the reproduction was digital and was available on the library's network,
then it could be used only within the premises and not on a campus network or the World Wide Web. In using the term "digital copy" Congress
may actually have narrowed the exemption for works that were originally
in digital format. For example, if the original work was a CD-ROM, which
now is lost and is not availableat a fair price, a library may create another
CD, which also happens to be a digital copy. But the language of the
statute says that digital copies cannot be used outside the premises even if
the original was a digital copy that could have been outside the premises
of the library. This is more restrictive than the previous version of the
statute, and likely is not what Congress meant to accomplish by the
amendment.

Id.
309. See, e.g., Reuters, No Need to Alter the DMCA-Yet, WIRED (Aug. 30, 2001),
at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,46440,00.html (listing concerns of
libraries over DMCA's provisions restricting fair use).

310. United States Copyright Office, Executive Summary Digital Millennium
Copyright Act Section 104 Report, at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/reports/studies/dmca/dmcaexecutive.html (last visited July 30, 2002) [hereinafter Copyright
Office, Report]; see also, e.g., Reuters, supra note 309 (discussing import of digital
copies on copyright law).
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arguments that relied on analogies to the physical world "flawed and
unconvincing.
3.

3 11

Giving Libraries the Scope of Immunity Accorded Commercial Internet
Service Providers

Internet Service Providers (ISPs) recognized early on that fair use was
an uncertain and doctrinally complex defense to assert, should any infringing materials be introduced into cyberspace through the portals and
speech platforms they provided. They realized that relying on a fair use
defense could easily bankrupt them, because even if they won a copyright
infringement suit, the litigation preceding what might ultimately prove a
pyrrhic victory would be lengthy, disruptive and hideously expensive.
With substantial lobbying money at their disposal, commercial ISPs
such as America OnLine were able to convince Congress to build ISP immunity into section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.3 12 Later,
they persuaded Congress that ISPs should be provided with immunity to
copyright infringement suits in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
ISPs are shielded by this immunity as long as they agree to take certain
actions against service users accused of infringement pursuant to the
DMCA's notice and "take down" provisions.3 13 This frees an ISP from burdensome monitoring of its customers, and the conflicts and responsibilities that could arise out of such monitoring. 3 14 The specific mechanics of
the DMCA encourage and reward risk averse "take down now, ask questions later" behavior by ISPs, raising serious freedom of expression concerns that need to be addressed.3 15 Nevertheless, at least this immunity
admirably insures that, for ISPs, copyright issues can be consistently and
predictably dispatched without wasting resources.
Libraries would benefit from a similar reduction in the risks and uncertainties that copyright issues currently pose. Rather than a doctrinal
test that isolates "factors for consideration" in establishing the parameters
of electronic works exploitation in library contexts-an approach that has
failed so miserably in the context of fair use-straightforward codification
311. Copyright Office, Report, supra note 310; see also, e.g., Reuters, supra note

309 (reporting findings of Copyright Office's study).
312. Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, even when an
ISP has notice of a defamatory third party posting it is entitled to immunity, as
section 230 expressly bars "any actions." See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996) (providing immunity to ISPs);Jane Doe v. Am. Online, 783 So. 2d 1010, 1018 (Fla. 2001)
(noting that "section 230 expressly bars 'any actions' and we are compelled to give
the language of this preemptive law its plain meaning"). For a further discussion
of 47 U.S.C. § 230, see supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
313. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (1999) (establishing "take down procedure" which
removes infringing material without risking liability).
314. It should be noted that ISP immunity in this context specifically applies
to computer services offered by libraries. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (2) (1996) (placing
services offered by libraries under definition of "interactive computer service").
315. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1999) (providing civil remedies for violations of
copyright).
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of a right to use digital documents as if they were constructed of ink and
paper would promote uniformity and stability. This would statutorily import behaviors and practices into the digital realm, allowing libraries to
3 16
continue to rely on established norms regardless of the work's format.
Ironically, when libraries provide patrons with access to the Internet
they actually qualify for ISP immunity, which gives libraries qualified protection from copyright suits that could arise if patrons post copyrighted
materials using library computers. 3 17 It is when patrons access and use
digitalized materials from library collections that libraries remain exceedingly vulnerable to accusations of copyright infringement, even though
providing access to information is arguably a more critical function of libraries than facilitating patron communications over the Internet. Libraries need statutory protection from copyright suits through a limited
immunity framework so that they can provide access to information without undue fear of litigation and are not burdened with extensive patron
monitoring responsibilities.
4.

PreventingReplacement by For-Profit "E-Libraries"

For-profit electronic library services generate an estimated $250 million annually, and one industry estimate suggests this figure will triple over
the next three years. 3 18 Online library services are spending years and
hundreds of millions of dollars to build digitalized collections of books.
They postulate that consumers (largely students at present) will pay for
Internet-enabled access to books,journals and reference materials, despite
the fact that most of the same information can be obtained from a nonprofit library free of charge.3 19 Publishers will favor for-profit libraries because they will create a new revenue stream, as if they did not obtain permission from (and remit royalties to) copyright holders, for-profit
electronic libraries would doubtlessly be sued with at least as much energy
and passion as Napster was. Ultimately, these so-called "e-libraries" will
316. Cf Crews, supra note 72, at 658 (noting that CONTU Guidelines have

great authority and legal credibility and, together with section 108, evidence
weight that Congress places on interlibrary services and conservation of
collections).
317. See, e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 778 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001) (stating public library is eligible for Communications Decency Act
defense); see also Arnold P. Lutzker, The DigitalMillennium Copyright Act: Highlights
of New Copyright ProvisionEstablishingLimitation of Liability for Online Service Providers,
MLANet, at http://www.mIanet.org/government/dmca/ospanalysis.html (last vis-

ited July 30, 2002) (explaining that libraries and other online service providers
function as common carriers under DMCA, therefore escaping liability if third
party material infringes on someone's copyright).
318. See Kendra Mayfield, The Quest for E-Knowledge, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2001), at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41543,00.html
(quoting E. Yegin
Chen: "[t] he market for e-library services totals approximately $250 million annually and is expected to triple over the next three years to over $850 million
annually").
319. See id. (describing business activities of Questia to build online product).
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have incentives to endorse and support any actions content owners take to
limit patron access to information in traditional libraries. Consequently,
constraining the electronic access that non-profit libraries can provide will
enhance the demand for for-profit online library services.
Some courts320 and copyright scholars 32 1 have advocated a "market

value" theory of fair use, which configures the scope of fair use for any
given copyrighted work in inverse proportion to the ease with which the
work (or rights to use the work) can be licensed or purchased in an open
market. This view of the fair use doctrine suggests that in the absence of a
new statutory right of access such as Library Use, the existence of affordable for-profit e-libraries undermines the doctrinal justifications for according non-profit libraries and their patrons broad fair use privileges.
320. See, e.g., Princeton U. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th
Cir. 1996) (adopting test to negate fair use based on proving diminution in potential market value); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d
Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed by 516 U.S. 1005 (1995) (discussing fourth factor of section 107, "the effect of the use upon the market for or value of the copyrighted
work").
321. The seminal article expostulating this theory is Wendy J. Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its
Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982). Gordon discusses it further in Wendy
J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and PrisonersDilemma in IntellectualProperty, 17
U. DAYrON L. REv. 853, 858-59 (1992) (discussing strategic behaviors that may prevent licensing in a range of contexts); see also, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Can the Internet Shrink FairUse? 78 NEB. L. REv. 880, 880 (1999) (explaining Gordon's theory
of fair use). Kitch noted:
The conception of fair use that has made the Internet relevant to fair use
was set out in an influential 1982 article by Wendy Gordon. She suggested that the fair use doctrine is and should be available to protect an
infringer from liability only when the infringer's use is one that is socially
beneficial and would be authorized by the copyright owner except for the
fact that transaction costs make it too costly to seek and obtain permission for the copying. "Fair use should be awarded to the defendant in a
copyright infringement action when (1) market failure is present; (2)
transfer of the use to defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an award of
fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff
copyright owner." An illustration of this test as it might be applied to a
traditional form of fair use-the quotation of a copyrighted work in another work-is as follows. The use of the quotation in the second work is
of such little value to the second author that it is not worth his time to
locate and communicate with the copyright owner. Yet the use of the
quotation helps the second author make the point, while it may help the
first author by acting as publicity for his work. Everyone is better off if the
quote is used, yet if permission is required the quote will not be used.
The fair use doctrine enables this use to occur, leaving everyone better
off.
The connection between this conception of fair use and the Internet
is the possibility that the Internet will make it easier for users of copyrighted work to communicate with, and obtain permission from, the copyright owner. As a result, there will be fewer situations in which there is
the market failure that in Gordon's view justifies the fair use doctrine.
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Though the acquisition decisions of non-profit libraries are undoubtedly determined by patron demand to some degree, the collections of forprofit libraries are likely to be much more "market driven." For-profit elibraries will have much stronger incentives than non-profit libraries to
stock only popular, mainstream works likely to be attractive to large numbers of users. If they become the primary venue through which content is
accessed by patrons, access to less conventional content will begin eroding
and works targeted at narrow, specialized audiences will become less profitable and, therefore, less "incentivized."
Some for-profit entities are beginning to provide electronic books to
academic, public and corporate libraries, rather than directly to individuals. 322 A patron of a subscribing library is typically allowed to "check out"

an electronic book for forty eight hours via the World Wide Web as long as
the patron's library has bought that particular e-book, and no one covered
under the same library subscription is using it contemporaneously. 3 23
While remote access may be convenient to the user, the e-book is likely to
be configured so that the ways in which the user can make use of the work
are very constrained 324 such as by preventing a user from printing or
downloading text.
Electronic books obtained from for-profit library intermediaries generally do not save libraries money or solve storage or shelving issues. This
is because libraries will, whenever possible, purchase the work in print as
well as in electronic form to ensure that the work will still be available to
patrons if it is removed from the online collection by the e-book company,
or if the e-book company discontinues its relationship with the library or
goes out of business.3 2 5 Sometimes, however, an e-version of a work is all
that is made available.
Anyone who doubts that for-profit libraries can displace or reconfigure non-profit ones should consider the effect that legal databases such
as Lexis and Westlaw have had on the ink and paper collections of law
libraries. As one librarian observed:
Facing shrinking or static budgets, law school libraries have indeed cancelled or stopped acquiring materials that are duplicated on legal research databases. This practice is so prevalent
322. See, e.g., Mayfield, supra note 318 (noting entrepreneurial impulse to capitalize on digital collection use).
323. See Lucia Snowhill, E-books and Their Future in Academic Libraries, D-LIB
at http://www.dlib.org/dlib/julyOl/snowhill/07snowhill.html (July/
August 2001) (summarizing status of current e-book market, technologies and libraries' experiences with e-books). But see M.J. Rose, The Library That Keeps On
Giving, WIRED (Aug. 21, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,
MAGAZINE,

46160,00.html (stating that normal procedure for e-libraries would allow e-books
to be borrowed by one reader per check-out).
324. See Blumenstyk, supra note 291 (noting that netLibrary, world's largest
provider of e-books, lends e-books that cannot be saved to user's computer).
325. See id. (discussing unfulfilled promise of e-libraries).
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that law libraries are even considering selective cancellations of
Shepard's citators because shepardizing is so readily available on
LEXIS and WESTLAW. Resistance to what is perceived as unnecessary duplication of information is so rampant that a new law
school seeking accreditation is suing the American Bar Association for, among other things, insisting that material on the
databases also be maintained in hard copy . . . [L]ibraries in-

and other databases as the
creasingly rely on LEXIS, WESTLAW,
326
sole sources for certain materials.

Patrons that do not have LEXIS, Westlaw or other necessary passwords
conferring authorization to use these databases are excluded from the informational resources they provide and are unable to use them even to
discover what information they are being denied. 32 7 Those of us with
ready and unlimited access to well-resourced libraries and expensive online legal databases are the lucky few. Most people working in the legal
field or in areas heavily impacted by law, such as police officers, public
sector workers and even judges and their clerks are confronted with space,
budgetary and geographic constraints that impede their ability to perform
broad based legal research.

328

In addition to online databases, law libraries are increasingly dependent on full-text resources available through the Internet, and document329
on-demand services that may be the only sources of certain materials.
Eventually, access to all legal information could require royalty payments.
Peter Martin has explained that in 1997 Microsoft began an ongoing initiative to set up electronic filing systems in courts, and to link law firms to
courts, and to each other. 330 While this may improve communications in
the legal field, he expressed fear that if courts and agencies do not insist
that the standards for data interchange are open and non-proprietary,
Microsoft and its allies will gain control over the flow of data into and out
of the government. Ultimately, he warned, this "would give Microsoft a
monopoly position over the tools of communication ...

that it could use

to get both the public and lawyers to pay for again and again, either directly or indirectly.

LAW

' 33 1

326. Gail M. Daly, BibliographicAccess to Legal Research DatabasesReconsidered, 87
LIBR. J. 192, 199 (1995) (citations omitted).

327. See id. at 201 (discussing access problems concerning legal databases).
328. See, e.g., Peter W. Martin, The Internet: "Full and Unfettered Access" to Law-

some Implications,26 N. Ky. L. REv. 181, 194 (1999) (discussing cumbersome quality
of print copies).
329. See Daly, supra note 326, at 199 (expressing concern over problems facing law librarians resulting from increasing numbers of certain Internet-only
sources, rendering single comprehensive catalogue "outmodled").
330. See Martin, supra note 328, at 204-05 (setting up chilling scenario where
Microsoft monopolizes legal communication).
331. Id. As Martin described:
In December of 1997, Microsoft announced a strategic alliance with several other vendors to "promote an electronic legal and justice system that
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Preventingthe Complete Evisceration of the First Sale Doctrine

The first sale doctrine is set out in section 109 of the Copyright
Act.
It guarantees to purchasers of "hard copies" of copyrighted works
such as books, the right to sell or "otherwise dispose of" that copy of a
work that has been straightforwardly purchased, regardless of whether the
purchasers are individuals or libraries. 333 As a general matter, depending
on how one looks at it, first sale doctrine either reflects or legitimizes
traditional "book behaviors." People who buy books can re-read them,
loan them to others, trade them, give them away or even rent them out
without violating the copyright laws. First sale doctrine is a bedrock princi334
ple upon which non-profit libraries are built.
332

First sale doctrine mandates that, for copyright owners, profiting from
a physical article embodying a copyrighted work is a one time only prowill digitally link law firms to courts, as well as law firms to each other."
The press release spoke of setting "up electronic filing systems in courts
through the United States" and offering law firms of all sizes a document
management system that "will integrate with the [court] systems" thereby
realizing the full potential of "electronic filing." Nevertheless, it is current and past corporate practice, and not paranoia, that suggests a contrasting vision. The Internet browser competition and the constant
addition of hitherto discrete applications to Windows "operating system"
provide inescapable evidence of Microsoft's willingness to give away technology products and services in order to secure market dominance. With
billions of dollars in reserve Microsoft should have no trouble dominating the market for electronic legal data interchange-that is, the means
of communication between lawyers, courts and other public bodies, and
ordinary citizens.
The scenario is straightforward. Imagine the Microsoft alliance offering a free or chillingly inexpensive, fully functional and secure "legal
data interchange" and "electronic filing" system to courts and public
agencies at all levels of government, few of whom are prepared to be
technology leaders, yet all of whom feel resource constraints. Integrated
smoothly with Microsoft Word, Internet Explorer, or the ubiquitous Windows operating system, and supported with ample training, this would be
a package that courts and agencies moving into the digital environment
might be hard pressed to refuse. However, if they accept such an offer
without insisting that the resulting standard for data interchange be an
open, non-proprietary one, they will have given the alliance control over
the flow of law data both into and out of government. That decision
would give Microsoft a monopoly position over tools of the communication that it could use to get both the public and lawyers to pay for again
and again, either directly or indirectly.
Id.
332. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1997) (providing limitations on exclusive rights of owners with respect to transfer of particular copies or phonorecords).
333. See § 109(a) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner,
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.").
334. Individuals are, by statute, restricted in what they may do with computer
programs or sound recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (providing that owners of
sound recordings or computer programs cannot dispose of them "by rental, lease,
or lending").
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position. Copyright owners are precluded from regulating or restricting
distribution of a book or periodical after it is sold. Therefore, among the
other functions it serves, section 109 enables students to sell textbooks
back to bookstores, and bookstores to resell the textbooks to other students, without transmitting additional royalties to entities that own the
copyrights in the texts.
First sale doctrine is the statutory foundation of many copyright use
norms. Before it was codified, copyright owners tried to coerce and proselytize alternative use norms more favorable to themselves. According to
Pamela Samuelson:
Book publishers and sound-recording companies once tried to
restrict what purchasers could do with their products by licenses,
but fortunately the courts didn't let them get away with it. (Take
a look at an old Victrola recording jacket and you'll see it purports to license use of the recording to one Victrola machine and
to deny authority to retransfer one's copy of the recording.)
One important case was Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus. Publisher BobbsMerrill sued . . . Straus . . . because he sold copies of Bobbs-

Merrill books in violation of a license restriction that conditioned
the right to retransfer copies of the books on an agreement to
charge at least $1 per copy. The U.S. Supreme Court treated the
license restriction as ineffective as a matter of copyright policy.
The Bobbs-Merrill decision contributed to the emergence of the
"first-sale" or "exhaustion-of-rights" doctrine in copyright law,
under which publishers lose authority to control redistributions
of copies of their works when, in commercial reality, the transaction is a sale. In the aftermath of this and similar cases, publishers and sound recording companies abandoned these
33 5
practices.
Having failed to convince the courts that the first sale doctrine would summarily bankrupt them, they turned to business solutions. For example,
publishers blunt the effect of the first sale doctrine by issuing revised editions of textbooks. This renders used copies of "old" editions less attractive and shrinks the market for used texts, 3 3 6 but publishers cannot do so

without giving the world an updated and at least hypothetically improved
information product.
Among its other advantages for libraries, the first sale doctrine helps
prevent price discrimination, because it allows those who buy a work at a
low price to resell it to an entity that otherwise may have been targeted for
335. Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: Does Information Really Have To Be
Licensed?, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, (Sept. 1998), available at http://
sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers/acm-2B.html.
336. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 51, at 214 (detailing publishers' alternative
measures of countering first sale doctrine).
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a high price. In other words, publishers cannot effectively tack surcharges
onto books they sell to libraries, even though those copies are likely to be
read by more people than copies sold to individuals, because libraries can
"arbitrage" books from those who are able to purchase them at lower
prices. When the first sale doctrine is circumvented through contract provisions governing licensing, reselling can be prevented (since there was
never a "first sale" to engage the eponymous doctrine) and libraries become vulnerable to price discrimination.33 7 In addition, certain kinds of
multiple uses can be prevented, and contract terms can be automatically
enforced, with technology that meters digital access, or by the use of computer discs that self-destruct after a certain amount of time, number of
338
users or attempts to print.

a.

Licensing Alters Library Functionality

As described above, section 108 of the Copyright Act places "library
oriented" limits on a copyright owner's exclusive rights, enabling libraries
(and archives) to make limited numbers of copies of copyrighted works to
replace, preserve or supplement market-acquired copies in a library or archival collection. 339 Section 108(f)(4), however, expressly states that
337. SeeJames Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic Analysis, PriceDiscrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2007, 2010-11, 2027 (2000)
(discussing how licensing will strip people of privileges now taken for granted with
printed material); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy:
Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REx,. 845, 861, 877-79 (1997) (discussing profitability of leases to content owners because leases skirt around first
sale, thus creating potential for consumer price discrimination).
338. See, e.g., Andy Patrizio, DVDs That Self-Destruct, WIRED (Jan. 20, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,33781,00.html (describing attempt by
Spectra Science to introduce coating on DVDs limiting use of product); Bob
Tedeschi, On-line Publishing Ventures are Still Looking for a Way Around Readers' Sales
Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at C14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
library/tech/99/10/cyber/commerce/O4commerce.html
(noting that certain
technologies "allow publishers to sell information online to one user, and have
that information encrypted on the hard drive of the user's computer. Software
that the user downloads with the document controls the information, so it cannot
be digitally reproduced, forwarded via e-mail or even, in some cases, printed.");
Peter Wayner, To Cover Electronic Tracks, E-mail That Self-Destructs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1999, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/1O/cyber/articles/
13mail.html ("Several companies are exploring ways to control the copying and
dissemination of electronic documents with their own versions of self-destructing
e-mail. They aim to make it possible to send a message or document that will
become unreadable after a predetermined period so that companies and individuals can keep their information on a short leash.").
339. More specifically:
Section 108 permits a library, under certain circumstances, to make a single copy of a periodical article or small excerpt of a larger work (such as a
book chapter) upon request of the library's patron or in response to a
request from another library on behalf of that library's patron. This right
is subject to two conditions. Subsection (g) (1) of section 108 prohibits a
library from engaging in related or concerted copying or distribution of
either single or multiple copies of the same material on one occasion or
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nothing in section 108 "in any way affects ... any contractual obligations
assumed at any time by the library or archives when it obtained a copy or
340
phonorecord of a work in its collections."
This legislative loophole makes libraries vulnerable to private ordering through contract that can hamper a library's ability to provide patron
access. Specifically, content owners can refuse to sell digital books or periodicals to libraries, instead requiring them to "license" copyrighted works,
often on nonnegotiable terms.3 4 I As Anne Klinefelter has observed:
Licensing avoids the first sale doctrine by characterizing the exchange as a purchase of rights to use the electronic product in
certain ways rather than as a sale of a copy. The language of the
copyright law provides first sale rights only to an owner of a copy.
So, is there is no sale, there is no owner; and if there is no owner,
3 42
there are no first sale rights.
Though courts have equivocated about the enforceability of some shrinkwrap and click-wrap licenses and license terms, the trend seems to be toward enforcing them.3 43 Moreover, states that adopt some permutation of
over a period of time. Subsection (g) (2) prohibits a library from engaging in the systematic reproduction of single or multiple copies of articles
or short excerpts. Libraries may, however, participate in interlibrary arrangements that do not have as their purpose or effect the receipt of
copies in such aggregate quantities as to substitute for a subscription to or
purchase of a work. Section 108, therefore, allows isolated and unrelated
copying and distribution of single copies of the same or different materials on separate occasions, but interlibrary lending that is systematic may
be viewed as substituting for a subscription or the purchase of the work.
James S. Heller, The Impact of Recent Litigation on Interlibrary Loan and Document Delivery, 88 LAw LIBR. J. 158, 160 (1996) (citations omitted).
340. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (1998).
341. See Anne Klinefelter, Copyright and Electronic Library Resources: An Overview
of How the Law Is Affecting TraditionalLibrary Services, 19 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES
Q. 175, 178 (2001) ("The point of licensing is to allow software providers to sell
copies of their information products without the attachment of the first sale
doctrine.").
342. Id. at 178-79.
343. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1997)
(finding shrinkwrap license valid and binding); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding shrinkwrap agreements enforceable). But
see, e.g., Vault v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-79 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding
shrinkwrap agreement unenforceable). See generally, e.g., Francis M. Buono &
Jonathan A. Friedman, Maximizing the Enforceability of Click-Wrap Agreements, 4 J.
TECH. L. & PoL'Y 3, 5-6 (1999) (noting that most courts have upheld shrinkwrap
agreements provided they meet principles of valid contract); Ryan J. Casamiquela,
ContractualAssent and Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 475, 477-80
(2002) (analyzing shrinkwrap caselaw and means by which courts have found such
agreements enforceable); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding
Commit, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1134 (2000) (discussing predecessors to clickwrap and
noting that courts have authorized shrinkwrap agreements).
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the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA) 3 44 are codifying the legality and enforceability of non-negotiated licenses for information products. As one commentator noted: "[UCITA], currently under
discussion for passage in the individual states, if passed, likely will make
the licensing issue even more difficult for libraries as the ability to negoti'34 5
ate may be subsumed into standard licensing terms for many products.
To the extent any negotiation with copyright owners is possible, large,
well-funded libraries or library systems will have huge advantages over
smaller libraries or those with fewer financial resources. For example, one
electronic book provider concentrated its initial sales efforts on the ten
largest library consortia because these entities spend $600 million on
books annually. 346 This enabled the libraries with the richest collections
to become information-wealthier still, while smaller, poorer libraries fell
further behind. Libraries with the sparsest resources are likely to serve
communities that have the fewest alternative information sources available
to them. If libraries are to fulfill the mission of delivering information
access to those who do not have the means to purchase such access independently, at a minimum lesser-funded libraries need to be able to license
information on terms that are at least equivalent to those available to
wealthier institutions.
United States Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, 34 7 has asserted
that the government is considering ways to adapt the first sale doctrine to
the digital age including insuring that content is destroyed on a hard drive
when a secondary sale of the content is made. 348 However, it is difficult to
believe that content owners would voluntarily forgo the advantages of a
licensing format, and return to selling works outright, simply because the
government helps them eliminate some unauthorized copies of digital
works.
Substitution of "freedom of contract" for the first sale doctrine will
work exclusively to the advantage of content owners: libraries usually have
inferior bargaining power and generally will be presented with standard
344. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7 U.L.A., pt. II, at 9, (Aug.
2001), available at http://ucitaonline.com/ucita.html.
345. Casaway, supra note 79, at 154. See Klinefelter, supra note 341, at 177
(discussing UCITA and "one-sided contracts" that will result from its enaction by
states).
346. See Vincent Kiernan, An Ambitious Plan to Sell Electronic Books, CIIRON. OF
EDUC., Apr. 16, 1999, at A29 (discussing venture allowing educational institutions to form consortia for purchasing electronic books, permitting libraries to
acquire books that they would otherwise be unable to afford).
347. For a biography of Marybeth Peters, see UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights BiographicalInformation, at http://www.loc.
gov/copyright/docs/mbpbio.html (detailing Peters' legal career) (last accessed
July 30, 2002).
348. See King, supra note 73 (noting attempts by government to amend first
sale doctrine).
HIGHER

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss1/2

102

Bartow: Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Bo

20031

ELECTRIFYING COPYRIGHT

NoRMs

license agreements on a take-it-or-leave it basis.3 49 When libraries submit
to restrictive licensing regimes, they do so with the highest motives (providing patrons entree to the licensed information), but simultaneously become complicit in access compression by tolerating limitations on
otherwise legitimate uses of the licensed works.
Licensing reconfigures digital information as a service rather than a
product, and renders it potentially subject to use restrictions, or even termination, over which a library has little if any control. As copyright owners write contracts granting themselves greater rights than the copyright
laws provide, and libraries fewer privileges, copying-related activities such
as archiving and preservation can be limited or prohibited 350 through a
judicious combination of contract terms and technology. This undermines an important traditional role of libraries. 35 1 Pure duplication as an
end, in and of itself, is the type of copying least likely to be found to be fair
use under section 107 of the Copyright Act,3 5 2 which is in fact the rationale behind giving libraries an explicit right to do some unauthorized copying in section 108. Licensing regimes that require libraries to forgo
section 108 rights make it difficult for libraries to perpetuate the long353
standing and beneficial norm of archival preservation.
Additionally, libraries have long relied on older technologies like
microfiche and microfilm to retain archival copies of certain types of copyrighted works such as newspapers and periodicals, and usually make them
available to researchers on an unrestricted basis. Future access to such
works may be compromised if archival copies are seen as revenue-producing commodities to be stored, retrieved and distributed only under the
aegis of "digital asset management," and accessible only on a pay-per-view
3 54
basis.
349. But see Rose, supra note 323 (finding that California State University System used its size-23 campuses and 370,000 students-to persuade netLibrary to
allow California State system libraries to lend e-books to unrestricted number of
borrowers at one time, representing significant change in how subscription models
generally work).
350. See Lemley, supra note 244, at 128-29 (noting that some contracts provide
that licensee may not make any copies of licensed work, whether or not copying
would be fair use).
351. See Klinefelter, supra note 341, at 179 ("[The] archiving function has
been an important traditional role of libraries.").
352. Duplicative copying is less likely to be fair than transformative copying.
For a further discussion of transformative use, see supra note 41 and accompanying
text. But see Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-51 (1984)
(concluding that use of Betamax to record television programs does not violate
copyright law).
353. See Gasaway, supra note 79, at 142 (citing DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note
74, at 9-10, 206-10) (discussing problems concerning libraries' ability to preserve
electronic material and its effect on cultural record).
354. See, e.g., Susan Stellin, CNN Video Archives to Become DigitalDatabase, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2001, at C8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/23/
technology/23SEAR.html (detailing CNN's drive to archive 115,000 hours of
videotape in digital format).
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Licenses could also force librarians into becoming gatekeepers of
copyrights. As a condition of acquiring copyrighted works, libraries could
be compelled to police how patrons get access to digital publications
based on who patrons are, the reasons patrons desire access, the ways patrons expect to use the publication or the nature of the publications at
issue. One privilege that library patrons have long enjoyed, access to
photocopiers, could be functionally taken away from them in the digital
environment.
Before the advent of photocopiers, "it was a customary fact of copyright life that individuals could make entire handwritten copies of copyrighted materials for their own use and that secretaries could make typed
copies for the use of their employers." 355 With the advent of
photocopiers, making copies of library holdings became faster and easier,
to the consternation of copyright owners. Libraries, however, have never
been required to monitor patron use of photocopiers, and as long as library photocopiers carry appropriate notices, libraries are immune from
liability as contributory infringers, regardless of how egregiously patrons
may exceed the bounds of fair use. 356 Making copies of portions of copyrighted works will continue to be important to patrons accessing digital
works. Unless Library Use prevents it, however, publishers can contract
around the fair use doctrine, forbidding even modest copying, and requiring librarians to be their enforcers. If copyright owners are so panicked
about possible acts of infringement, and so determined to reap a profit
from every use of a work, library users could be put in the position of hand
copying excerpts from a computer screen, This relegates patrons to a
"pre-photocopying" level of access of usability, which will arguably slow
scholarly output and discourage research. Nevertheless, hand-copying still
enables, however onerously and inefficiently, circumvention of copy controls, a fact content owners highlight to rebut claims that they prevent fair
357

use of their works..

355. Laurie C. Tepper, Copyright Law and Library Photocopying: An Historical
LIBR. J. 341, 350 (1992).
356. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(1) (1998) (stating that liability shall not be imposed on libraries, provided that displays are affixed announcing that copying of
material may be subject to copyright laws).
357. See, e.g., Appellate Reply Brief of Movie Industry Plaintiffs-Appellee in
MPAA v. 2600, officially Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
Feb. 28, 2001) (No. 00-9185), at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAADVD_
cases/20010228_ny-op-reply-brief.html (arguing that trafficking proscriptions do
not eliminate fair use of films delivered on DVD).
A movie released on DVD and in no other format could be the subject of
innumerable uses potentially qualifying as fair use. Its plot and characters can be imitated or spoofed; its language can be quoted; and it can be
shown on a DVD player in a classroom. Further, nothing in the DMCA,
for example, would prohibit taking a brief snapshot from a TV or video
display, that otherwise meets the statutory fair use criteria, of the content
on a DVD (which would not, to be sure, be a perfect digital copy, but that
is precisely the point of the trafficking proscriptions). In short, rigorous
enforcement of the anti-circumvention provisions would impair, at most,

Survey, 84 LAW

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss1/2

104

Bartow: Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Bo
2003]

ELECTRIFYING COPYRIGHT NoRMs

Libraries could also be contractually compelled to collect and monitor data about the use of library assets on behalf of copyright owners, or to
allow content owners to collect data and monitor usage directly. Content
owners can assert a right to perform this monitoring to track whether use
of the copyrighted work is allowed under the terms and conditions of the
pertinent license. This would compromise patron privacy, and thereby
eviscerate a core library value. 358 Contract provisions pertaining to monitoring use can be enforced by virtue of technologies with the ironic moniker "trusted systems." Such technologies would enable a content owner
real space control over how often a work was accessed, whether the user
had the ability to cut parts of the text and paste them into other texts and
how many times a work could be printed (if at all).359
the marginal quality of the image available for certain kinds of exotic fair
uses. However, § 107 of the Copyright Act does not afford a "privilege" to
make perfect digital copies of DVD movies; it merely provides a defense
in infringement actions for certain permissible uses.
Nothing in the DMCA or the First Amendment gives courts the duty
or power, in the abstract, to create a new fair use "right" to optimal copies
of a copyright owner's works, when Congress already has weighed the
competing interests and come to a different balance.
Id.; see also WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability
Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 229, 235-36
(1997) (testimony of Michael K. Kirk, executive director, American Intellectual
Property Law Ass'n); see also id. at 78-82 (1997) (statement of Jack Valenti, President and CEO, Motion Picture Ass'n of America); Associated Press, Free Speech Defense Questioned in DVD Trial, USA TODAY, May 2, 2001, at http://www.usatoday.
com/life/cyber/tech/2001-05-02-dvd-copying-suit.htm
(reporting Judge Newman's opinion that fair use doesn't necessarily apply to digital formats when other
formats such as videotape, are available); Declan McCullagh, DVD PiracyJudgesResolute, WIRED (May 1, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,
43470,00.html (noting that Judge Newman claimed fair use was still possible if
lower quality copy was made and that fair use does not require using only most
technologically modern means).
358. See, e.g., American Library Association, Statement on Core Values, ALA, at
http://www.ala.org/congress/corevalues/draft5.html (Apr. 28, 2000) (discussing
core values). The American Library Association states that the "Core Values of
Librarianship" include the:
Connection of people to ideas
Assurance of free and open access to recorded knowledge, information,
and creative works.
Commitment to literacy and learning
Respect for the individuality and the diversity of all people
Freedom for all people to form, to hold, and to express their own beliefs
Preservation of the human record
Excellence in professional service to our communities
Formation of partnerships to advance these values
Id. The statement explains that "[r]espect for the individuality and the diversity of
all people" means to "honor each request without bias and ... meet it with the
fullness of tools at our command." Id. Additionally, it entails respecting the "individual's need for privacy" and for confidentiality in their search or study. Id.
359. See, e.g., Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital
Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink DigitalPublishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137,
139 (1997) (describing basics of trusted systems).
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The Librarian of Congress and the Copyright Office were given the
opportunity by Congress to issue rules governing the access provisions of
the DMCA that established an enhanced right of fair use access to copyrighted works via unauthorized (but legal) circumvention of "trusted system" type technologies. They chose not to do so, 360 and thus monitored
access may be on its way to becoming a norm. Already "[t]he licenses for
some electronic products ask for individual accounts that can provide
tracking of each participating patron's research habits." 3 61 For example,
when law libraries assign passwords as a condition of access to electronic
databases, unless a library negotiates to protect the privacy of its patrons,
the research patterns of individuals associated with each password can be
collected and studied by these database publishers in a personally identifi362
able manner.
Even more alarmingly, content owners could try to use licensing
frameworks to regulate qualitative usage of works by placing terms in licensing agreements that prohibit public criticism or comment about the
underlying work. While some courts may be reluctant to uphold such
terms because they are in conflict with the First Amendment, if non-profit
libraries do not have the resources to challenge outrageous license terms,
they become de facto enforceable and could eventually constitute new and
arguably undemocratic norms.
Finally, licensing works is more expensive and time consuming for
libraries, meaning that ultimately libraries have fewer acquisition resources available, and can make fewer works accessible to patrons.3 63 Library staff members have to review individual licenses, perform any
monitoring required by the license and develop and manage institutional
mechanisms for license administration and compliance. 364 This is labor
and resource intensive, and potentially diverts time and energy away from
other worthy projects.

360. For a further discussion of the Copyright Office's decision not to issue
rules governing the access provision of the DMCA, see supra note 297 and accompanying text.

361. Klinefelter, supra note 341, at 187.
362. See id. (noting that at millennium, publishers were asking for contact
information of users).
363. See id. at 176 ("[T]he licensing process can become quite burdensome
and can involve entities normally outside of the print material purchasing process
.... Librarians have no choice but to redirect staff energies to licensing because
what happens at the contract level affects almost all library support efforts and
services to patrons.").

364. See, e.g., id. at 177 (describing increased responsibility of libraries in response to licensing under UCITA).
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Licensing Substitutes Breach of Contract for Torts-based Liability
Analysis

As discussed above, a copyright infringement suit is an action in
tort. 365 As such, common practice plays a role, admittedly only obliquely
at times, in judicial application of the fair use defense. For example, the
Supreme Court's ruling in Sony rested in part on the fact that "free television" was a longstanding norm. 366 In other situations, however, new
norms that threatened the profit streams of content owners were judicially
squelched. In Kinko's, an emerging norm of selling fair use "course packs"
to students was stopped in its tracks, based on the perception that course
packs prepared by photocopy shops were dislodging norms of textbook
purchasing.3 67 By the time the same issue arose in MichiganDocument Services,3 68 a new social norm was in place, one of photocopy shops in the
course pack business obtaining permissions and paying photocopy royalties to publishers.
While "practice in the industry" may have some vague applicability in
the context of gleaning the meaning of contractual terms, when works are
licensed rather than sold, for all practical purposes longstanding norms of
library usage will have no role or meaning whatsoever. Licenses that preclude any copying whatsoever of the licensed work come directly into conflict with the public policy goals of section 108 of the Copyright Act. They
are also inconsistent with the right to make section 107 fair use of the
copyrighted work, as sections 108 and 107 are intentionally designed to
make certain nonconsensual uses non-infringing, and therefore beyond
the control of the copyright holder. If publishers can "contract around"
library exceptions and fair use, the normative aspirations of the copyright
law are frustrated. 369 If libraries can be denied affordable access, 3 70 or
365. For a discussion of the treatment of copyright infringement suits as torts,
see supra notes 152-53, 170-72 and accompanying text.
366. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)
(finding that copyright holders who license television programs for free would not
object to private recordings of those programs).
367. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1534
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (showing effect on market of textbook sellers by Kinko's copy
actions).
368. Princeton U. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., 855 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Mich.
1994), affd in part and vacated in part, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
369. See Lemley, supra note 244, at 169-71 (noting conflict between contract
and copyright norms). As Lemley observed:
To be sure, not everyone is happy with the idea that public policy overrides contract. Judge Easterbrook has suggested that it should do so only
rarely, and advocates of a strong form of private ordering often suggest
that "the market" will do a better job of determining public policy than
"the law." Robert Gomulkiewicz derides this effort to balance between
policy and freedom of contract as "over-regulating" by the government.
Id.
370. For a further discussion of the denial of affordable access to libraries, see
supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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access at any price, the objective of the copyright laws are undermined
even more dramatically. Mark Lemley has observed:
[I] ntellectual property is a prime example of an area in which we
cannot simply rely on "the agreement of the parties" to choose
our public policy. This is true partially because intellectual property licenses are notoriously fallible as indicators of the "intent"
of the parties; as we proceed to remove all trace of assent from
the notion of contract, the philosophical basis for private ordering disappears as well. But the problem is more fundamental
than this. Intellectual property is a deliberate, government-sponsored departure from the principles of free competition, designed to subsidize creators and therefore to induce more
creation. This departure from the competitive model affects
37
third parties who are not participants in the contract. '
The externalities Lemley refers to will clearly impact students, scholars,
researchers and library patrons generally if the licensing of copyrighted
informational products is allowed to evolve unfettered into a full blown
social norm.
6.

Select ParadigmaticExamples of the Need For Library Use

a.

Indexes, Codes and Laws

i. indexes
In analog real space, indexes and abstracts have traditionally been
published by neutral third parties, and were therefore outside the control
of those who owned the copyrights in the underlying indexed and abstracted works.3 72 Libraries have to purchase these copyrighted indexes,
and presumably seek out the best ones available, regardless of who publishes them.
Neutral third party index compilers do not have monetary incentives
to direct index users to any particular works. Quite the contrary: efforts to
produce a high quality index would logically focus on thoroughness, accuracy and objectivity. However, the norm of neutral, independent indexes
is being obliterated by the confluence of copyright law and digitalization.
Publishers are adopting a system of digital object identifiers (DOIs) to attach to digital content so that it can be abstracted and indexed with links
to the full text of a given work. 373 This gives publishers control over access

to the indexes in addition to control over access to the digital works
themselves.
371. Lemley, supra note 244, at 169-71.
372. See Gasaway, supra note 79, at 123, 156-58 (explaining history of indexing
as being radically altered by digital object identifiers).
373. See id. at 156-57 (discussing benefits of digital object identifiers (DOIs) as
replacements for Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), which merely state location
on a server and do not specify content as DOIs do).
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This means that not even the indexes would be available to potential
users of the works, absent licensing arrangements.37 4 Publishers will increasingly control information about the existence of works and any summaries of them. 375 As a result, "scholars will not be able even to
determine whether a particular paper or article exists unless they have a
license to use the publishers' system or access through a library license
376
that provides access."
Thus, the new norm that publishers are imposing requires libraries or
library patrons to remunerate publishers for entree to the indexes and
summaries of works they own the copyrights in, creating control mechanisms and profit streams for publishers that would be unavailable absent
digitalization. A related, consequential new norm involves the mindset
with which researchers must approach "non-neutral" abstracts and indexes. If abstracts and indexes are written and compiled by publishers
who have financial stakes in which works a user chooses to access in full
text form, the scholar must approach these research tools fully cognizant
of these publishers' directive agendas, and somehow attempt to ignore or
control them.
ii.

codes and laws

When governments enact laws that have been written and copyrighted by private entities, the private entities generally claim ownership in
the copyright to the laws they have authored. 377 For example, the copyright in California's Building Code is owned by a private company that
does not allow California to post the Code on the state's website, where
most of California's laws are available to the public. Instead, one must
either purchase a copy of the Building Code, the only complete version of
which is in print and costs $738,378 or seek out a copy available for public
379
viewing at a library.
Meanwhile, the legal system depends upon assumed knowledge of the
law and legal notice. Those governed by the law are presumed to know it,
and lack of awareness of the law, or the inability to afford access to the
374. See id. at 123 (summarizing benefits and disadvantages of switching from

third party indexing to attaching DOI indexes).
375. See id. at 158 ("There will no longer be publications of abstracts and indexes by third party publishers, as the linking of DOIs among publishers will subsume this activity.").
376. Id.
377. SeeVeeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, 241 F.3d 398, 411 (5th Cir. 2001)

(holding that private entity that developed model code may maintain copyright in
it despite that code being adopted in globo as law); Kathryn Blaint, Public Laws
Owned By The Public? Think Again, Copyright Rulings Show, S.D. UNION TRIB., May
13, 2001, at Al (reporting controversy and holding in Veeck).
378. See Blaint, supra note 377 (noting that CD-ROM of code is available, but
does not include laws covering plumbing or electrical work).
379. See id. (explaining that code is available at public libraries).
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written law, is not a defense for failure to obey or conform to it.3 80 When
the operative philosophy is "ignorance of the law is no excuse," citizens
ought to have free and unfettered access to the laws that bind them, and
libraries' efforts to provide it should be encouraged and supported.
b.

Preserving Reserves

Maintaining a reserve collection of materials that are in high demand
is a practice academic libraries have been engaging in since the early
1900s.3 8 1 Reserves offer faculty members the ability to assign supplemental readings without requiring students to purchase additional books or
expensive course-packs. 38 2 Students benefit from these savings, and from
having reserve collections that are easily and broadly accessible. To simultaneously provide broad access and perhaps mitigate demand for personal
copies, however, libraries generally will have to make some copies of the
reserve works in order to meet student demand and prevent (or at least
reduce) damage to the original if it is in bound form.
If a student feels confident that she can expediently read a reserve
copy of the material assigned for a class in the library, she is unlikely to
make a personal copy of the work. However, accessing traditional "analog" ink and paper reserves requires students to be physically present in a
library, and may entail a wait for materials to become available. Often,
reserve works can only be checked out for short (two to four hour) intervals. 38- These inconveniences are exacerbated when large numbers of students put off reserve reading until the last minute, either attempting to
read assigned materials immediately before class, or shortly before an
examination.
Electronic reserves offer numerous advantages. Digital works can be
read by a large number of people simultaneously; they can be accessed
from anywhere if available through the Internet; and extensive usage does
not damage or degrade the works. The materials may be searchable, better organized and more easily edited. Use of the works may be tracked so
that faculty members can see how many students access given materials
and with what frequency (though presumably this would be aggregate
rather than personally identifiable data, as library circulation records are
generally confidential.38 4 It is also faster, cheaper and easier for students
380. See Martin, supra note 328, at 200 (recognizing standard of "assumed"
knowledge of law).
381. See Steven J. Melamut, Pursuing Fair Use, Law Libraries and Electronic
Reserves, 92 LAw LIBR.J. 157, 158 (2000) (citing Scott Seaman, Copyright andFairUse
in an Electronic Reserves System, 7J. INTERLIBR. LOAN, Doc. DELIVERY & INFO. SUPPLY
19, 19 (1996)) (giving brief introduction to resources in academic law libraries).
382. See, e.g., Melamut, supra note 381, at 158 (exalting qualities of academic
law library reserve collections).
383. See id. at 159 (detailing general limitations on reserve collection use).
384. See id. at 161 (noting that "[a]lthough aggregate data provided to faculty
members may help guide what to place in reserve in future semesters, the same
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to make personal copies of reserve works by downloading and printing
than by photocopier.
At present, serious copyright questions are raised if a library converts
print works into electronic form for the purposes of developing and maintaining electronic reserve collections. For works that are already digital in
nature, in addition to copyright concerns, the terms of any licensing
agreement between the library and/or academic institution and the publisher will be implicated as well.3 85 Some publishers will refuse to license
386
their works for electronic reserve purposes altogether.
None of the section 108 library exceptions apply to reserve copying,
so the copyright issues are evaluated in the context of section 107 fair uses.
However, publishers have argued that digital versions of a work distributed
under the guise of "library lending" compete so directly with "original copies" that there can be no fair use of them whatsoever. Attempts to work
out a compromise between libraries and publishing companies on the is38 7
sue of electronic reserves have failed so far.
confidentiality normally accorded to library circulation records is likely to protect
the records of individual students").
385. See, e.g., id. at 162 (discussing LEXIS and Westlaw software, which allow
schools to use materials online that they already have in their own reserves).
386. See Gasaway, supra note 76, at 819 (explaining difficult situation educational institutions face when publishers refuse to negotiate e-reserve licenses).
387. See Melamut, supra note 381, at 185-86 (discussing talks between libraries
and publishers concerning electronic reserves).
Beginning with a public hearing in November 1993, the Working Group
on Intellectual Property Rights of the Information Infrastructure Task
Force sought to have copyright stakeholders negotiate guidelines for the
fair use of electronic materials in nonprofit educational contexts. Before
the first meeting of the Conference on Fair Use (CONFU), which it had
convened, the working group released the preliminary draft of its report
(popularly known as the Green Paper) on July 7, 1994. In it, the working
group expressed the belief that it would be difficult and inappropriate to
apply the specific language prepared for print media to digital works and
online services. The Green Paperappeared to be calling for a reexamination of fair use, and many parties rejected it as overreaching its mandate.
At the first CONFU meeting in September 1994, working groups were
established on Intellectual Property Rights in the Electronic Environment, Distance Learning, Multimedia, Electronic Reserves, Interlibrary
Loan, and Image Collections.
The Electronic Reserves group included representatives of copyright
holders, educational institutions, and the library community. The committee discussed the issues of fair use involved in digital reserves in nonprofit educational institutions: storage, access, display, and downloading.
The negotiations reached an impasse in the fall of 1995. Some members
of the committee continued to work, however, preparing a draft proposal
entitled "Fair Use Guidelines for Electronic Reserve Systems" in March
1996. Finally, in November 1996, "at the plenary session of the Conference on Fair Use, participants concluded that there was insufficient support for the March 5, 1996 draft. CONFU participants agreed that the
March draft would not be submitted for consideration as a proposal for
CONFU fair use guidelines or included in the final CONFU report."
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Enabling Remote Access Libraries

Evidence suggests that people will continue to venture out to real
space libraries even if remote access to electronic collections is available.38 8 According to one academic librarian:
There are more public libraries in the United States than McDonald's restaurants. Americans make 3.5 billion visits to school,
public and college or university libraries every year-three times
more than visits to the movies. Children and young adults go to
school libraries 1.7 billion times during the school year-two
389
times more visits than to state and national parks.
Libraries often function as community centers, and the increasing use of
computers as communication tools may make the real space meeting
places that libraries provide more important than ever. However, anyone
who has geographic or temporal impediments to visiting real space libraries would benefit from being able to access library collections through
cyberspace, and many other people would simply value the convenience.
At present, however, libraries are unable to serve patrons via the Internet as they do in person, and copyright laws pose some of the barriers
that will prevent them from doing so in the future. The Library of Congress has so far put five million historical items online as part of its Ameri-

can Memory Project, carefully choosing mostly works that were not
copyrighted, or in which the copyright has expired, though some copyrighted works (those for which permission to digitize could be obtained
from copyright owners) were also included. 390 Given the lengthy duration
of copyrights, one can expect routine time lags of 100 years or more
before modern creative and informational works can become part of the

online "American Memory."3'9

Despite being curtailed by copyright con-

siderations, however, the American Memory website has been enormously

popular, receiving (as of January 2001) 18 million page views per month,
388. See Dean E. Murphy, Queens Library Moves Past "Shh" (and Books), N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2001, Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/O3/O7/nyregion/07LIBR.htmI (describing innovative ways of keeping Queens borough libraries modern, resulting in more than 500,000 people participating in 30,000
programs at libraries in Queens, NY last year); see also id. (noting that North Shore
Library System near Chicago has seen resurgence in library usage, despite prevalence of home computers).

389. Wayne Weigand, LibrariansIgnore the Value of Stories, CHRON.

OF HIGHER

EDUC., Oct. 27, 2000, at B20; see also Gasaway, supra note 79, at 126 (citing Wayne
A. Weigand, The Structure of Librarianship:Essay on an Information Profession, Samual
Lazerow Memorial Lecture at Florida State University (November 23, 1998) (forthcoming, 2003)) ("In mid-1998, a Gallup poll showed that 67% of Americans visited
a public library within the last year, 54% checked out a book, and 21% checked
out other materials, like a CD or a video.").
390. See Kendra Mayfield, Library of Congress Goes Digital, WIRED (Jan. 19,
2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41166,00.html (noting efforts
to digitalize items with mass-market appeal).
391. http://memory.loc.gov
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while the website of the Library of Congress receives 80 million page views
3 92
each month.
Similarly, the School of Information at the University of Michigan
hosts the Internet Public Library, described as "the first public library on
the Internet," 3 93 but its collections are limited to "any online text that

resembles a traditional non-online text, and is available in its entirety for
free."3 9 4 Excluded is anything covered by copyright for which free permission cannot be obtained, which rules out almost everything published after 1923 and even works not covered by copyrights that have not been
3 95
converted from print to digital form.
Meanwhile, the National Science Foundation, in conjunction with
teams of computer scientists and librarians from several major research
universities, is constructing a National Science Digital Library to enable
users to browse digital resources from libraries around the country. 396 It
is intended to be "one library with many portals" that enables searches
through numerous digital library collections in science, mathematics, engineering and technology education from a centralized site. 39 7 However,
copyright concerns are greatly complicating this undertaking, which
would benefit greatly from an appropriate Library Use doctrine and the
lowered transaction costs that the associative clear rules would make possible. Unless the legal regime governing rights in digital works is reconfigured to support online library lending as an expressly chosen social
priority, remote access libraries will never reach their full potential.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental notion that has been proposed here is that iterated
widespread past practices keyed to particular uses of works available in inkand-paper form could provide a sound basis for normative paradigms for
the fair use, and (more specifically) Library Use of digital materials in
analogous electronic contexts. These real space use norms could be easily
adapted to digital formats, and codified with a high degree of specificity to
insure permanent, consistent and predictable levels of access to electronic
materials.
392. See id.

393. AMERICAN BAR AssociATiON, Reference Materials Online, at http://www.aba
net.org/lpm/bestpractices/articles/bparticlel1754_front.shtml (last visited July
30, 2002).
394. THE INTERNET PUBLIC LIBRARY, Books Help & Frequently Asked Questions, at

http://www.ipl.org/reading/books/help.html (last visited July 30, 2002).
395. See id. (answering the frequently asked questions "[wihy can't Ifind a book
by my favorite author? Why can't I find a specific book?").
396. See Katie Dean, This Library's "Born Digital", WIRED (June 18, 2001), at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,44554,00.html (describing Natural Science Foundation's desire to open educational opportunities to variety of
individuals).
397. See id. (noting functions available on National Science Digital Library).
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Copyright law has long been driven by pragmatism rather than morality. When large content owners or government representatives hypocritically pretend otherwise, they only undermine their own self-serving
attempts to foster "copyright respect" as an ethical imperative. A copyright-respectful social norm will not be "enforced" unless there is a general
consensus about the norm among copyright consumers.3 98 Codifying a
normative framework for copyright use behavior by individuals could reduce uncertainty and lead to enhanced compliance with copyright laws,
but only if the copyright laws on which it is premised reasonably comport
with ordinary understandings and widespread norms of copyright use.
Because copyright owners can exert more control over copyrighted
works in digital formats, requiring them to provide ink and paper levels of
access would somewhat diminish their ability to maximally control and exploit their copyrights. The idea of codifying real space copyright use
norms cannot be implemented unless these norms can be distilled from
consistent and widespread past practices such that they are virtually undeniable and irrefutable, because they flow from constructions of fair use
and related doctrines that copyright holders will find objectionable and
indeed have battled vigorously to narrow or eliminate. The fairness and
legitimacy of these norms as they are reconfigured into laws is imperative
to their acceptance and ultimate success in achieving the objectives of preserving access.
Providing the end users of creative works with some consistency of
access could also lead to emergence of more societal respect for copyrights, which would be very beneficial to content owners in the long term.
If, in the norms of real space, experiential access is preserved and
respected in the electronic environment, certain precepts of copyright law
may attain enhanced legitimacy and adherence, and social norms of making authorized rentals or purchases may be imported into the digital world
as well. A shared acceptance of the lines between fair use and infringement could then emerge between copyright owners and copyright
consumers.
It is important to note that making it easier to comply with the law
does not guarantee improved compliance. 399 If the expressive powers of
copyrights law can be improved, however, the response may be that blatantly infringing copyright use behaviors are reduced without the need for
increased attempts at legal coercion. Individuals may very well live up or
down to the copyright laws' perceived expectations of them.
Finally, whether the approach suggested by this Article or another is
attempted, action needs to be taken quickly. The closer that large content
owners come to obtaining the holy grail of absolute power over their copy398. See, e.g., Chong, supra note 82, at 2079 ("Social norms depend for their
enforcement on widespread recognition within one's social group that a general
consensus exists around the norm.").
399. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 74, at 125-27 (arguing for simplification
of copyright laws).
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righted content, the less willing they will be to relinquish any semblance of
control. Among other consequences of limitless and unconditional copyrights, the information flowing fluidly through the "fountains of fair use"
that non-profit libraries represent will quickly evaporate.
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